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Abstract
BAS¸AK ALTAN: Essays in Durable Goods Monopolies.
(Under the direction of Gary Biglaiser.)
This study analyzes a vertically differentiated market for an imperfectly durable good
served by a monopolist in an infinite horizon, discrete time game. I characterize Markov perfect
equilibria of this game as a function of the common discount rate, the common depreciation
rate of the goods, the length of the time period between successive price changes, and the
quality levels of the goods. I establish that quality differentiation may alleviate the time
inconsistency problem of a durable goods monopolist. In particular, I prove that when the
monopolist is not allowed to buy the goods back from previous buyers, the set of parameters
supporting the monopoly outcome is larger and the set of parameters supporting the Coase
Conjecture is smaller. When the monopolist, however, is allowed to buy the goods back from
previous buyers, quality differentiation only affects the off-equilibrium path either by increasing
the rate at which a steady state is reached or by expanding the set of steady states supporting
the monopoly outcome. This study suggests that when the innate durability of a good is high,
the monopolist must commit to not buying the used goods back and produce a lower quality
good to maintain his market power.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Durable goods markets have received much attention since Coase (1972) argued that a durable
goods monopolist cannot exercise his monopoly power when the good is perfectly durable.
Upon sale of a unit, the monopolist has incentives to sell more by lowering the price of the
good. Thus, a rational consumer, anticipating that the monopolist will cut the price as long
as it is no less than the marginal cost of the good, prefers deferring consumption so long as the
price is not close to the competitive level. Hence, in the absence of the ability to commit to
the future prices, the monopoly power of a durable goods monopolist is largely deteriorated,
and the monopolist is unable to extract as much consumer surplus as a monopolist selling a
perishable good could. Moreover, when the monopolist becomes extremely flexible in adjusting
prices, market power vanishes and the competitive outcome is immediately achieved.
The existing theories on durable goods monopolies support the Coase Conjecture by es-
tablishing that in Markov perfect equilibria, a durable goods monopolist cannot exercise his
market power.1 Casual empirical evidence, however, suggests that durable goods monopolists
charge prices much higher than the marginal cost of production and make considerable profits
(e.g. Microsoft, Apple, etc.).
This dissertation studies an unexplored motive, the role of quality differentiation, for solv-
ing the commitment problem a durable goods monopolist faces. I consider a market for an
imperfectly durable good served by a monopolist in an infinite horizon, discrete time game. In
1See Bulow (1982), Stokey (1981), Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson (1986), and Sobel (1991).
each period, the monopolist can sell two versions, high and low quality, of the durable good
that depreciate stochastically. I analyze whether the simultaneous introduction of vertically
differentiated goods enables the monopolist to maintain his market power and to credibly
commit to deferring sales to low valuation consumers.
In an interesting study, Deneckere and McAfee (1996) analyze damaged goods in a static
market and show that manufacturers may intentionally damage a portion of their goods in order
to price discriminate. For example, Intel first produced a fully functioning 486DX processor,
then by disabling the math coprocessor produced the 486SX that is inferior to the 486DX.
Even though the 486SX was more expensive to produce, the price of the 486SX was lower.
In addition to price discrimination, Intel might use the 486SX to maintain his market power.
Because, Intel might credibly defer sales of the 486DX to low valuation consumers by selling
the 486SX to low valuation consumers instead. The issue that the current study investigates is
whether a monopolist will damage a portion of the goods and produce a lower quality version
of it in an attempt to mitigate the commitment problem and enhance his market power.
Earlier studies on durable goods monopolies suggest that there are many responses a
durable goods monopolist can adopt to restore the profitability, such as reducing the dura-
bility of the good (Coase, 1972), leasing (Bulow, 1986), contractual provisions (Butz, 1990),
or using an inferior high cost technology (Karp and Perloff, 1996). Such responses, however,
are not extensively observed in several durable goods markets. This implies that the commit-
ment problem that Coase conjectures does not decrease profits of durable goods monopolists
as much as theory claims. Deneckere and Liang (2008) provide an answer for why casual
empirical evidence may contradict with Coase’s insight by establishing that a durable goods
monopolist can commit to high future prices when the good is sufficiently perishable.
Recent studies extend the seminal analyses on durable goods monopolies by considering
new product introductions. By offering new products for sale the monopolist seller can increase
the economic depreciation of the initial version of the good and regain his profitability.2 Even
though we have a clearer understanding of why the Coase Conjecture may not hold, our exact
2See Levinthal and Purohit (1989), Waldman (1993, 1996), Choi (1994), Fudenberg and Tirole (1998), Lee
and Lee (1998), Fishman and Rob (2000), Kumar (2002, 2006), and Anton and Biglaiser (2009).
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understanding of Coase’s insight remains incomplete, since a glance at durable goods markets
suggests that many durable goods are characterized by menus of multiple quality levels and
prices: Dell’s Inspiron laptop vs its XPS laptop, Mathematica’s student version vs its full
version, hardcover textbooks vs paperback textbooks, etc.
From a theoretical point of view, this study follows Deneckere and Liang (2008). I extend
their single good setting into a setting of a vertically differentiated market to analyze the ef-
fect of quality differentiation on the commitment problem a durable goods monopolist faces.
Similar to Deneckere and Liang (2008), I establish that there exist three types of Markov per-
fect equilibria: a Coase Conjecture equilibrium, a monopoly equilibrium, and a reputational
equilibrium. For sufficiently low depreciation rates, the unique equilibrium is the Coase Con-
jecture equilibrium. The Coase Conjecture equilibrium has a unique steady state equal to the
competitive quantity. At the steady state, the monopolist serves the high quality good to all
consumers. For sufficiently high depreciation rates, the unique equilibrium is the monopoly
equilibrium. The intuition is that when the durable good is sufficiently perishable, replace-
ment sales at high prices compensate the desire to penetrate the market further by lowering
the price of at least one of these two versions of the durable good. This equilibrium has two
monopoly steady states one of which is equal to the static monopoly quantity. At this steady
state, the monopolist only serves the high quality good to the high type consumers. The
market at the other monopoly steady state is segmented into two: the monopolist serves the
high quality good to the high type consumers and serves the low quality good to the low type
consumers. Upon deviation from a monopoly steady state, if the good is sufficiently perishable,
the monopolist returns to one of these two steady states from any state. Otherwise, the Coase
Conjecture steady state coexists with the monopoly steady states. For intermediate values of
the depreciation rate, all three types of equilibria exist. In the reputational equilibrium, the
monopolist cuts the production of the high quality good to create a reputation of pricing high.
The steady state quantity of the high quality good falls short of the monopoly quantity of the
high quality good.
When buyers are allowed to trade the good with each other in a perfectly competitive
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second-hand market that the monopolist is not allowed to enter, I prove that the set of pa-
rameters supporting the Coase Conjecture equilibrium is smaller and the set of the parameters
supporting the monopoly equilibrium is larger when the monopolist produces low and high
quality goods. When the monopolist is, however, allowed to buy back the goods from previ-
ous buyers, I prove that quality differentiation does not affect the domain of the parameters
supporting each type of equilibrium but affects the off-equilibrium path.
This dissertation establishes that when the monopolist is not allowed to buy back the goods
from previous buyers, quality differentiation may enhance market power of a durable goods
monopolist and alleviate the commitment problem. In particular, when the innate durability
of a good is high, to credibly commit to the monopoly prices of the good the monopolist will
produce a lower quality good either by damaging a portion of the goods or by producing the
lower quality good from scratch. On the other hand, when the monopolist is allowed to buy
back the goods from previous buyers, if the innate durability of a good is sufficiently high, it is
less likely to observe quality differentiation. In particular, if the depreciation rate is so low that
the Coase Conjecture equilibrium is the unique equilibrium then the monopolist is reluctant
to introduce lower quality versions of the good. Moreover, a durable goods monopolist selling
a sufficiently perishable good has penetrated the market in an attempt to increase profit, then
he may introduce a higher (or a lower) quality version of the good to be able to restore his
market power. However, if the monopolist has already been committed to the monopoly price,
he will be reluctant to introduce a lower quality version of the good.
The rest of my dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the literature. Chapter
3 introduces the model. Chapter 4 characterizes equilibria in a durable goods monopoly when
buyers can trade with each other in a perfectly competitive second-hand market. Chapter 5
characterizes equilibria in a durable goods monopoly when the seller can buy back the goods
from previous buyers. Chapter 6 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
The time inconsistency problem a durable goods monopolist faces has been aggressively
studied since Coase (1972) conjectured that the sequence of prices (or outputs) of a monopolist
selling a perfectly durable good does not maximize his overall profitability. The goal of this
section is to briefly survey the literature in an effort to understand the theory of durable goods
monopolies and to place this study in the appropriate context.1
Early studies analyzing a monopolist selling a perfectly durable good establish that if
buyers condition their strategies on payoff relevant part of the histories (that is, if buyers use
Markov strategies), Coase’s prediction holds. Bulow (1982) studies a durable goods monopolist
in a two period model and shows that the optimum price charged by the monopolist is strictly
less than the static monopoly price. Intuitively, unless the monopolist credibly precommit to
a production plan, consumers anticipate that the monopolist will produce additional units to
exploit residual demand which decreases the present value of the durable good. Therefore,
since consumers are reluctant to pay the static monopoly price in the first period, in response
to the expectations of the consumers the monopolist cuts the price of the durable good. Stokey
(1981) extends Bulow’s (1982) setting into an infinite horizon setting and proves the existence
of an equilibrium that is the limit of the unique equilibrium of the finite version of her model
which satisfies the Coase Conjecture. Similarly, Gul, Sonnenschein, and Wilson (1986) show
that even though a continuum of subgame perfect equilibria may exist in an infinite horizon
1See Waldman (2003) for a detailed literature survey on durable goods monopolies.
model, the Coase Conjecture is verified for Markov strategies. Sobel (1991) extends these
initial analyses by considering a market for a perfectly durable good in which demand expands
over time. His study also verifies Coase’s prediction for Markov strategies. Intuitively, if the
monopolist charges the static monopoly price forever, as new consumers enter the market the
number of low valuation consumers grows cutting the price then becomes inevitable.
On the contrary to the early studies, Ausubel and Deneckere (1989) show that if buyers
condition their strategies on not only payoff relevant part of the histories but the past actions
as well, there exist equilibria in which the monopolist creates a reputation and maintains some
or all of his market power when the marginal cost of production is no less than the lowest
valuation of the buyers. In addition to establishing a reputation, depreciation of a durable
good can also help a durable goods monopolist avoid the time inconsistency problem. Bond
and Samuelson (1984) show that in a discrete time, infinite horizon game when the good
depreciates, replacement sales may deter the monopolist from cutting the price as long as the
time period between successive offers of the monopolist is nonzero. However, in the limit, as the
time period approaches zero, the competitive outcome is achieved and the Coase Conjecture
holds. Karp (1996), on the other hand, by using a continuous time model with replacement
sales constructs continuous time equilibria in which the monopolist can earn profits above the
competitive level. However, Karp (1996) also shows the existence of an equilibrium that verifies
the Coase Conjecture. Following Karp (1996), Deneckere and Liang (2008) characterize the
effect of the depreciation rate on the market outcome of a durable goods monopoly when agents
use Markov strategies. They conclude that below a certain level of durability, there exists a
unique stationary equilibrium in which the monopolist charges the static monopoly price in
each period which continues to exist even when the seller becomes highly impatient. Intuitively,
when the product depreciates, replacement sales become more profitable than penetrating the
market by cutting the price of the good.
A number of recent studies on durable goods monopolies revolves around the issue of intro-
duction of new products with quality improvements. Levinthal and Purohit (1989), Fudenberg
and Tirole (1998), and Lee and Lee (1998) study optimal sales strategy of a durable goods
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monopolist who may introduce an improved version of the good in a two period model. Wald-
man (1993, 1996), Choi (1994), Fishman and Rob (2000), and Kumar (2002) study the quality
and pricing strategy of a durable goods monopolist. These studies develop the idea of planned
obsolescence and established that Coase’s insight holds. Intuitively, introduction of higher
quality products lower the value of used units. Since consumers foresee that the units they
have will become obsolete, they refuse to pay the static monopoly price of the good. Hence,
the monopolist faces a problem of time inconsistency and the overall profitability is reduced.
Kumar (2006) analyzes a discrete time, infinite horizon model in which the monopolist selling
a perfectly durable good can vary the quality of the good and shows that when lowest buyer
valuation is greater than the marginal cost of production every subgame perfect equilibrium
verifies the Coase Conjecture. Anton and Biglaiser (2009) study an exogenous quality growth
in an infinite horizon durable goods monopoly model. They show that, for any positive dis-
count factor, the support of Markov perfect equilibrium payoffs ranges from getting all the
surplus to getting the single period flow value of each upgrade. Takeyama (2002) studies
quality differentiation of a perfectly durable good and the possibility of upgrades in a two
period model. Inderst (2008), on the other hand, studies optimal strategy of a durable goods
monopolist who can offer perfectly durable goods in different qualities in an infinite horizon
model and shows that when the monopolist becomes extremely flexible in adjusting the prices
and qualities, he immediately loses his monopoly power and competitive outcome is achieved.
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Chapter 3
The Model
Consider a market for an indivisible and imperfectly durable good. The market is served
by a monopolist who can produce two versions of the durable good that differ in quality: high
quality and low quality goods with quality levels qH and qL, respectively. The durable good
with quality level qi may be referred as durable good i. The monopolist offers both versions
of the durable good for sale simultaneously at discrete points in time. The monopolist is risk
neutral and has discount rate r. The objective of the monopolist is to maximize the present
value of his expected profits.
There exists a continuum of infinitely-lived buyers indexed by b ∈ [0, 1]. Buyers are seg-
mented into two groups: high valuation buyers and low valuation buyers. Buyer b′s reservation
price for acquiring one unit of durable good i is represented by
f i (b) =
 θqi for b ∈ [0, b̂]θqi for b ∈ (̂b, 1] .
All buyers are risk neutral and have the same discount rate r. Buyer b derives a net surplus
of e−rt(f i(b)− pi) if she purchases durable good i at price pi at time t. Each buyer wishes to
possess at most one unit of the durable good.1 A buyer is allowed to access the markets as
often as she wishes and seeks to maximize the present value of her expected payoffs.
1We may assume that the storage costs of the second unit is infinite.
The length of the time period between successive price changes is z > 0. Both versions
of the durable good depreciate stochastically at the same rate. The probability that a good
is still working after a length of time t is e−λt. Hence, with probability µ ≡ 1 − e−λz, the
good fails between successive price changes. For all versions of the good, the marginal cost of
production is assumed to be lower than θ(qH − qL). Hence, without loss of generality, it is set
to zero.
In Chapter 4, we assume that there exists a perfectly competitive second-hand market in
which buyers can trade with each other. In Chapter 5, however, we assume that the monopolist
can buy back the goods from previous buyers. Sales occur only at discrete points in time,
t = 0, z, 2z, . . . , nz, . . . in all markets. The time nz is referred as period n. In each period, the
game runs as follows. First, the monopolist sets the price of each version of the good before
trade occurs. Then, buyers choose whether or not to hold a good and which version to hold,
and trade occurs in all markets simultaneously. After a time interval of z passes, the game
repeats itself.
Markov perfect equilibria of this game in which agent strategies only depend on the current
state are sought to derive. A strategy of the monopolist specifies the price he charges for each
version of the good, and a strategy of a buyer specifies whether or not to hold a durable good
and which version to hold. Formally, the game is denoted by G(z, r, λ, qH , qL). Let σ be a pure
strategy for the monopolist where σ determines the price charged for each version of the good
by the monopolist in a period as a function of the prices charged in the previous period and the
actions chosen by the buyers in the previous period. Let the set of buyers’ acceptances of good
i in a period be denoted by Qi. Since either there exists an active perfectly competitive second-
hand market or the monopolist is allowed to buy back, strategies of a buyer are independent of
her holding status and depend only on the current prices.2 A buyer’s strategy in such equilibria
is described by acceptance functions, V H(·) and V L(·), where buyer b chooses to hold good i
2If there were no perfectly competitive second-hand market, the strategies of the monopolist would depend
on the distribution of the current holdings of each version of the good rather than the size of the current stock
of goods, and the strategies of a buyer would depend on not only the current prices, but the current holding
status as well.
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in the current period if and only if the current price of good i satisfies pi ≤ V i(b).3 Hence, the
set of buyers holding good i after trade is an interval of the form [0, bH ] for the high quality
good and (bH , bL] for the low quality good. It follows that σ can be represented as a function
of the current stock of goods in the market. Hence, the prices of the monopolist in a period are
determined by σ : Ω × Ω → R2+ where Ω is the Borel sigma algebra on [0, 1]. A strategy of a
buyer with valuation parameter θ ∈ {θ, θ} is denoted by τθ where τθ : R2+ → {0, 1, 2}. Decision
0 indicates that the buyer chooses not to hold any good in the current period. Decision 1
indicates that the buyer chooses to hold the low quality good in the current period. Decision
2 indicates that the buyer chooses to hold the high quality good in the current period. The
pure strategy profile {σ, τ} generates a stationary path of prices and sales that can be derived
recursively. The monopolist is also allowed to mix. Later, however, it is established that the
monopolist never randomizes in any period of the game unless it is the initial period. As
in Gul, Sonnenschein, and Wilson (1986), the attention is restricted to equilibria in which
deviations by sets of measure zero buyers change neither the actions of the monopolist nor the
actions of the other buyers. Hence, in such equilibria buyers behave as price takers. From now
on, I refer to Markov perfect equilibrium simply as equilibrium.
3If there exists b such that pH ≤ V H (b) and pL ≤ V L ( b) then b accepts the offer that gives her the highest
payoff.
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Chapter 4
Perfectly Competitive Second-hand Market
In this chapter, we study vertical product differentiation in a durable goods market with
a perfectly competitive second-hand market. Buyers are allowed to trade the good with each
other in the second-hand market. The monopolist, however, is not allowed to enter this
market.1
4.1 Characterization of Dynamic Optimization
In this section, first, we represent the dynamic optimization problems of the buyers and the
monopolist. Then, we discuss the characteristics of equilibrium strategies of the monopolist.
The acceptance function V i (b) must be consistent with buyer b’s intertemporal optimiza-
tion which requires buyer b to be indifferent between purchasing the good today at the price
V i (b) and waiting one period to purchase it. Hence, V i (b) is derived from
f i (b) − V i (b) = ρ(f i (b) − p´i) (4.1)
where ρ ≡ δ(1 − µ) and p´i is the expected price of good i in the next period. Since f i(·)
is monotone and deviations of measure zero buyers do not affect the equilibrium, V i (·) is a
non-increasing left-continuous function.
Let xi denote the stock of the durable good i before trade and yi denote the stock of the
1All proofs of this section are relegated to the Appendix A.
durable good i after trade. The value function of the monopolist is R(xH , xL) and must satisfy
R (x) = max
yi∈[xi,1]
{
PH (y)
(
yH − xH)+ PL(y)(yL − xL) + δR ((1− µ) y)} (4.2)
where δ ≡ e−rz is the discount factor and P i(·) is the price of durable good i. The price
of the high quality good must be consistent with the incentive compatibility constraint of
the marginal buyer of the high quality good, and the price of the low quality good must be
consistent with the participation constraint of the marginal buyer of the low quality good.
Hence, when the stock of the goods after trade is (yH , yL), the price of the high quality good
is
PH (y) = V H
(
yH
)− V L (yH)+ PL (y) , (4.3)
and the price of the low quality good is
PL (y) = V L(yH + yL) (4.4)
where V L(yH)− PL(y) is the payoff of buyer yH if she purchases the low quality good at the
price PL (y).
Let T (·) denote the argmax correspondence of the objective function. By the generalized
theorem of the maximum and the contraction mapping theorem, there exists a unique contin-
uous function R(·), and T (·) is a non-empty and compact valued correspondence.2 Moreover,
the supermodularity of the objective function implies that T (·) is non-decreasing. It follows
that there exists at most countable number of points for which T (·) is multi-valued. Even
though the monopolist is allowed to use behavioral strategies, we establish that
Proposition 1. The monopolist does not randomize along any equilibrium path and chooses
the minimum of the argmax correspondence with probability one unless it is the initial period.
Therefore, given a state (xH , xL), the equilibrium output choice of the monopolist is t(x) =
minT (x). Moreover, the output function, ti(·) : [0, 1− µ]× [0, 1− µ]→ R+, is nondecreasing
2See Ausubel and Deneckere (1989) for the generalized theorem of the maximum.
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since T (x) is a monotone correspondence.
An equilibrium is represented by {PH(·), PL(·), tH(·), tL(·), R(·)}. The structure of a sta-
tionary path is as follows. In the initial period, the monopolist selects prices: PH(y0) and
PL(y0). All buyers b ≤ yH0 purchase the high quality good and all buyers yH0 < b ≤ yH0 + yL0
purchase the low quality good.3 At the beginning of the next period, the stock of the high
quality good is xH1 = (1 − µ)yH0 and the stock of the low quality good is xL1 = (1 − µ)yL0 .
The monopolist selects prices, PH(y1) = P
H(t(x1)) and P
L(y1) = P
L(t(x1)), and all buyers
b ≤ yH1 choose to hold the high quality good and all buyers yH1 < b ≤ yH1 + yL1 choose to hold
the low quality good. This continues until a steady state is reached. Once a steady state is
reached, the monopolist continues by selling to replacement demands.
In order to construct equilibria of this game, the solution method introduced by Deneckere
and Liang (2008) is followed. First, we prove the existence of a steady state in any equilibrium.
Then, we characterize all possible steady states. Finally, we derive all stationary paths that
reach a steady state by using backward induction from the steady state.
The analysis of this study focuses on the nontrivial case where b̂ θ > θ. Otherwise, the
static monopoly prices would be θqH and θqL.
4 Since a durable goods monopolist who does
not have any commitment power can achieve this outcome, the unique stationary steady state
of this game when b̂θ < θ is the static monopoly outcome.5
4.2 Characterization of Steady States
In this section, first, we establish the existence of a steady state in any equilibrium. Then,
we characterize all possible steady states that may coexist.
Let a steady state (yHs , y
L
s ) be defined as the stock levels of durable goods satisfying t
H((1−
µ)ys) = y
H
s and t
L((1 − µ)ys) = yLs . We establish that any equilibrium has a corresponding
3If T (0, 0) is multi-valued, the monopolist may select the price randomly from P (T (0, 0)).
4Indeed, any price for the low quality good would be an equilibrium price as long as all buyers purchase the
high quality good.
5For the hairline case b̂θ = θ, one can use the limit of b̂θ > θ.
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steady state.
Proposition 2. Any equilibrium has at least one steady state, and the steady state prices
satisfy PH
(
yHs , y
L
s
)
= fH
(
yHs
)− fL (yHs )+ fL (yHs + yLs ) and PL (yHs , yLs ) = fL (yHs + yLs ).
The economic intuition behind the steady state prices is as follows. At a steady state
(yHs , y
L
s ), the marginal buyer of the high quality good is y
H
s and the marginal buyer of the
low quality good is yHs + y
L
s in each period. Buyer y
H
s + y
L
s is indifferent between today’s and
tomorrow’s offer for the low quality good when the price of the low quality good is fL(yHs +y
L
s ).
Similarly, buyer yHs is indifferent between today’s and tomorrow’s offer for the high quality good
when the price of the high quality good is fH(yHs ). However, when the price of the low quality
good is fL
(
yHs + y
L
s
)
, buyer yHs ’s net surplus from the low quality good is f
L(yHs )−fL(yHs +yLs ).
Hence, in order to sell the high quality good to buyer yH , the monopolist has to leave an
information rent no less than fL(yHs ) − fL(yHs + yLs ) to the high type buyers. Therefore, at
the steady state, the price of the high quality good is fH(yHs ) − fL(yHs ) + fL(yHs + yLs ) and
the price of the low quality good is fL(yHs + y
L
s ).
Let us consider a market for a perfectly durable good served by a monopolist. The monopo-
list cannot credibly commit to a static monopoly output since he has an irresistible temptation
to cut the price to sell the good to the remaining buyers. Thus, in this setting, the static
monopoly output would never be a steady state. Deneckere and Liang (2008) point out that
when the good depreciates the monopolist may prefer serving to the replacement demand of
the high type buyers at a higher price rather than cutting the price in an attempt to increase
sales. They show that there exist three types of steady states: a Coase Conjecture, a monopoly,
and a reputational steady state.
When a monopolist produces two versions of a durable good, there exist five possible steady
states: (1, 0), (̂b, 0), (̂b, 1− b̂), (yˆH , 0), and (yˇH , 1− yˇH) where yˆH , yˇH ∈ (0, b̂). At the steady
state (1, 0), all buyers hold the high quality good after trade and the monopolist serves their
replacement demand in each period. This steady state is called the Coase Conjecture steady
state and the equilibrium having (1, 0) as the unique steady state is called the Coase Conjecture
equilibrium. At the steady state (̂b, 0), all high type buyers hold the high quality good after
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trade and the monopolist sells to the replacement demand of the high type buyers for the high
quality good in each period. At the steady state (̂b, 1− b̂), all high type buyers hold the high
quality good and all low type buyers hold the low quality good after trade, and the monopolist
serves the replacement demands in each period. In the one-period version of this game, due
to the assumption that b̂θ > θ, the monopolist sells the high quality good to the high type
buyers at the price θqH and sets the price of the low quality good high enough so that none of
the buyers purchase it. Hence, (̂b, 0) is called the static monopoly steady state and (̂b, 1− b̂) is
called the segmented monopoly steady state. The static monopoly steady state always coexists
with the segmented monopoly steady state. Depending on the magnitude of µ, the Coase
Conjecture steady state (1, 0) may coexist with the monopoly steady states. The equilibrium
with a monopoly steady state is called the monopoly equilibrium. Finally, the states (yˆH , 0)
and (yˇH , 1 − yˇH) are called reputational steady states and the equilibrium corresponds with
them is called the reputational equilibrium. At a reputational steady state, the monopolist
limits the production of the high quality good and sells it to some of the high type buyers.
The Coase Conjecture steady state (1, 0) always coexist with the reputational steady states.
These results are summarized by
Proposition 3. Let S denote the set of steady states. In any equilibrium one of the followings
holds:
1. S = {(1, 0)};
2. S = {(̂b, 1− b̂), (̂b, 0)} or S = {(̂b, 1− b̂), (̂b, 0), (1, 0)} or S = {(̂b, 1− b̂), (1, 0)};
3. S = {(yˆH , 0), (yˆH , 1− yˆH), (1, 0)} or S = {(yˇH , 1− yˇH), (1, 0)} where yˇH , yˆH ∈ (0, b̂).
The intuition behind Proposition 3 comes from the following two observation. First, given
the expectations of the buyers, some states cannot be a steady state as the monopolist can
profitably deviate from these states. Second, since the number of the steps in f i is two, if the
marginal buyer of the high quality good is a high type then the marginal buyer of the low
quality good can be either a high type or a low type, whereas if the marginal buyer of the
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high quality good is a low type, then the marginal buyer of the low quality good must be a
low type as well. Hence, at most three steady states can coexist in an equilibrium.
4.3 Characterization of Equilibria
In this section, we derive all possible equilibria and establish that the equilibrium of each
type is unique. Moreover, we analyze the effects of quality differentiation on each type of
equilibrium.
4.3.1 The Coase Conjecture Equilibrium
Consider equilibria with a unique steady state at which all buyers, after trade, hold the high
quality good. By conducting backward induction from the Coase Conjecture steady states, we
construct the stationary paths for all (xH , xL).
First, we describe stationary paths when stock of the high quality good is greater than
(1 − µ)̂b. Since the stock of the high quality good has to increase in each period in such
equilibria, when xH > (1 − µ)̂b, the marginal buyers are low types thereafter. The low type
buyers, anticipating that the monopolist will saturate the entire market with the high quality
good, do not accept any price greater than θqi for durable good i.
6 Hence, in this case the
stationary paths are defined as follows. When none of the buyers hold the low quality good,
the monopolist sets the price of the high quality good as θqH and the price of the low quality
good as θqL. All buyers hold the high quality good after trade and the monopolist continues by
selling the high quality good to the replacement demand µ at the price θqH thereafter. When
some buyers hold the low quality good, if the stock of the low quality good is low enough, the
monopolist prefers selling the high quality good to buyers who do not currently hold any good.
Hence, the monopolist sets the price of the high quality good as θqH and the price of the low
quality good as θqL and continues by selling the high quality good to the replacement demand
6If buyer b ∈ (̂b, 1] is willing to pay more than θqi for durable good i, so is buyer b ∈ (̂b, b̂ + ε), since V i(.)
is non-increasing. This implies that b is expecting to make a capital gain by purchasing it. Namely, buyer b
expects that the price of good i will increase next period. However, since neither (̂b, 1− b̂) nor (̂b, 0) is a steady
state, this is not possible.
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µ at the price θqH . However, if the stock of the low quality good falls above this threshold, the
monopolist prefers selling the high quality good to all buyers. Due to an excess supply of the
low quality good in the second-hand market, the low quality good will be available for free.
Hence, the monopolist sets the price of the high quality good as θ(qH − qL).7 All buyers hold
the high quality good after trade, and the monopolist continues by selling the high quality
good to the replacement demand µ at the price θ∆q.
Second, we describe the stationary paths when stock of the high quality good is less
than (1 − µ)̂b. There exist four paths depending on the state of the low quality good.
On path 1, none of the buyers hold the low quality good. On path 2, the marginal buyer
of the low quality good is a high type. On path 3, the marginal buyer of the low qual-
ity good is a low type. On path 4, there exists an excess supply of the low quality good.
The sequence of states {(xHk,j , xLk,j)}mj+1k=2 for each path j = 1, . . . , 4 is constructed such that
when the state is (xHk,j , x
L
k,j), the monopolist is indifferent between bringing the next period’s
state to (xHk−1,j , x
L
k−1,j) by charging (p
H
k−1,j , p
L
k−1,j) and bringing the next period’s state to
(xHk−2,j , x
L
k−2,j) by charging (p
H
k−2,j , p
L
k−2,j). The sequence {(pHk,j , pLk,j)}mj+1k=0 is set such that
the incentive compatibility constraint of the marginal buyer of the high quality (4.3) and the
participation constraint of the marginal buyer of the low quality good (4.4) hold.
Figure 1 illustrates how states move towards the Coase Conjecture steady state. When
none of the buyers hold the low quality good, the movement is as follows. For yH ≤ y, the
stock of the high quality good after trade in the next period will be b̂. For yH > y, the
monopolist will penetrate the entire market with the high quality good in the next period
and reach the Coase Conjecture steady state, and continue by serving the high quality good
to the replacement demand of all buyers thereafter. When some buyers hold the low quality
good, the arrows indicate the direction of movement of the state at any (yH , yL) to the Coase
Conjecture steady state. Figure 1 also indicates that as the stock of the low quality good
increases, the real time that passes to reach the Coase Conjecture steady state increases as
well.
7For ease of exposition from now on qH − qL is referred as ∆q.
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Figure 4.1: The Coase Conjecture Equilibrium
Now, let us illustrate the movement of the high quality good towards the Coase Conjecture
steady state with its corresponding prices when some high type buyers hold the low quality
good. For expositional purposes, the monopolist is assumed to immediately penetrate the
market with the high quality good by charging θ∆q for the high quality good when xH ≥
(1−µ)̂b and xL > 0. If xH ∈ (xHk+2,2, xHk+1,2] for k ≥ 1, the monopolist sets the price of good i
as pik,2 so that after trade the stock of good i will be y
i
k,2. If x
H ∈ (xH1,2, 1−µ], the monopolist
sets the price of the high quality good as θ∆q to penetrate the entire market with the high
quality good. Then, all buyers will hold the high quality good and the low quality good will
be available for free. Figure 2 illustrates how the price and the stock of the high quality good
evolves along path 2. For ease of exposition yHk,2 is referred as yk and refer p
H
k,2 as pk. The
arrows indicate the direction of the movement of a state.
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Figure 4.2: Path 2
We establish that existence of a Coase Conjecture equilibrium requires that {xHk,j}mj+1k=0
must be strictly decreasing and must satisfy xHmj+1,j ≤ 0 < xHmj ,j . The set of parameters
supporting this condition is derived and it is proved that the equilibrium is unique.
Theorem 1. There exists at most one Coase Conjecture equilibrium if and only if µ < µ for
some µ ∈ (0, 1).
The Coase Conjecture equilibrium does not exist for sufficiently perishable goods. Because,
for large µ, rather than fully penetrating the market with the high quality good at the price
pH0,j , the monopolist would sell to the replacement demands µy
H
1,j and µy
L
1,j at the prices p
H
1,j
and pL1,j , respectively.
The differences among the paths with respect to the high quality good is illustrated to
analyze how the production of the low quality good affects the stock and the price of the
high quality good and to analyze whether the production of the low quality good helps the
monopolist maintain his market power. For ease of exposition yHk,j is referred as yk,j and p
H
k,j
is referred as pk,j .
First, we study the effect of the low quality good when the initial stock of the low quality
good is zero. We must compare path 1 on which none of the buyers hold the low quality good
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Figure 4.3: Path 1 vs Path 2
with path 2 on which the marginal buyer of the low quality good is a high type. Figure 3
illustrates these two paths. We observe that when some high types hold the low quality good,
the price of the high quality good diminishes. For all xH < (1 − µ)̂b, on path 2 the marginal
buyer of the low quality good is a high type. Hence, information rent cannot explain the price
difference between these two paths. However, while moving towards the steady state along
path 2, once all high type buyers hold the high quality good, the marginal buyer of the low
quality good becomes a low type. When some low type buyers hold the low quality good,
to make high type buyers hold the high quality good rather than the low quality good, the
monopolist has to leave some information rent to the high type buyers. Hence, the high type
buyers, anticipating that the monopolist will eventually lower the price of the high quality
good, are willing accept a price for the high quality good that is significantly lower than the
price when none of the buyers hold the low quality good. In addition to the price difference,
we also observe that when some high types hold the low quality good, the time elapses to reach
the Coase Conjecture steady state is longer.
Second, we study the effect of the low quality good when some high types hold the low
quality good. We must compare path 2 on which the marginal buyer of the low quality good
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Figure 4.4: Path 2 vs Path 3
is a high type with path 3 on which the marginal buyer of the low quality good is a low type.
Figure 4 illustrates these two paths. We, first, observe that the price of the high quality good
is lower on path 3. The reason is that on path 3 the monopolist has to leave some information
rent to the high type buyers to eliminate their incentives to buy the low quality good rather
than the high quality good. In addition to the price difference, we also observe that the time
elapses to reach the Coase Conjecture steady state is longer on path 3.
Last, we study the effect of the low quality good when there is an excess supply of the low
quality good. In this case, the low quality good is available for free. Since, the monopolist
does not make any profits from the low quality good when there is an excess supply of the
low quality good, on path 4 the stock of the high quality good does not depend on the stock
of the low quality good. Figure 5 illustrates path 1 and path 4. We can see that the stock of
the high quality good is the same on these two paths. Moreover, since the low quality good is
available for free on path 4, the information rent that the monopolist has to leave to the high
type buyers is greater than the information rent on path 3. Hence, on path 4 the price of the
high quality good is even lower.
When none of the buyers hold the low quality good, the monopolist fully penetrates the
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Figure 4.5: Path 1 vs Path 4
market by charging θqH for the high quality good. However, when some of the buyers hold
the low quality good, the monopolist either fully penetrates the market with the high quality
good at the price θ∆q or sells the high quality good to some of the low type buyers at the price
θqH and reaches the steady state gradually. Moreover, we observe from the figures that as the
stock of the low quality good increases, so does the real time that passes before the monopolist
reaches the Coase Conjecture steady state. It follows that the threshold depreciation rate
supporting the Coase Conjecture equilibrium must be smaller when xL is positive. Therefore,
Corollary 1. The domain of the parameters consistent with the Coase Conjecture equilibrium
is smaller when the monopolist can produce multiple goods that differ in quality.
The monopolist fully penetrates the entire market with the high quality good in mj periods
on path j. Hence, the real time that elapses until the market is fully penetrated with the high
quality good is mjz. We show that mj has a finite limit m̂j regardless of the state of the low
quality good. Therefore,
Corollary 2. In the Coase Conjecture equilibrium, the initial price of the high quality durable
good converges to the lowest buyer valuation θqH as the length of the time period between
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successive offers approaches zero.
We show that m̂1 = m̂4 = m̂ and m̂ < m̂j for j = 2, 3 where m̂ is the corresponding limit
of a durable goods monopolist selling a single version of the good. Additionally, we establish
that m̂j for j = 2, 3 increases with the state of the low quality good and decreases with the
quality difference between the versions of the good. Therefore,
Corollary 3. When the time period between successive price changes is arbitrarily small, as
the quality difference between two versions of the durable good increases, the real time that
elapses until the market is fully penetrated with the high quality good converges to m̂.
4.3.2 The Monopoly Equilibrium
Consider equilibria in which the monopolist credibly commits not to selling the high quality
good to low type buyers. The monopoly steady states of such equilibria are (̂b, 0) and (̂b, 1− b̂).
The necessary conditions for the existence of a monopoly equilibrium are as follows. First,
when the state before trade is ((1−µ)̂b, 0), the monopolist must prefer selling the high quality
good to the high type buyers’ replacement demand µb̂ at the price θqH forever to selling the
high quality good to buyers who do not hold the high quality good (1−(1 − µ)̂b) at the price
PH(1, 0) and continuing by selling the high quality good to all buyers’ replacement demand µ
at the price PH(1, 0) thereafter. If
µb̂θqH
1−δ ≥(1−(1− µ)̂b)PH(1, 0)+ δµ1−δPH(1, 0) (4.5)
holds, the monopolist never cuts the price of the high quality good to PH(1, 0) to serve the
high quality good to all buyers. Since PH(1, 0) ≤ θqH , (4.5) holds for µ ≥ (1−δ)(1−b̂)θ
b̂∆θ−δ(1−b̂)θ ≡ µ
st.
Second, when the state before trade is ((1− µ)̂b, 0), the monopolist must prefer selling the
high quality good to the high type buyers’ replacement demand µb̂ at the price θqH forever
to selling the high quality good to the high type buyers’ replacement demand µb̂ at the price
PH (̂b, 1−b̂) forever and selling the low quality good to the low type buyers 1−b̂ at the price
PL(̂b, 1−b̂) and continuing by selling the low quality good to their replacement demand µ(1−b̂)
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at the price PL(̂b, 1−b̂) thereafter. If
µb̂θqH
1−δ ≥ µb̂1−δPH (̂b, 1−b̂) + (1−b̂)PL(̂b, 1−b̂)+ δµ(1−b̂)1−δ PL(̂b, 1−b̂) (4.6)
holds, the monopolist never cuts the price of the low quality good to PL(̂b, 1−b̂) in order to
serve the low quality good to the low type buyers. Since PH (̂b, 1−b̂) ≤ θqH −θqL+PL(̂b, 1−b̂)
and PL(̂b, 1−b̂) ≤ θqL, (4.6) holds if µ ≥ µst. Therefore, the monopolist does not deviate from
the static monopoly steady state (̂b, 0) when µ ≥ µst.
Third, when the state before trade is ((1− µ)̂b, (1− µ)(1−b̂)), the monopolist must prefer
selling the high quality good to the high type buyers’ replacement demand µb̂ at the price
θqH − θqL + θqL and selling the low quality good to the low type buyers’ replacement demand
µ(1− b̂) at the price θqL forever to penetrating the entire market with the high quality good
by charging PH(1, (1− µ)(1−b̂)) and continuing by selling the high quality good to all buyers’
replacement demand µ at the price PH(1, xL) thereafter. If
µb̂(θqH−θqL+θqL)
1−δ +
µ(1−b̂)θqL
1−δ ≥(1−(1− µ)̂b)PH(1, xL)+ δµ1−δPH(1, xL) (4.7)
holds, the monopolist never cuts the price of the high quality good to PH(1, xL) to serve
the high quality good to all buyers. Since PH(1, xL) ≤ θ∆q for all xL > 0, (4.7) holds
if µ ≥ (1−δ)(1−b̂)θ∆q
b̂∆θ∆q−δ(1−b̂)θ∆q+θqL
≡ µsg. Therefore, the monopolist does not deviate from the
segmented monopoly steady state (̂b, 1−b̂) for µ ≥ µsg. Moreover, since PH(1, 0) > PH(1, xL)
for all xL > 0, µsg < µst must hold.
It is established that the necessary condition for the existence of a monopoly equilibrium,
µ ≥ µsg, is also sufficient for the existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Theorem 2. There exists at most one monopoly equilibrium iff µ ≥ µsg. The monopoly steady
states of such equilibrium are {(̂b, 1−b̂)} for µsg ≤ µ < µst and {(̂b, 0), (̂b, 1−b̂)} for µ ≥ µst.
In such an equilibrium, for µ ≥ µst the monopolist initially charges θqH for the high quality
good and charges a price for the low quality good high enough that none of the buyers purchase
it. Hence, from the initial state (0, 0) the monopolist brings the state to (̂b, 0) by selling the
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high quality good to all high types. He then continues to charge the static monopoly prices
to serve the replacement demand of the high type buyers for the high quality good. For
µsg ≤ µ < µst the monopolist initially charges θqH − θqL + θqL for the high quality good and
θqL for the low quality good. Hence, from the initial state (0, 0) the monopolist brings the
state to (̂b, 1− b̂) by selling the high quality good to all high types and selling the low quality
good to all low types. He then continues to charge the segmented monopoly prices to serve
the replacement demands.
If the monopolist deviates from a monopoly steady state by selling more of the high quality
good in an attempt to increase profits, the movement of the states in a monopoly equilibrium
is as follows. The sequence of states {(x˜Hk,j , x˜Lk,j)}mj+1k=0 is constructed such that when that
state is (x˜Hk,j , x˜
L
k,j), the monopolist is indifferent between bringing the next period’s state to
(x˜Hk−1,j , x˜
L
k−1,j) by charging (p˜
H
k−1,j , p˜
L
k−1,j) and staying at (x˜
H
k,j , x˜
L
k,j) by charging (p˜
H
k,j , p˜
L
k,j)
forever. There exist three paths depending on the state of the low quality good. On all paths,
the initial value of the state of the high quality good is x˜H0,j = (1 − µ)̂b and its end value is
x˜Hmj+1,j ≤ 1− µ.
On path 1, none of the buyers hold the low quality good. For all xH ≤ x˜Hm1+1,1, path 1
reaches the static monopoly steady state. On path 2, some buyers hold the low quality good.
For all xH ≤ x˜Hm2+1,2, path 2 reaches the segmented monopoly steady state. Since the low
type buyers anticipate that the price of the low quality good will be eventually equal to θqL,
the monopolist cannot charge more than θqL for the low quality good. Hence, p˜
L
k,2 = θqL for
all k. On path 3, there exists an excess supply of the low quality good. Hence, p˜Lk,3 = 0 for all
k. For all xH ≤ x˜Hm3+1,3, path 3 reaches the segmented monopoly steady state.
If the good is sufficiently perishable, the monopolist will return to a monopoly steady state
from any state of the high quality good above (1 − µ)̂b. Hence, we have x˜Hmj+1,j = 1 − µ.
Otherwise, the Coase Conjecture steady state coexists with monopoly steady states. In this
case, we have x˜Hmj+1,j < 1 − µ. Hence, when the state is (x˜Hmj+1,j , x˜Lmj+1,j), the monopolist
is indifferent between bringing the state to (y˜Hmj ,j , y˜
L
mj ,j
) and fully penetrating the market by
selling the high quality good to all buyers and continuing by serving the replacement demand µ
for the high quality good thereafter. It follows that the monopolist strictly prefers penetrating
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Figure 4.6: The Monopoly Equilibrium I
the market with the high quality good when the state of the high quality good is greater than
x˜Hmj+1,j .
When the state is moving towards a monopoly steady state, low type buyers purchase
the high quality good at a price exceeding their valuation, in order to make capital gains by
reselling it in the second-hand market at a later date. If none of the buyers hold the low
quality good, the steady state of the market will be (̂b, 0); otherwise it will be (̂b, 1− b̂).
Figure 6 illustrates how states move to a monopoly steady state when the good is sufficiently
perishable. The arrows indicate the direction of movement of the state at any (yH , yL). When
none of the buyers hold the low quality good, the states move towards the static monopoly
steady state from any (yH , 0) as follows. For yH ≤ y, the stock of the high quality good after
trade in the next period will be b̂ and the monopolist will continue by selling the high quality
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Figure 4.7: The Monopoly Equilibrium II
good to the replacement demand of the high type buyers thereafter. For yH > y, the stock of
the high quality good after trade in the next period will be y. When some buyers hold the low
quality good, the states move towards the segmented monopoly steady state along the arrows.
Figure 7 illustrates how states move to the a monopoly steady state when the good is
not sufficiently perishable. The arrows indicate the direction of movement of the state at
any (yH , yL). If yH is low, the states move towards a monopoly steady state, otherwise the
states move towards the Coase Conjecture steady state. When none of the buyers hold the low
quality good, the states move as follows. For yH ≤ y the stock of the high quality good after
trade in the next period will be b̂ and the monopolist will continue by selling the high quality
good to replacement demand of the high type buyers thereafter. For y < yH ≤ y, the stock of
the high quality good after trade in the next period will be y. For yH > y, the stock of the
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Figure 4.8: The Monopoly Equilibrium
high quality good after trade in the next period will be 1 and the monopolist will continue
by selling the high quality good to replacement demand of all buyers thereafter. When some
buyers hold the low quality good, the states move towards a steady state along the arrows.
Figure 8 illustrates the movement of the high quality good towards a monopoly steady state
with its corresponding prices. For expositional purposes only path 1 and path 2 are studied,
and when the monopolist moves towards the Coase Conjecture steady state, the monopolist is
assumed to immediately penetrate the market with the high quality good by charging θ∆q for
the high quality good. For ease of exposition y˜Hk,j is referred as yk,j and p˜
H
k,j is referred as pk,j .
On the left graph the state moves back to a monopoly steady state from any state, whereas
on the right graph the state moves towards the Coase Conjecture steady state when the stock
of the high quality good is high. The arrows indicate the direction of the movement. We can
observe from these graphs that production of a low quality good lowers the price of the high
quality good in a monopoly equilibrium.
Let µs (δ) be the threshold depreciation rate derived in Deneckere and Liang (2008). When
a monopolist produces a single version of a durable good, a monopoly equilibrium exists for
all µ > µs (δ). It is established that
Corollary 4. The threshold depreciation rate supporting the static monopoly steady state µst
is a function of δ such that µst(δ) = µs (δ) holds for all δ.
Since the segmented monopoly steady state is supported for µsg ≤ µ < µst, the set of
parameters consistent with the monopoly equilibrium expands when a monopolist produces a
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low quality good as well as a high quality good.
Now, consider the structure of the stationary path as the time period between successive
offers of the monopolist diminishes. For xH > (1 − µ)̂b, the state either immediately moves
to the Coase Conjecture steady state or slowly goes back to a monopoly steady state. It is
established that the rate at which a monopoly steady state is reached is independent of the
state of the low quality good and that
Corollary 5. As the length of the time period between successive price changes approaches
zero, the state of the high quality good moves towards a monopoly steady state at the rate of
x˙H = λxH
(
1− θ
θ
(
yH
b̂
)λ+r
λ
)
for xH > (1− µ)̂b.
4.3.3 The Reputational Equilibrium
Consider equilibria in which the monopolist establishes a reputation by cutting the production
of the high quality good. The stock of the high quality good at a reputational steady state
falls short of the static monopoly output of the high quality good. The reputational steady
states of such equilibria are (yˇH , 1− yˇH) and (yˆH , 0) where yˆH , yˇH ∈ (0, b̂).
If µ is sufficiently low, from the initial state (0, 0), the monopolist will immediately bring
the state to (yˇH , 1− yˇH) by charging θqH−θqL+θqL for the high quality good and θqL for the
low quality good and continue by selling to the replacement demand µyˇH for the high quality
good at the price θqH−θqL+θqL and to the replacement demand µ(1− yˇH) for the low quality
good at the price θqL thereafter.
If µ falls above this threshold, from the initial state (0, 0), the monopolist will immediately
bring the state to (yˆH , 0) by charging θqH for the high quality good and charging a price no
less than θqL for the low quality good and continue by selling to the replacement demand µyˆ
H
for the high quality good at the price θqH thereafter.
If the monopolist penetrates the market by selling more of the high quality good, he loses
his reputation for pricing high. Since buyers expect that the future prices will be lower, they
are reluctant to pay a high price for the high quality good. Hence, the monopolist has to
drastically lower the price of the high quality good, and the state slowly moves to the Coase
Conjecture steady state (1, 0). Therefore, upon deviation from a reputational steady state by
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increasing the stock of the high quality good, the game follows the Coase Conjecture path.
When the steady state is (yˆH , 0), if the monopolist penetrates the market by selling more
of the low quality good, buyers expect that the monopolist will increase the sales of the low
quality good and hence, they do not accept any price for the low quality good significantly
greater than θqL. Hence, the monopolist immediately brings the state to (yˆ
H , 1 − yˆH) by
charging θqH − θqL + θqL for the high quality good and charging θqL for the low quality good
and continues by selling to the replacement demands thereafter.
Theorem 3. There exists a unique reputational equilibrium if and only if µsg < µ ≤ µ.
The reputational steady states of such equilibrium are {(yˇH , 1 − yˇH)} for µsg < µ ≤ µ′ and
{(yˆH , 0), (yˆH , 1− yˆH)} for µ′ < µ ≤ µ where µ′ ≥ µst.
The existence of the reputational equilibrium necessitates existence of the Coase Conjecture
equilibrium and the monopoly equilibrium. The intuition behind this is as follows. If the Coase
Conjecture equilibrium does not exist, neither does the reputational equilibrium. Because when
the Coase Conjecture equilibrium does not exist, the steady state stock of the high quality good
falls short of a certain level below which a path that the monopolist follows upon deviation
from a reputational steady state cannot be constructed. Moreover, the monopoly equilibrium
does not exist when the monopolist cannot resist penetrating the market further in an attempt
to increase profits. Since, the monopolist makes less profits by limiting the production of the
high quality good, when the monopoly equilibrium does not exist, neither does the reputational
equilibrium.
The structure of the reputational equilibrium, when the time period between successive
price changes is infinitesimal is studied and it is established that
Corollary 6. Let yˇH = θ
θ
and yˆH = (λ+r)θ
λθ+rθ
. As the length of the time period between successive
price changes approaches zero, the reputational steady state converges to (yˇH , 1 − yˇH) for
µ ∈ (µsg, µst], and converges to (yˆH , 0) for µst < µ ≤ µ.
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4.4 Coexistence of Equilibria: Single Good vs Multiple Goods
In this section, first, we study an example to analyze how production of a low quality product
affects the existence and the uniqueness of each type of equilibrium. Then, we characterize
the set of parameters supporting each type of equilibrium, when the time period between
successive price changes is arbitrarily small.
Let µs (δ) and µs (δ) be the threshold depreciation rates when the monopolist produces a
single version of a durable good.8 It is established that
Proposition 4. The threshold depreciation rates are functions of δ such that µsg (0) < µ (0) <
µs (0) = µs (0), and limδ→1 µsg (δ) = limδ→1 µst (δ) = 0 and limδ→1 µ (δ) = limδ→1 µs (δ).
We study an example to identify how production of a low quality good affects the param-
eters consistent with each type of equilibrium. Consistent with the example in Deneckere and
Liang (2008), we assume that θ = 0.6 θ, b̂ = 0.7, and qH = 3 qL.
First, let us study Figure 9 which illustrates the range of (µ, δ) where each type of equi-
librium exists when the monopolist produces only a high quality good. As discussed in detail
by Deneckere and Liang (2008), for µ < µs (δ) the Coase Conjecture equilibrium is the unique
equilibrium, for µs (δ) ≤ µ ≤ µs (δ) all types of equilibrium coexist, and for µ > µs (δ), the
monopoly equilibrium is the unique equilibrium. The intuition behind this result is as follows.
As depreciation factor µ increases, profits from replacement sales increase. Hence, rather than
penetrating the market further, the monopolist prefers serving replacement demands.
Second, let us study Figure 10 which illustrates the range of (µ, δ) supporting each type of
equilibrium when the monopolist produces a low quality good as well as the high quality good.
For expositional purposes, we refer µsg (δ) as µ (δ). We can observe that with multiple goods
differ in quality, the range of (µ, δ) consistent the Coase Conjecture equilibrium is smaller and
the range of (µ, δ) consistent with the monopoly equilibrium is larger. The economic intuition
behind this result is as follows. For µ (δ) ≤ µ < µs (δ), the Coase Conjecture equilibrium
does not exist when the monopolist produces multiple goods, since the depreciation rate is
8See Deneckere and Liang (2008) for details.
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Figure 4.9: Support of Each Type of Equilibrium: Single Good
high enough so that when the state is (̂b, 1− b̂), the monopolist prefers selling to replacement
demands rather than fully penetrating the market with the high quality good. Moreover, for
µ (δ) < µ ≤ µs (δ), a monopoly equilibrium exists when the monopolist produces multiple
goods because for a given value of δ, µ ∈ (µ (δ) , µs (δ)] supports the segmented monopoly
steady state but not the static monopoly steady state.
Figure 10 also helps us identify the structure of equilibria when the monopolist can adjust
the prices frequently. As the length of the time period diminishes, (µ, δ) converges to (0, 1)
for all r > 0 and λ < ∞. Since µ(δ) = 1 − δ λr , (µ(δ), δ) lies below (µ(δ), δ) when λr is small.
Moreover, when the length of the time period between successive offers of the monopolist is ar-
bitrarily small, the cutoff value λ0 below which the Coase Conjecture equilibrium is the unique
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Figure 4.10: Support of Each Type of Equilibrium: Multiple Goods
equilibrium is λ0 =
r(1−b̂)θ∆q
(̂bθ−θ)∆q+θqL
, whereas the corresponding threshold when the monopolist
produces a single version of the good is λs0 =
r(1−b̂)θ
(̂bθ−θ) . Therefore,
Corollary 7. (i) Let λ0 =
r(1−b̂)θ∆q
(̂bθ−θ)∆q+θqL
. As the length of the time interval between successive
offers of the monopolist converges to zero, a Coase Conjecture equilibrium exists for all λ <∞.
When λ < λ0, the Coase Conjecture equilibrium is the unique equilibrium. When λ ≥ λ0, all
three types of equilibrium coexist.
(ii) Let λs0 =
r(1−b̂)θ
(̂bθ−θ) . When the monopolist produces single version of the good, as the
length of the time interval between successive offers of the monopolist converges to zero, a
Coase Conjecture equilibrium exists for all λ < ∞. When λ < λs0, the Coase Conjecture
equilibrium is the unique equilibrium. When λ ≥ λs0, all three types of equilibrium coexist.
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Hence, since λ0 < λ
s
0, it is concluded that for all z ≥ 0, the monopoly equilibrium is more
likely to occur, when the monopolist offers multiple goods differ in quality. For example, when
θ = 0.6 θ, b̂ = 0.7, qH = 3 qL, and δ = 0.60, the threshold depreciation rates are µ = 0.15,
µ = 0.41, and µs = 0.42, µs = 0.64. Therefore, if the monopolist only produces the high
quality good, the monopoly equilibrium exists when the expected life time is less than 3 years,
and is the unique equilibrium when the expected life time is less than 1 year. However, if
the monopolist produces the low quality good as well as the high quality good, the monopoly
equilibrium exists when the expected life time is less than 6 years, and is the unique equilibrium
when it is less than 2 years.
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Chapter 5
Buybacks
In this chapter, we study vertical product differentiation in a durable goods market when
the monopolist is allowed to buy the goods back from previous buyers.1
5.1 Characterization of the Dynamic Optimization
In this section, first, we represent the dynamic optimization problems of the buyers and the
monopolist. Then, we discuss the characteristics of equilibrium strategies of the monopolist.
First, let us provide the first result to help us characterize the optimization problem. There
are two numbers βH and βL summarizing the actions of the previous buyers in a stationary
equilibrium.
Proposition 5. In any stationary equilibrium, for any current price p =
(
pH , pL
)
, there exist
cutoff indices βH (p) and βL (p) with βH (p) < βL (p) such that after trade, every buyer with
index not exceeding βH (p) holds a high quality good, every buyer with index between βH (p)
and βL (p) holds a low quality good, and every buyer with index greater than βL (p) holds none
of the goods and prefers waiting for the next period’s offer.
Hence, a buyer’s strategy in a stationary equilibrium is described by non-increasing left-
continuous functions2, PH(·) and PL(·), with buyer b choosing to hold a high quality good (a
1All proofs of this section are relegated to the Appendix B.
2Since we restrict our attention to stationary equilibria in which bilateral deviations of measure zero buyers
does not change actions of the agents, we can assume that acceptance functions are left continuous.
low quality good) in the current period if and only if the current price of the high quality good
satisfies pH ≤ PH (b) (pL ≤ PL (b)).3
Let xi denote the stock of the durable good with quality i before trade and let V
(
xH , xL
)
denote the monopolist’s net present value of profits. Therefore, we have
V
(
xH , xL
)
= max
yH ,yL≥0
yH+yL∈[0,1]
 ℘
H
(
yH , yL
) (
yH − xH)+ ℘L (yH , yL) (yL − xL)
+δV
(
(1− µ) yH , (1− µ) yL)

where δ = e−rz represents the discount factor and ℘H and ℘L stand for the market price of
the high quality good and the market price of the low quality good, respectively. The price of
the high quality good satisfies the incentive compatibility constraint of the marginal high type
buyer. Hence, we must have
℘H
(
yH , yL
) ≤ PH (yH)− fL (yH)+ ℘L (yH , yL)
where fL
(
yH
)− ℘L (yH , yL) is the surplus of buyer yH , purchasing the low quality good.
Let T (·) denote the argmax correspondence of the objective function. By the general-
ized theorem of the maximum (Ausubel and Deneckere (1989)) and the contraction mapping
theorem, there exists a unique continuous function V (·), and T (·) is a non-empty and com-
pact valued correspondence. Moreover, supermodularity of the objective function implies
that T (·) is non-decreasing. The stock of the high quality good and the stock of the low
quality good after trade are represented by tH
(
xH , xL
)
and tL
(
xH , xL
)
, respectively, where(
tH
(
xH , xL
)
, tL
(
xH , xL
)) ∈ T (xH , xL). The acceptance function P i (b) i = H,L is derived
from buyer b’s optimization problem. Hence, PH(·) and PL(·) should satisfy the arbitrage
equations of the buyers,
fH
(
yH
) − PH (yH) = ρ (fH (yH) − PH (tH(·)))
3If there exists b such that pH ≤ PH (b) and pL ≤ PL ( b) then b accepts the offer that gives her the highest
payoff.
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and
fL
(
yH + yL
) − PL (yH + yL) = ρ (fL (yH + yL) − PL (tH(·) + tL(·)))
where ρ = δ (1− µ) and ti(·) = ti ((1− µ) yH , (1− µ) yL), i = H,L.
Since T (·) is a non-decreasing compact correspondence, there exist at most countable num-
ber of points for which it is multi-valued. The following lemma shows that the monopolist
does not gain from randomization.
Proposition 6. The monopolist does not randomize along any stationary equilibrium path
and chooses the minimum element of the argmax correspondence with probability 1 unless it is
the initial period.
Therefore, given the state variables,
(
xH , xL
)
, the monopolist chooses minT
(
xH , xL
)
un-
less it is the initial period which implies that the output function ti(·) : [0, 1− µ]× [0, 1− µ]→
R+ for all i = H,L is nondecreasing. Since T (·) is upper-hemicontinuous and monotone, ti(·)
is left-continuous as well.
A stationary equilibrium is represented by
{
PH(·), PL(·), R(·), tH(·), tL(·)}. The structure
of a stationary path is as follows. In the initial period, the monopolist selects prices: for the
high quality good, ℘H
(
yH0 , y
L
0
)
, and for the low quality good, ℘L
(
yH0 + y
L
0
)
. All buyers b ≤ yH0
purchase the high quality good and all buyers yH0 < b ≤ yH0 + yL0 purchase the low quality
good.4 At the beginning of the next period, a stock of high quality good is xH1 = (1− µ) yH0
and the stock of low quality good is xL1 = (1− µ) yL0 . In period 2 the game is repeated and all
buyers b ≤ yH1 choose to hold the high quality good and all buyers yH1 < b ≤ yH1 +yL1 choose to
hold the low quality good. This continues until a steady state is reached. The market prices
are derived from acceptance functions, and the price of the high quality good should satisfy
the incentive compatibility constraint. We therefore have
℘H
(
yHi , y
L
i
)
= PH
(
yHi
)− fL (yHi )+ ℘L (yHi , yLi )
and
4If T (0, 0) is multi-valued, the monopolist may select randomly.
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℘L
(
yHi + y
L
i
)
= PL
(
yHi + y
L
i
)
where PH
(
yH0
)
= PH
(
tH (0, 0)
)
and PL
(
yH0 + y
L
0
)
= PL
(
tH (0, 0) + tL (0, 0)
)
, and PH
(
yHi
)
=
PH
(
tH
(
xHi , x
L
i
))
and PL
(
yHi + y
L
i
)
= PL
(
tH
(
xHi , x
L
i
)
+ tL
(
xHi , x
L
i
))
for all i = 1, 2, . . ..
To construct the stationary equilibria, we follow the solution method introduced by De-
neckere and Liang (2008). First, we prove the existence of a steady state in any stationary
equilibrium. Then, we characterize all possible steady states. Finally, we derive the stationary
path that reaches a steady state by using backward induction from the steady state.
5.2 Characterization of Steady States
In this section, after proving the existence of a steady state for any stationary equilibrium, we
characterize all possible steady states that may coexist.
Let a steady state
(
yHs , y
L
s
)
be defined as stock levels of the durable goods after trade
satisfying tH
(
(1− µ) yHs , (1− µ) yLs
)
= yHs and t
L
(
(1− µ) yHs , (1− µ) yLs
)
= yLs . The follow-
ing proposition establishes the existence of a steady state by showing that for any stationary
equilibrium there exists at least one corresponding steady state.
Proposition 7. Any stationary equilibrium has at least one steady state. That is, there exists
(yH , yH) such that
tH
(
(1− µ) yH , (1− µ) yL) = yH
and
tL
(
(1− µ) yH , (1− µ) yL) = yL
where yH ∈ (0, 1], yH + yL ≤ 1. Moreover, the steady state prices satisfy
℘H
(
yH , yL
)
= fH
(
yH
)− fL (yH)+ fL (yH + yL)
and
℘L
(
yH , yL
)
= fL
(
yH + yL
)
.
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The steady state prices are derived from marginal buyers’ arbitrage equations and the
incentive compatibility condition. When the steady state stock levels are yHs and y
L
s for the
high and the low quality goods, respectively, then in each period the marginal buyer of the
high quality good is yHs and the marginal buyer of the low quality good is y
H
s + y
L
s . Buyer
yHs is indifferent between today’s and tomorrow’s offer for the high quality good when the
price of the high quality good is fH
(
yHs
)
. Similarly, buyer yHs + y
L
s is indifferent between
today’s and tomorrow’s offer for the low quality good when the price of the low quality good
is fL
(
yHs + y
L
s
)
. However, when the price of the low quality good is fL
(
yHs + y
L
s
)
, buyer
yHs ’s net surplus from the low quality good is f
L
(
yHs
)− fL (yHs + yLs ). Therefore, to sell the
high quality good to buyer yH , the monopolist has to leave information rent no less than
fL
(
yHs
)− fL (yHs + yLs ). Therefore, at the steady state, the price of the high quality good is
fH
(
yHs
)− fL (yHs )+ fL (yHs + yLs ) and the price of the low quality good is fL (yHs + yLs ).
The analysis of this study focuses on the nontrivial case where b̂ θ > θ. Otherwise, the
static monopoly prices would be θqH and θqL
5, and a durable goods monopolist who does
not have any commitment power can achieve this outcome. This result follows from Lemma
3 which shows that neither version’s price is less than the lowest reservation price for that
version of the durable good.6
The seller never charges a price less than θqH for the high quality good and a price less
than θqL for the low quality good.
Proposition 8. Since the unique stationary steady state of this game when b̂θ < θ is the static
monopoly outcome, we restrict our attention to b̂θ > θ.7
The result that there always exists a steady state associated with any stationary equilib-
rium helps us conduct backward induction from each steady state in order to construct the
corresponding stationary equilibria. To establish it we first need to derive all possible steady
states.
5Indeed, any price for the low quality good would be an equilibrium price as long as all buyers purchase the
high quality good.
6This result is also established by Fudenberg, Levine and Tirole’s (1985) Lemma 2 for the single good case.
7For the hairline case b̂θ = θ, we can use the limit of b̂θ > θ.
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Let us consider a market for a perfectly durable good served by a monopolist. The monopo-
list cannot credibly commit to a static monopoly output since he has an irresistible temptation
to cut the price to sell to the remaining buyers. Thus, in this setting, the static monopoly
output would never be a steady state. Deneckere and Liang (2008) points out that when the
good depreciates the monopolist may prefer selling to the replacement demand of the high
type buyers at a higher price rather than cutting the price in an attempt to increase the sales.
They show that there exist three types of steady states: a Coase Conjecture, a monopoly,
and a reputational steady state. If the monopolist moves the market to a state by selling the
good to all buyers and continues fulfilling the replacement demand then the state is called the
Coase Conjecture steady state. The monopoly steady state is the one in which the monopolist
preserves his market power by selling to the high type buyers and fulfilling their replacement
demand forever. In the reputational steady state, the monopolist cuts the production and sells
the good to some of the high type buyers.
Despite the similarity with the results of Deneckere and Liang (2008), we show that pro-
duction of a low-end durable good necessitates existence of other steady states. We establish
that there exist five possible steady states: (1, 0),
(
b̂, 0
)
,
(
b̂, 1− b̂
)
,
(
y`H , y`L
)
,
(
y`H , 1− y`H)
where y`H ∈
(
0, b̂
)
and y`L ∈
[
0, b̂− y`H
]
. If the steady state is (1, 0) then all buyers hold the
high quality good after trade and the monopolist serves their replacement demand in each
period. We call (1, 0) the Coase Conjecture steady state and call the equilibrium having (1, 0)
as the unique steady state the Coase Conjecture equilibrium. We call
(
b̂, 0
)
the standard
monopoly steady state. At such a steady state, after trade all high type buyers hold the high
quality good and the monopolist sells to the replacement demand of the high type buyers for
the high quality good forever. At the standard monopoly steady state the price of the low
quality good is set sufficiently high so that none of the buyers purchases it. We call
(
b̂, 1− b̂
)
the segmented monopoly steady state. At the segmented monopoly steady state, after trade all
high type buyers hold the high quality good, all low type buyers hold the low quality good,
and the monopolist serves the replacement demands in each period. The segmented monopoly
steady state
(
b̂, 1− b̂
)
always coexists with the standard monopoly steady state
(
b̂, 0
)
. De-
pending on the magnitude of the depreciation rate, µ, we may observe the Coase Conjecture
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steady state (1, 0) with
(
b̂, 0
)
and
(
b̂, 1− b̂
)
as well. We call an equilibrium with the standard
and the segmented monopoly steady states the monopoly equilibrium. We call
(
y`H , y`L
)
and(
y`H , 1− y`H) reputational steady states and the corresponding equilibrium the reputational
equilibrium. At a reputational steady state, the monopolist limits the production of the high
quality good and sells it to some of the high type buyers. At the first reputational steady
state, after trade some of the high type buyers hold the high quality good and some of them
hold the low quality good whereas at the second steady state, while some high type buyers
hold the high quality good, the rest of the buyers holds the low quality good. The steady
states
(
y`H , 1− y`H) and (1, 0) always coexist with (y`H , y`L). The result is established by the
following.
Proposition 9. Let S denote the set of steady states. In any stationary equilibrium one of
the followings hold:
1. S = {(1, 0)} ;
2. S =
{(
b̂, 0
)
,
(
b̂, 1− b̂
)}
or S =
{(
b̂, 0
)
,
(
b̂, 1− b̂
)
, (1, 0)
}
;
3. S =
{(
y`H , 1− y`H) , (1, 0)} or S = {(y`H , y`L) , (y`H , 1− y`H) , (1, 0)} where y`H ∈ (0, b̂)
and y`L ∈
[
0, b̂− y`H
]
.
The intuition behind this comes from the following two casual observation. First, given
the expectations of the buyers, some of the states cannot be a steady state as the monopolist
can profitably deviate from these states. Additionally, since the number of the steps in f i is
two, at most three steady states can coexist in an equilibrium.8
5.3 Characterization of Stationary Equilibria
In this section, we derive stationary equilibria for a given demand curve. Similar to Deneckere
and Liang (2008), there exist three types of equilibria: a Coase Conjecture equilibrium, a
8If the marginal buyer of the high quality good is high type, then the marginal buyer of the low quality good
can be either high type or low type. However, if the marginal buyer of the high quality good is low type, then
the marginal buyer of the low quality good must be low type as well.
41
monopoly equilibrium and a reputational equilibrium. We show the uniqueness of the equilib-
rium of each type, and analyze the effects of quality differentiation on each type of equilibrium.
5.3.1 The Coase Conjecture Equilibrium
We characterize equilibria with a unique steady state at which all buyers, after trade, hold the
high quality good.9
We now describe the derivation of the stationary path that leads us to the steady state (1, 0)
from any state. In such equilibria, since the low type buyers anticipate that the monopolist
saturates the entire market with the high quality good eventually, they are reluctant to pay
more than their reservation price for the durable goods. Hence, for any buyer b ∈
(
b̂, 1
]
, the
acceptance price of the high quality good is θqH and the acceptance price of the low quality
good is θqL.
10 Thus, the stationary path that reaches (1, 0) is immediately defined for all xH ≥
(1− µ) b̂ and all xL. To construct the stationary path for xH < (1− µ) b̂, we define a sequence
of states
{(
xHk , x
L
k
)}m+1
k=2
such that when the state is
(
xHk , x
L
k
)
, the monopolist is indifferent
between
(
yHk−1, y
L
k−1
)
with
(
pHk−1, p
L
k−1
)
and
(
yHk−2, y
L
k−2
)
with
(
pHk−2, p
L
k−2
)
where xik represents
the stock of the durable good with quality i before trade in period k+1 and yik =
xik
1−µ represents
the stock of the durable good with quality i after trade in period k, i = H,L. Given the state
of the market, the seller serves either the high type buyers or all buyers. These two possible
cases are represented by
{(
xHk , (1− µ) b̂− xHk
)}m′+1
k=2
and
{(
x̂Hk , 1− µ− x̂Hk
)}m+1
k=2
. On the
path
{(
xHk , (1− µ) b̂− xHk
)}m′+1
k=2
, the seller serves only the high type buyers until the steady
state is reached. Some of the high type buyers hold the high quality good and the rest of
them holds the low quality good. While moving towards the steady state, the monopolist
buys the low quality good gradually and sells the high quality good instead. On the path
9One should observe that selling only the low quality good can never be an equilibrium, since the monopolist
would be strictly better off by buying all low quality good back and selling the high quality good instead.
10If the acceptance price of a buyer b ∈
(
b̂, 1
]
for the good with quality i was greater than θqi then the
acceptance price of buyer b ∈
(
b̂, b̂+ ε
)
would be greater than θqi, since P
i (.) is non-increasing. This would
imply that b is expecting to make a capital gain by purchasing it. Namely, buyer b would expect that the price
of the good with quality i will increase next period. However, since neither
(
b̂, 1− b̂
)
nor
(
b̂, 0
)
is a steady
state, this is not possible.
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{(
x̂Hk , 1− µ− x̂Hk
)}m+1
k=2
, the seller serves some high type buyers with the high quality good
and fulfills the rest of the market with the low quality good. Until the steady state is reached,
all low type buyers hold the low quality good and the quality of the good that they hold is
upgraded once the steady state is reached. Upon reaching the steady state, the monopolist
sells to the replacement demand of all buyers for the high quality good thereafter. The stock
of the low quality good determines which path that the monopolist follows. If the stock of the
low quality good before trade is sufficiently low then the seller prefers buying all excess low
quality good back immediately and serving only the high type buyers until the steady state
is reached. Otherwise, in addition to selling the high quality good to some of the high type
buyers, the monopolist would like to fulfill the rest of the market with the low quality good.
The market prices depend on which path the monopolist follows. On the first path, the
marginal buyer of each version of the good is high type. The market prices in period k, pHk
and pLk , are set such that a high type buyer is indifferent between purchasing the good with
quality i at pik today and waiting one more period to purchase it at p
i
k−1. Hence, in period k,
the market prices, pHk and p
L
k , are θqH − ρk
(
θ − θ) qH and θqL − ρk (θ − θ) qL, respectively.11
On the second path, the marginal buyer of the high quality good is high type, whereas the
marginal buyer of the low quality good is low type. Hence, the price of the high quality good
should satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint rather than the indifference condition. In
this case, the market prices are p̂Hk = θqH − ρk
(
θ − θ) qH − (1− ρk) (θ − θ) qL and p̂Lk = θqL.
The following theorem shows that the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence
of the Coase Conjecture equilibrium is the depreciation rate being sufficiently low.12
Theorem 4. There is at most one Coase Conjecture equilibrium. This equilibrium exists if
11Suppose that a buyer is indifferent between purchasing the high quality good today and purchasing it
tomorrow and that the same buyer is also indifferent between purchasing the low quality good today and
purchasing it tomorrow. Then the buyer is indifferent between these two versions of the good in the current
trading period.
12The Coase Conjecture equilibrium does not exist when µ is large. The intuition is as follows. When the
depreciation rate is large, rather than fulfilling the replacement demand of all buyers for the high quality good
at the price of θqH , the seller would be better off by selling either to the replacement demand of the high type
buyers for the high quality good and to the replacement demand of the low type buyers for the low quality
good at the market prices θqH − θqL+ θqL and θqL, respectively or to the replacement demand of the high type
buyers for the high quality good at the market price θqH .
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Figure 5.1: The Coase Conjecture Equilibrium
and only if µ < µ, for some µ ∈ (0, 1) .
The proof establishes that both
{
xHk
}
and
{
x̂Hk
}
are strictly decreasing and there exist m′
and m such that xHm′+1 < 0 ≤ xHm′ and x̂Hm+1 < 0 ≤ x̂Hm when µ falls below µ.
The movement of the high quality good with the corresponding prices on these two paths
illustrated in Figure 11. We suppose that m′ = 2 and m = 3.13 Arrows indicate the direction of
the movement of the state of the high quality good. On the first path (top path), the monopolist
only sells to the high types, whereas on the second path (bottom path), the monopolist sells
to low type buyers as well. Hence, the monopolist has to leave some information rent to the
high type buyers on the second path. We therefore have pHk > p̂
H
k . However, as the state gets
closer to the steady state (as k decreases), the information rent that a high type buyer gets
diminishes. That is, the distance between pHk and p̂
H
k diminishes and it vanishes at the steady
state. Even though the price of the high quality good decreases on both paths, the rate at
which it diminishes on the first path is greater, pk+1 − pk < p̂k+1 − p̂k for all k < min (m′,m).
Moreover, we also establish that even though the proportion of the high type buyers holding the
high quality good on the second path is greater than the one on the first path, ŷk > yk for all
13Actually, we have limz→0+ m
′ < limz→0+ m.
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k < min (m′,m), the rate at which the monopolist penetrates the market with the high quality
good on the first path is strictly greater than the rate on the second path. Indeed, the exact
relation between these two is
(
yk − yk+1
)
= (ŷk − ŷk+1) qH
(qH − qL) for all k < min (m
′,m).
On the equilibrium path, from the initial state (0, 0) the seller serves only the high type
buyers until the steady state is reached and fully penetrates the market in m′ periods. We
show that as the time period between the successive offers of the monopolist diminishes, m′
converges its finite limit. This implies that the real time passes before the prices drop to θqH
and θqL vanishes as the time period between successive price changes approaches zero. Hence,
the following concludes.
Corollary 8. In the Coase Conjecture equilibrium, the initial price of the durable good with
quality i converges to the lowest buyer valuation θqi as the length of time period between two
successive offers approaches zero.
We also show that the limit of m′ is strictly less that the limit of the number of the periods
required to reach the Coase Conjecture Steady state when the monopolist produces only one
version of the good.
Corollary 9. The rate at which the market prices converge to θqH and θqL increases as the
quality difference between two versions of the durable good increases.
Therefore, our result suggest that if the good that a monopolist produces is sufficiently
durable, he is reluctant to expand the product-line by producing different versions of it in
response to the time inconsistency problem he faces and that vertical product differentiation
in a market for highly durable goods can only be explained by profit motives.
5.3.2 The Monopoly Equilibrium
We study equilibria in which the monopolist can credibly commit to the static monopoly prices.
If this was a one period game, the monopolist would sell the high quality good to the high
type buyers at the price θqH and set the price of the low quality good high enough so that
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none of the buyers purchases it.14 Hence, we consider equilibria in which
(
b̂, 0
)
is a steady
state and characterize the set of parameters so that such equilibria exist.
If the monopoly equilibria exist then, from the initial state (0, 0), the monopolist moves to(
b̂, 0
)
by charging θqH for the high quality good and θqL for the low quality good and then he
continues fulfilling the replacement demand of the high type buyers for the high quality good
µb̂ at the price θqH .
15 However, if the monopolist deviates from
(
b̂, 0
)
by charging a lower
price for the low quality good in an attempt to increase profit by selling the low quality good
to the low type buyers then, rather than moving the state back to
(
b̂, 0
)
by buying the low
quality good back or waiting for the low quality good dissipating gradually, the monopolist
may immediately bring the state to
(
b̂, 1− b̂
)
and continue serving the replacement demands.
Hence, there exist two types of monopoly steady state: the standard monopoly steady state(
b̂, 0
)
and the segmented monopoly steady state
(
b̂, 1− b̂
)
. The monopolist can credibly
commit to the static monopoly prices at the standard monopoly steady state, whereas at the
segmented monopoly steady state the price of the high quality good must be lower than its
static monopoly price due to the incentive compatibility constraint.
In a monopoly equilibrium, the Coase Conjecture steady state (1, 0) always coexists with
the monopoly steady states. Upon deviation from a monopoly steady state, if the stock of
the high quality good is sufficiently high and the depreciation rate is sufficiently low, the
monopolist will immediately bring the state to (1, 0) and continue serving the replacement
demand of all buyers for the high quality good.
The existence of a monopoly equilibrium with the standard monopoly steady state requires
that when the state before trade is
(
(1− µ) b̂, 0
)
, the monopolist must prefer selling to the
replacement demand of the high type buyers for the high quality good to penetrating the
market further by cutting the price of the goods. Hence, the monopolist must prefer serving
the replacement demand µb̂ at the price θqH to cutting the price of the high quality good to
PH (1) in order to sell the high quality good to all buyers and continuing by selling to the
14It is due to the restriction on the parameters to eliminate the nontrivial case: b̂θ > θ.
15We assume that when a buyer is indifferent between the two versions of the durable good, she buys the
high quality good.
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replacement demand µ at the price PH (1) thereafter. Therefore, we must have
µb̂θqH
1− δ ≥
(
1− (1− µ) b̂
)
PH (1) +
δµPH (1)
1− δ .
Additionally,when the state before trade is
(
(1− µ) b̂, 0
)
, the monopolist must not cut the
price of the low quality good in an attempt to increase profit by selling the low quality good
as well. That is, the monopolist must prefer serving the replacement demand µb̂ at the price
θqH to serving the high type buyers’ replacement demand for the high quality good forever at
the price θqH − θqL + θqL and selling the low quality good to low type buyers at PL (1) and
continuing by selling to their replacement demand µ
(
1− b̂
)
for the low quality good at the
price PL (1) thereafter. Therefore, we must have
µb̂θqH
1− δ ≥
µb̂
(
θqH − θqL + θqL
)
1− δ +
(
1−b̂
)
PL (1) +
δµ
(
1−b̂
)
PL (1)
1− δ .
Similarly, the existence of a monopoly equilibrium with the segmented monopoly steady
state requires that when the state is
(
(1− µ) b̂, (1− µ)
(
1−b̂
))
, the monopolist must prefer
selling to the replacement demands to penetrating the entire market by charging PH (1) and
selling to the replacement demand of all buyers for the high quality good thereafter. Therefore,
we must have
µb̂
(
θqH − θqL + θqL
)
+ µ
(
1− b̂
)
θqL
1− δ ≥(
1− (1− µ) b̂
)
PH (1)− (1− µ)
(
1−b̂
)
PL (1) +
δµPH (1)
1− δ .
We show that these three inequalities hold if and only if µ ≥ µ. The following theorem shows
that the condition, µ ≥ µ, is also sufficient for the existence the monopoly equilibrium.
Theorem 5. There exists a unique monopoly equilibrium iff µ ≥ µ.
We construct a sequence of states, {x˜k}m
′+1
k=0 where x˜k =
(
x˜Hk , 0
)
with the initial value x˜H0 =
(1− µ) b̂ and the end value x˜Hm′+1 ≤ (1− µ) such that when the state is x˜k, the monopolist is
indifferent between bringing the next period’s state to x˜k−1 < x˜k and staying at x˜k forever.
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Similarly, we construct a sequence of states {x̂k}m+1k=0 where x̂k =
(
x̂Hk , 1− µ− x̂Hk
)
with the
initial value x̂H0 = (1− µ) b̂ and the end value x̂Hm+1 ≤ (1− µ) such that when the state is x̂k,
the monopolist is indifferent between bringing the next period’s state to x̂k−1 < x̂k and staying
at x̂k forever. We show that for all k ≤ min (m′,m), x˜Hk = x̂Hk , and that the limit state of the
high quality good depends on the depreciation rate. When the good is sufficiently perishable
we have x˜Hm′+1 = x̂
H
m+1 = 1 − µ, whereas otherwise we have x̂Hm+1 < x˜Hm′+1 < 1 − µ. We call
the sequence {x˜k}m
′+1
k=0 the standard monopoly path and the sequence {x̂k}m+1k=0 the segmented
monopoly path.
On the standard monopoly path, if some buyers hold the low quality good, the monop-
olist buys all low quality good back from them immediately. Hence, the monopolist prefers
incurring a higher cost rather than waiting for the low quality good dissipating gradually. If
the monopolist left some of the low quality good in the market, he wouldn’t be able to sell
as much the high quality good as he could. Since the marginal benefit of selling one unit of
the high quality good is greater than the marginal cost of buying one unit of the low quality
good back, and as the states get closer to the steady state, the marginal cost of having the
low quality good in the market raises, the monopolist strictly prefers buying all low quality
good back immediately when he is on the standard monopoly path. On the other hand, if the
segmented monopoly steady state is eventually reached, anticipating that the price of the low
quality good will be equal to the low type buyers’ reservation price θqL sooner or later, the
low type buyers are not willing to pay more than θqL for the low quality good. Hence, when
the monopolist is on the segmented monopoly path, he always sells the low quality good to
the low type buyers who does not hold the high quality good, and gradually buys the high
quality good from the low type buyers and sells the low quality good instead until the steady
state
(
b̂, 1− b̂
)
is reached.
For any state of the high quality good xH , there exists a threshold for the state of the
low quality good x
(
xH
)
. Suppose xH ∈ (x˜Hk−1, x˜Hk ] ∩ (x̂Ht−1, x̂Ht ]. If xL ≤ x (xH) then the
monopolist follows the path that reaches the standard monopoly steady state
(
b̂, 0
)
. The
market prices will be p˜Hk and p˜
L
k , and the stock of the high quality and the stock of the
low quality good after trade will be tH
(
xH , xL
)
= y˜Hk−1 and t
L
(
xH , xL
)
= 0, respectively. If
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xL > x
(
xH
)
then the monopolist follows the path that reaches the segmented monopoly steady
state
(
b̂, 1− b̂
)
. The market prices will be p̂Ht and p̂
L
t , and the stock of the high quality and the
stock of the low quality good after trade will be tH
(
xH , xL
)
= ŷHt−1 and tL
(
xH , xL
)
= 1− ŷHt−1,
respectively.
If the good is sufficiently perishable, µ ≥ µ′, then the monopolist will return to a monopoly
steady state from any state above (1− µ) b̂. The buyers in the interval
(
b̂, 1
]
purchase the
high quality good at a value exceeding their reservation prices, in order to make capital gains
by reselling it to the monopolist at a later date. If the state of the low quality good is below
its threshold value then the steady state of the market will be
(
b̂, 0
)
; otherwise it will be(
b̂, 1− b̂
)
. Therefore, for any state
(
xH , xL
)
with xH ∈
(
(1− µ) b̂, 1
]
it will take at most
m + 1 periods to return to a steady state (if xL ≤ xL (xH), the steady state will be (b̂, 0);
otherwise, it will be
(
b̂, 1− b̂
)
). Upon reaching
(
b̂, 0
)
the monopolist charges the standard
monopoly prices θqH and θqL and serves the replacement demand of the high type buyers
for the high quality good forever, and upon reaching
(
b̂, 1− b̂
)
the monopolist charges the
segmented monopoly prices θqH − θqL + θqL and θqL and serves the replacement demand of
the high type buyers for the high quality good and the replacement demand of the low type
buyers for the low quality good forever. When the good is sufficiently perishable, we have
x˜Hk = x̂
H
k and m
′ = m. Even though the stock of the high quality good after trade is the same
on both paths, since some of the low type buyers hold the low quality good on the segmented
monopoly path, the price of the high quality good should satisfy the incentive compatibility
constraint and hence, it is strictly less than its price on the standard monopoly path.
If the good is sufficiently durable, µ ≤ µ < µ′, the Coase Conjecture steady state (1, 0)
exists with
(
b̂, 0
)
and
(
b̂, 1− b̂
)
. Suppose that the state of the high quality good equals x˜Hm′+1
and that the state of the low quality good falls below the threshold. Then the monopolist is
indifferent between moving to
(
y˜Hm′ , 0
)
and fully penetrating the market by selling the high
quality good to all buyers and serving their replacement demand for the high quality good
forever. It follows that the monopolist strictly prefers moving to (1, 0) and staying there
forever when the state of the high quality good is greater than x˜Hm′+1. Suppose now that the
state of the high quality good equals x̂Hm+1 and that the state of the low quality good falls
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above the threshold. Then the monopolist is indifferent between moving to
(
y˜Hm , 1− y˜Hm
)
and
fully penetrating the market by selling the high quality good to all buyers and serving their
replacement demand for the high quality good forever. It implies that the monopolist strictly
prefers moving to (1, 0) and staying there forever when the state of the high quality good is
greater than x̂Hm+1. In this case, it is possible to have m
′ > m. When stock of high quality good
is high enough, the monopolist brings the state to the Coase Conjecture steady state (1, 0)
immediately. The set of states of the high quality good supporting the standard monopoly
equilibrium is smaller than the set of states supporting the segmented monopoly steady state.
Now, we consider the structure of the equilibrium as the time period between successive
offers of the monopolist diminishes. If some of the low type buyers hold the high quality good,
the state either immediately moves to the Coase Conjecture steady state or slowly goes back to
a monopoly steady state. Let x˜H = limz→0+ x˜Hm′(z)+1 and x̂
H = limHz→0+ x˜m(z)+1. Suppose the
stock of the low quality good is sufficiently low (high). Then, if the stock of the high quality
good after trade lies in the interval
(
(1− µ) b̂, x˜H
]
(
(
(1− µ) b̂, x̂H
]
) then it takes real time for
the state to move back to
(
b̂, 0
)
(
(
b̂, 1− b̂
)
). However, if the stock of the high quality good
lies in the interval
(
x˜H , 1
]
(
(
x̂H , 1
]
), the state immediately moves to (1, 0). We show that the
quality of the durable goods does not play any role in the rate at which the state moves back
to a steady state. Therefore, we have the following.
Corollary 10. If total stock of durable goods before trade xH+xL is less than
(
yHθ − θ) λ+ r
r
,
then
P i
(
yH , yL
)
=

θqi for y
H ∈
[
0, b̂
]
, all yL
θqi
(
b̂
yH
)λ+ r
λ
for yH ∈
(
b̂, x˜H
]
, all yL
θqi for y
H ∈ (x˜H , 1] , all yL
where i = H,L. When xH < b̂, the monopolist sells b̂ − xH units of high quality good; when
xH ∈
(
b̂, x˜H
]
, the monopolist selects x˙H = λxH
1− θθ
(
yH
b̂
)λ+ r
λ
; when xH > x˜H , the
monopolist sells 1−xH units of high quality good. Moreover, the monopolist buys all low quality
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good back immediately. Otherwise, we have
PH
(
yH , yL
)
=

θqH − θqL + θqL for yH ∈
[
0, b̂
]
, all yL
θ∆q
(
b̂
yH
)λ+ r
λ
+ θqL for y
H ∈
(
b̂, x̂H
]
, all yL
θqH for y
H ∈ (x̂H , 1] , all yL
and
PL
(
yH , yL
)
= θqL for all y
H and yL.
When xH < b̂, the monopolist sells b̂ − xH units of high quality good; when xH ∈
(
b̂, x̂H
]
,
the monopolist selects x˙H = λxH
1− θθ
(
yH
b̂
)λ+ r
λ
, and sells low quality good to the rest
of the buyers; when xH > x̂H the monopolist sells 1 − xH units of high quality good. When
xH ≤ x̂H , the monopolist fulfills the rest of the market with low quality good but buys all low
quality good back when xH > x̂H . Moreover, x̂H > x˜H .
We also prove that the steady state path of the monopolist who produces single version,
say qH only, of the durable good coincide with
{
x˜Hk
}m′+1
k=0
and that as the time horizon between
successive offers of the monopolist approaches zero, the limit if the path for single good market
is the same as x˜H . We therefore conclude that
Corollary 11. The set of states of the high quality good supporting the monopoly equilibrium
expands with the introduction of the low quality good.
5.3.3 Reputational Equilibrium
We now consider equilibria in which the monopolist establishes a reputation by cutting the
production of the high quality good. The steady states of such equilibria are
(
y`H , y`L
)
,(
y`H , 1− y`H) and (1, 0) where y`H ∈ (0, b̂) and y`L ∈ [0, b̂− y`H]. The stock of the high
quality good in a reputational steady state falls short of the static monopoly output. However,
whether or not the monopolist limits the production of the low quality good as well depends
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Figure 5.2: The Reputational Equilibrium
on the parameter values. If θ
(
y`H + y`L
) ≥ θ, from the initial state (0, 0), the monopolist will
immediately move to
(
y`H , y`L
)
by charging θqH for the high quality good and θqL for the low
quality good and continue selling to the replacement demands. Otherwise, from the initial state
(0, 0), the monopolist will immediately move to
(
y`H , 1− y`H) by charging θqH − θqL + θqL for
the high quality good and θqL for the low quality good and continue providing for the replace-
ment demands. If the monopolist penetrates the market by selling more of the high quality
good, he loses his reputation for pricing high and has to drastically lower the price of the high
quality goods. Since buyers expect that the future prices will be lower, they are reluctant to
pay a high price for the high quality good and hence, the state slowly moves to the Coase
Conjecture steady state (1, 0).
The movement of the high quality good’s price and state in a reputational equilibrium is
illustrated in Figure 12. For all xH < (1− µ) y`H , the monopolist immediately brings the state
of the high quality good to y`H . Depending on the parameter values and the stock of the low
quality good, the state of low quality good is moved to y`L or 1− y`H . For simplicity, we assume
that upon deviation from y`H , it takes two steps to reach the Coase Conjecture steady state,
and is characterized by the stationary path derived for the Coase Conjecture equilibrium.
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When the steady state is
(
y`H , y`L
)
, the monopolist does not completely lose his reputation
if he penetrates the market by selling more of the low quality good. Upon observing a price
cut on the low quality good, buyers expect that the monopolist will increase the sales of the
low quality good and hence would not accept any price for the low quality good significantly
greater than θqL. Thus, the monopolist must drop the price of the low quality good rather
than losing the sale. This implies that, deviation from
(
y`H , y`L
)
via cutting the price of the
low quality good causes the state to immediately move to
(
y`H , 1− y`H).
Theorem 6. There exists a unique reputational equilibrium if and only if µ < µ ≤ µ.
Moreover, in the limit, as the time period between successive offers approaches zero, the
steady state output levels and the acceptance prices are represented by the following corollary.
Corollary 12. Let y`H and y`L satisfy
(
y`HqH + y`
LqL
)
=
(λ+ r) θqH
λθ + rθ
. Then, as the time
period between two successive offers approaches zero, the reputational equilibrium acceptance
price converges to
PH
(
yH , yL
)
=

θqH for y
H ∈ [0, y`H] , and yL ∈ [0, y`L](
θqH − θqL + θqL
)
for yH ∈ [0, y`H] , and yL ∈ (y`L, 1]
θqH for y
H ∈ (y`H , 1] , all yL
and
PL
(
yH , yL
)
=

θqL for y
H ∈ [0, y`H] , and yL ∈ [0, y`L]
θqL for y
H ∈ [0, y`H] , and yL ∈ (y`L, 1]
θqL for y
H ∈ (y`H , 1] , all yL
In a reputational equilibrium, as the time period between successive offers is arbitrarily
short, the steady state stock of the durable good with the production of a low-end good falls
short of the steady state stock of the durable good when the low-end good is not produced.
Moreover, the difference between these two output levels increases with respect to the quality
of the low-end good. However, the segment of the market that the monopolist serves expands
with the production of the low-end good, and increases as the quality of the low-end good
increases. Hence, welfare comparison is not trivial.
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Therefore, our results suggest that when the monopolist has a reputation of being tough,
and has credibly committed to the static monopoly price, he is reluctant to produce a low-end
good. However, if the monopolist has deviated from the equilibrium by cutting the price of
the good in an attempt to increase profit, he then wants to introduce a higher quality good to
regain his reputation for pricing high.
5.4 Coexistence of Stationary Equilibria
The issue we address in this section is whether or not it is possible to observe more than one
type of stationary equilibrium for given exogenous variables: depreciation rate µ, discount
factor δ, valuation parameters
(
θ, θ
)
, quality parameters (qH , qL), proportion of the high type
buyers b̂. To establish it, we have the following result.16
Proposition 10. The threshold depreciation rates µ and µ are decreasing in discount fac-
tor δ with the same initial values µ (0) = µ (0) =
(
1− b̂
)
θ
θ − θ and with the end values of
limδ→1− µ (δ) > 0 and µ (1) = 0.
When the monopolist does not count any future profit (i.e. δ = 0), we either observe a
Coase Conjecture equilibrium or a monopoly equilibrium depending on the depreciation rate.
If µ <
(
1− b̂
)
θ
θ − θ , the unique equilibrium will be the Coase Conjecture equilibrium. Otherwise,
it will be the monopoly equilibrium.
When the monopolist discounts future payoffs (i.e. δ > 0), we observe all types of stationary
equilibrium. When µ < µ (δ), the Coase Conjecture equilibrium is the unique equilibrium.
When µ (δ) ≤ µ ≤ µ (δ) all types of equilibrium, the Coase Conjecture, the monopoly, and the
reputational equilibrium, coexist. When µ > µ (δ), the monopoly equilibrium is the unique
equilibrium.
This result implies that as long as the durable good depreciates (i.e. µ > 0), a monopoly
equilibrium always exists for sufficiently large discount factors δ. Moreover, it also shows that
16This auxiliary result is also established by Lemma 3 of Deneckere and Liang (2008).
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as the monopolist discounts future less, the domain of (δ, µ) on which a Coase Conjecture
equilibrium exists contracts.
Let µS (δ) and µS (δ) denote the threshold depreciation rates of single good model of
Deneckere and Liang (2008). We prove that vertical product differentiation does not affect the
values of µ (δ) and µ (δ).
Corollary 13. For all δ > 0, µ (δ) = µS (δ) and µ (δ) = µS (δ) where µS (δ) and µS (δ) stand
for corresponding threshold depreciation rates of single durable good market.
Since, the threshold depreciation rates are the same as the ones in Deneckere Liang (2008),
their result for the existence of stationary equilibria, as the time period between two successive
offers gets arbitrarily small remains. The results are as follows.17 There exists a threshold
λ0 below which the Coase Conjecture equilibrium is the unique equilibrium even when the
time period between successive offers is vanished. However, when λ > λ0, all three types of
equilibria coexist.
17See Deneckere and Liang (2008) for a detailed analysis.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this dissertation, I study the effect of quality differentiation on the commitment problem
of a durable goods monopolist. I extend the single good setting of Deneckere and Liang
(2008) into a setting of a vertically differentiated market and consider a monopolist selling an
imperfectly durable good available in two quality levels in an infinite horizon, discrete time
game. I characterize the Markov perfect equilibria as a function of the common discount rate,
the common depreciation rate of the goods, the length of the time period between successive
price changes, and the quality levels of the goods. Similar to Deneckere and Liang (2008),
I establish that there exist three types of Markov perfect equilibria: a Coase Conjecture
equilibrium, a monopoly equilibrium, and a reputational equilibrium. For sufficiently low
depreciation rates, the unique equilibrium is the Coase Conjecture equilibrium. The Coase
Conjecture equilibrium has a unique steady state equal to the competitive quantity. For
sufficiently high depreciation rates, the unique equilibrium is the monopoly equilibrium. This
equilibrium has two monopoly steady states one of which is equal to the static monopoly
quantity. The market at the other monopoly steady state is segmented into two: the monopolist
serves the high quality good to the high type buyers and serves the low quality good to the low
type buyers. For intermediate values of the depreciation rate, all three types of equilibria exist.
In the reputational equilibrium, the monopolist creates a reputation of pricing high by cutting
the production of the high quality good. Hence, the reputational steady state quantity of the
high quality good falls short of the monopoly quantity of the high quality good. These results
survive even when the agents become extremely patient. However, the set of parameters for
which the Coase Conjecture equilibrium is unique vanishes. When the length of the time period
between successive price changes is arbitrarily close to zero, the Coase Conjecture equilibrium
always exists and the monopoly equilibrium exists only if the good is sufficiently perishable.
I prove that the set of parameters supporting the Coase Conjecture equilibrium is smaller
and the set of the parameters supporting the monopoly equilibrium is larger when the monop-
olist, who is not allowed to buy back used goods from previous buyers, can produce a lower
quality good and when buyers are allowed to trade the good with each other in a perfectly
competitive second-hand market. When the monopolist is, however, allowed to buy back the
goods from previous buyers, I prove that quality differentiation does not affect the domain of
the parameters supporting each type of equilibrium but affects the off-equilibrium path.
This study establishes that quality differentiation may enhance market power of a durable
goods monopolist and alleviate the commitment problem when the monopolist is not allowed
to buy back the goods from previous buyers. In particular, when the innate durability of
a good is high, to credibly commit to the monopoly prices of the good the monopolist will
produce a lower quality good either by damaging a portion of the goods or by producing the
lower quality good from scratch. On the other hand, when the monopolist is allowed to buy
back the goods from previous buyers, if the innate durability of a good is sufficiently high, it is
less likely to observe quality differentiation. In particular, if the depreciation rate is so low that
the Coase Conjecture equilibrium is the unique equilibrium then the monopolist is reluctant
to introduce lower quality versions of the good. Moreover, a durable goods monopolist selling
a sufficiently perishable good has penetrated the market in an attempt to increase profit, then
he may introduce a higher (or a lower) quality version of the good to be able to restore his
market power. However, if the monopolist has already been committed to the monopoly price,
he will be reluctant to introduce a lower quality version of the good.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 4
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose there exists a history after which the state is (xH0 , x
L
0 )
and the monopolist randomizes among the elements of P (t(x0)). Let the expected price of
good i be pi2. Since T (·) is a sublattice of Y , we have y1 ∧ y2 ∈ T (xH , xL) where y1, y2 ∈
T (xH , xL). It follows that pi2 < p
i
1 = P
i(inf T (x0)) and p
−i
2 ≤ p−i1 = P−i(inf T (x0)) for
i ∈ {H,L}. Let us define v̂Hj by fH(yH0 ) − v̂Hj = ρ(fH(yH0 ) − pHj ) and v̂Lj by fL(yH0 +
yL0 ) − v̂Lj = ρ(fL(yH0 + yL0 ) − pLj ), j = 1, 2 where yH0 =
xH
1− µ and y
L
0 =
xL
1− µ . When
the monopolist randomizes the price of the high quality and the low quality goods in the
previous period cannot be greater than v̂H2 and v̂
L
2 , respectively. We will show that P
i(y0) ≥
v̂i1 and P
−i(y0) ≥ v̂−i1 . Let (yHn , yLn ) be defined such that (yHn , yLn ) ↑ (yH0 , yL0 ) and T ((1 −
µ)yn) is single valued for all n. Since T (·) is a monotone increasing correspondence, we have
PH (y0) = lim
n→∞P
H (yn) = lim
n→∞
(
(1− ρ) fH (yHn )+ ρPH (T ((1− µ) yn)) ≥ (1− ρ) fH (yH0 ) +
ρpH1 = v̂
H
1 and P
L (y0) = lim
n→∞P
L (yn) = lim
n→∞
(
(1− ρ) fL (yHn + yLn )+ ρPL (T ((1− µ) yn)) ≥
(1− ρ) fL (yH0 + yL0 ) + ρpL1 = v̂L1 . Hence, we can conclude that the monopolist does not
randomize along any equilibrium path and (tH(x), tL(x)) = inf T (x) denotes the monopolist’s
equilibrium choice.
Proof of Proposition 2. If (yHs , y
L
s ) is the stock level after trade in a steady state, we must
have V H(yHs ) = f
H(yHs ) and V
L(yHs + y
L
s ) = f
L(yHs + y
L
s ). This implies that P
H(yHs , y
L
s ) =
fH(yHs )− fL(yHs ) + fL(yHs + yLs ) and PL(yHs , yLs ) = fL(yHs + yLs ).
Let us define the sets SH and SL as SH = {bH : V H(bH) = fH(bH)} and SL = {bL :
V L(bL) = fL(bL)}. Suppose that SH and SL are nonempty. Let (b´H , b´L) be defined as
b´H = supSH and b´L = supSL such that b´H < b´L. First, we show that (b´H , b´L− b´H) is a steady
state. Then, we prove that V i and f i necessarily cross for all i ∈ {H,L} and that b´H < b´L.
We now prove that (b´H , b´L − b´H) is a steady state. First, we claim that there is no
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bH > b´H such that the maximum willingness to pay of buyer bH for the high quality good
is greater V H(b´H). We prove this claim by contradiction. Suppose that there exists bH >
b´H with V H(bH) ≥ V H(b´H). Then, by definition we must have fH(bH) < fH(b´H). Since
ti(·) is non-decreasing with respect to both arguments and ∣∣ti1∣∣ ≥ ∣∣ti2∣∣ we haveV H(tH((1 −
µ)bH , (1−µ)((b′L−bH))) ≤ V H(tH((1−µ)b´H , (1−µ)((b´L− b´H))). This implies a contradiction,
since V H(bH) = (1 − ρ)fH(bH) + ρV H(tH((1 − µ)bH , (1 − µ)(b′L − bH))) < (1 − ρ)fH(b´H) +
ρV H(tH((1 − µ)b´H , (1 − µ)(b´L − b´H))) = V H(b´H). Similarly, we now claim that there is no
bL > b´L such that the maximum willingness to pay of buyer bL for the low quality good is
greater V L(b´L). Suppose that there is bL > b´L with V L(bL) ≥ V L(b´L). Then by definition we
have fL(bL) < fL(b´L). Moreover, by the same reasoning above, we have V L((tH + tL)((1 −
µ)b′H , (1 − µ)((bL − b′H))) ≤ V L((tH + tL)((1 − µ)b´H , (1 − µ)(b´L − b´H))). This implies a
contradiction, since V L(bL) = (1 − ρ)fL(bL) + ρV L((tH + tL)((1 − µ)b′H , (1 − µ)(bL − b′H)))
< (1− ρ)fL(b´H) + ρV L((tH + tL)((1− µ)b´H , (1− µ)(b´L − b´H))) = V L(b´L). Therefore, we can
conclude that, if the offer is PH(b´H , b´L) = fH(b´H)−fL(b´H)+fL(b´L) and PL(b´H , b´L) = fL(b´L),
all b ≤ b´H holds the high quality good, all b´H < b ≤ b´L holds the low quality good, and all
b > b´L rejects. Since V H(b´H) = (1 − ρ)fH(b´H) + ρV H(tH((1 − µ)b´H , (1 − µ)(b´L − b´H))) and
V H(b´H) = fH(b´H), we must have tH((1 − µ)b´H , (1 − µ)(b´L − b´H)) = b´H and since V L(b´L) =
(1−ρ)fL(b´H)+ρV L((tH+tL)((1−µ)b´H , (1−µ)(b´L− b´H))) and V L(b´L) = fL(b´L), we must have
(tH+tL)((1−µ)b´H , (1−µ)(b´L− b´H)) = b´L which implies that tL((1−µ)b´H , (1−µ)((b´L− b´H)) =
b´L − b´H . Hence, (b´H , b´L − b´H) is a steady state.
Now, we prove that V i and f i necessarily cross for all i ∈ {H,L} and that b´H < b´L. First,
suppose that there is a stationary equilibrium which does not have any steady states. This
implies that Si for i ∈ {H,L} is empty. We show that if SH is empty then V H(b) < θqH for
b ∈ [0, b̂] and V H(b) > θqH for b ∈ (̂b, 1]. If SH is empty, then we must have V H(b) 6= θqH for
b ∈ [0, b̂] and V H(b) 6= θqH for b ∈ (̂b, 1]. Since the seller never charges a price less than θqH
for high quality good as long as pL > 0, we cannot have V H(b) < θqH . Hence, we must have
V H(b) > θqH for b ∈ (̂b, 1]. Moreover, it is not possible that V H(b) > θqH for some b ∈ [0, b̂].
If we had V H(b) > θqH , it would imply that V
H(0) > θqH , since V
H(·) is nonincreasing.
Given a state, say (0, xL), the arbitrage equation V H(0) = (1 − ρ)θqH + ρV H(tH(0, xL))
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implies that V H(tH(0, xL)) > V H(0) which is a contradiction because tH(0, xL) ≥ 0 and
V H(0) is nonincreasing. Second, suppose that SL is empty. We show that if SL is empty
then V L(b) < θqL for b ∈ [0, b̂] and V L(b) > θqL for b ∈ (̂b, 1]. If SL is empty then V L(b) 6=
θqL for b ∈ [0, b̂] and V L(b) 6= θqL for b ∈ (̂b, 1]. Since the seller never charges a price
less than θqL for low quality good when b
L < 1, we must have V L(b) > θqLfor b ∈ (̂b, 1].
Moreover, it is not possible that V L(b) > θqL for some b ∈ [0, b̂]. If it was, it would imply
that V L(0) > θqL, since V
L(·) is nonincreasing. Given a state (0, bL), the arbitrage equation
V L(0) = (1− ρ)θqL + ρV L((tH + tL)(0, 0)) implies that V L((tH + tL)(0, 0)) > V L(0) which is
a contradiction because ti(0, 0) ≥ 0 for all i = H,L and V L(·) is nonincreasing.
We now show that V i(b) < θqi for b ∈ [0, b̂] and V i(b) > θqi for b ∈ (̂b, 1] leads to a
contradiction with the definition of ti(·). Suppose that the state is (xH , xL) where xH ∈ [0, b̂].
Since θqH −V H( xH1−µ) > 0, the arbitrage equation θqH −V H( x
H
1−µ) = ρ(θqH −V H(tH(xH , xL)))
implies that V H(tH(xH , xL)) < V H( x
H
1−µ). That is, t
H(xH , xL) > x
H
1−µ . Suppose now that
the state is (((1 − µ)(̂b + ), xL) where  ∈ (0, 1 − b̂] and (1 − µ)(̂b + ) + xL ≤ 1. Since
θqH−V H (̂b+) < 0, the arbitrage equation θqH−V H (̂b+) = ρ(θqH−V H(tH((1−µ)(̂b+), xL)))
implies that V H(tH((1 − µ)(̂b + ), xL)) > V H (̂b + ). That is, tH((1 − µ)(̂b + ), xL) < b̂ + .
Therefore, lim
→0+
tH((1 − µ)(̂b + ), xL) ≤ b̂ < tH((1 − µ)̂b, xL). Since, T (·) is upper hemi-
continuous, lim
→0+
(tH((1 − µ)(̂b + ), xL), tL((1 − µ)(̂b + ), xL)) ∈ T ((1 − µ)̂b, xL). Moreover,
since T (·) is a lattice, lim
→0+
(tH((1−µ)(̂b+), xL), tL((1−µ)(̂b+), xL))uprise(tH((1−µ)̂b, xL), tL((1−
µ)̂b, xL)) ∈ T (·) which contradicts with the definition of (tH(·), tL(·)). Suppose that the state
is (xH , xL) where xH + xL ∈ [0, b̂]. Since θqL − V L(xH+xL1−µ ) > 0, the arbitrage equation
θqL − V L(xH+xL1−µ ) = ρ(θqL − V L((tH + tL)(xH , xL))) implies that V L((tH + tL)(xH , xL)) <
V L(x
H+xL
1−µ ). That is, (t
H + tL)(xH , xL) > x
H+xL
1−µ . Similarly, suppose the state is (x
H , (1 −
µ)(̂b + ) − xH) where  ∈ (0, 1 − b̂]. Since θqL − V L(̂b + ) < 0, the arbitrage equation
θqL − V L(̂b + ) = ρ(θqL − V L((tH + tL)(xH , (1 − µ)(̂b + ) − xH))) implies that V L((tH +
tL)(xH , (1− µ)(̂b+ )− xH)) > V L(̂b+ ). That is, (tH + tL)(xH , (1− µ)(̂b+ )− xH) < b̂+ .
So, lim
→0+
((tH + tL)(xH , (1−µ)(̂b+)−xH)) ≤ b̂ < (tH + tL)(xH , (1−µ)(̂b+)−xH . Since tH is
nondecreasing, we have lim
→0+
tH(xH , (1−µ)(̂b+)−xH) ≥ tH(xH , (1− µ) b̂−xH). This implies
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that lim
→0+
tL(xH , (1 − µ)(̂b + ) − xH) < tL(xH , (1 − µ)(̂b − xH)). Since, T (·) is upper hemi-
continuous, lim
→0+
(tH(xH , (1−µ)(̂b+)−xH), tL(xH , (1−µ)(̂b+)−xH)) ∈ T (xH , (1−µ)̂b−xH).
Moreover, since T (·) is a lattice, lim
→0+
(tH(xH , (1−µ)(̂b+ )−xH), tL(xH , (1−µ)(̂b+ )−xH))
uprise(tH(xH , (1− µ)̂b− xH), tL(xH , (1− µ)̂b− xH)) ∈ T (·) which contradicts with the definition
of (tH(·), tL(·)).
Lemma 1.
If there exists
(
y´H , y´L
)
such that (i) V H
(
yH
)
= V H
(
y´H
)
and fH
(
yH
)
= fH
(
y´H
)
, (ii)
V L
(
yH + yL
)
= V L
(
y´H + y´L
)
and fL
(
yH + yL
)
= fL
(
y´H + y´L
)
, (iii) V H (yH) (y´H − yH)
+ V L
(
yH + yL
) (
y´L − yL) > 0 hold for some y´H ≥ 0 and y´L ≥ 0 then (yH , yL) cannot be a
steady state.
If these conditions hold, then the monopolist strictly prefers
(
y´H , y´L
)
to
(
yH , yL
)
. There-
fore
(
yH , yL
)
cannot be a steady state since the monopolist deviates from that state with
probability one.
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof of this lemma is trivial. Because, it is clear that the monopolist
prefers
(
y´H , y´L
)
to
(
yH , yL
)
almost sure.
Proof of Proposition 3. Lemma 1 helps us to establish that some states cannot be a steady
state. First, we show that (y`H , 0) cannot be a steady state when y`H ∈ (̂b, 1). Suppose not.
Then V H(y`H) = θqH and V
L(y`H) = θqL. Since V
i(·) is a non-increasing function, V H(b) ≤
θqH and V
L(b) ≤ θqL for all b ∈ (y`H , 1]. So, V H(yH) = θqH and V L(yH) = θqL for all
y ∈ [y`H , 1]. Since the seller would prefer yH > y`H , (y`H , 0) cannot be a steady state.
Second, for y`H ∈ (0, b̂], and y`H+y`L ∈ (̂b, 1), (y`H , y`L) cannot be a steady state. Suppose not.
Then V H(y`H) = θqH and V
L(y`H + y`L) = θqL. Therefore, for all b > y`
H + y`L, V L(b) ≤ θqL has
to hold for (y`H , y`L) to be a steady state. However, for all b ∈ [0, 1], we must have PL(b) ≥ θqL.
So, for all b > y`H + y`L, we must have fL(b) = θqL. Hence, (y`
H , y`L) cannot be a steady state.
Third, for y`H ∈ (̂b, 1), and y`H+ y`L ∈ (̂b, 1], (y`H , y`L) cannot be a steady state. Suppose not.
Then V H(y`H) = θqH and V
L(y`H + y`L) = θqL. Therefore, for all b
H > y`H and bL > y`H + y`L,
V H(bH) ≤ θqL and V L(bL) ≤ θqL have to hold for (y`H , y`L) to be a steady state. However,
for all bH ∈ [0, 1] and bL ∈ [0, 1], we must have V H(bH) ≥ θqL and V L(bL) ≥ θqL. So, for all
bH > yH and bL > y`H + y`L, we have V H(bH) ≥ θqL and V L(bL) = θqL. Hence, we conclude
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that (y`H , y`L) cannot be a steady state.
Fourth, for y`H + y`L ∈ (0, b̂] and y`L > 0, (y`H , y`L) cannot be a steady state. Suppose not.
Then, we must have V H(b) < θqH for b ∈ (y`H , b̂] and V L(b) = θqL for b ≤ y`H + y`L. However, if
there exists b′ such that V H(b′) < θqH , it must be V L(b′) < θqL which leads to a contradiction.
Proof of (2): Suppose that (̂b, 0) is a steady state. Then, according to Proposition 2,
PH (̂b) = θqH and P
L(̂b) = θqL. Since V
i(·) is non-increasing, we must have P i(b) ≤ θqi for all
b ∈ [0, b̂]. So Lemma 1 shows that (b, 0) such that b < b̂ cannot be a steady state. We conclude
that the only possible steady states other than (̂b, 0) are (̂b, 1 − b̂) and (1, 0). Suppose now
that (̂b, 1− b̂) is a steady state. Then, PH (̂b) = θqH− θqL+ θqL and PL(̂b) = θqL.
Proof of (3): Suppose that (y`H , 0) where y`H ∈ (0, b̂) is a steady state. Then PH(b) = θqH
and PL(b) = θqL for all b ∈ [0, y`H ] and PH(b) < θqH and PL(b) < θqL for all b ∈ (y`H , b̂]. This
implies that (̂b, .) cannot be a steady state. We conclude that the only possible steady states
other than (y`H , 0) when y`H ∈ (0, b̂) are (y`H , 1 − y`H) and (1, 0). Suppose that (y`H , b̂ − y`H)
where y`H ∈ (0, b̂) is a steady state. Then PH(bH) = θqH and PL(bL) = θqL for all bH ∈ [0, y`H ]
and bH ∈ [0, b̂] and PH(bH) < θqH for all bH ∈ (y`H , b̂]. This implies that (̂b, .) cannot be a
steady state. We conclude that the only possible steady states other than (y`H , b̂− y`H) when
y`H ∈ (0, b̂) are (y`H , 1− y`H) and (1, 0).
Proof of (1): If there is no steady state in [0, b̂] then (1, 0) is a steady state.
Proof of Theorem 1. First, let us define the set of states on each path. Let xjk,i be the state
of the durable good j in period k on path i. We start with defining the set of states for the
high quality good. For k = 0, 1, the states are xH0,i = 1 − µ and xH1,i = (1 − µ)̂b on all paths
(i = 1, . . . , 4). For k = 2, the state is xH2,i =
b̂θ−θ
θ−θ on the first and the forth paths (i = 1, 4), and
it is xH2,i =
(b̂θ−θ)(qH−qL)+(1−xL2,i)θqL
θqL+(θ−θ)(qH−qL) on the second and the third paths ( i = 2, 3). For k = 3,
the state is xH3,i = (1−µ)−1 θρ(θ−θ)(x
H
2,i− (xH1,i−xH2,i)) on the first and the forth paths (i = 1, 4),
and xH3,2 = (1 − µ)−1(1 + θqL+θ(qH−qL)(θ−θ)qL+ρ(θqL+(θ−θ)(qH−qL)))x
H
2,2 −
b̂θ(qH−qL)+(1−xL3,2)θqL
(θ−θ)qL+ρ(θqL+(θ−θ)(qH−qL)) , and
xH3,3 = (1 − µ)−1(1 + θqL+θ(qH−qL)ρ(θqL+(θ−θ)(qH−qL)))x
H
2,2 −
b̂θ(qH−qL)+(1−xL3,2)θqL
ρ(θqL+(θ−θ)(qH−qL)) . For k > 3, the states
are xHk,i = (1 − µ)−1(xHk−1,i − ak,i(xHk−2,i − xHk−1,i)) where ak,i = θρk−2(θ−θ) for i = 1, 4, ak,2 =
θqH
ρk−3((θ−θ)qL+ρ(θqL+(θ−θ)(qH−qL))) , and ak,3 =
θqH
ρk−2(θqL+(θ−θ)(qH−qL)) .
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We now define the set of states for the low quality good. On path 1, the states are
xLk,1 = 0 for all k. On path 2, the states are x
L
1,2 = (1 − µ)(1 − b̂) for k = 1 and xLk,2 ∈
(0, (1 − µ)̂b − xHk,2] for all k ≥ 2. On path 3, states are xL1,3 = (1 − µ)(1 − b̂) for k = 1 and
xLk,3 ∈ ((1− µ)̂b− xHk,3, 1− µ− xHk,3] for all k ≥ 2. On path 4, there is an excess supply of the
low quality good, so xLk,4 > 1− µ− xHk,4 holds for all k.
Second, let us define µ. Let us define the set Λi as Λi = {µ ≥ 0 | ∃ mi < ∞ s.t.
xHm+1,i < 0 ≤ xHm,i and {xHk,i}mik=0 is a strictly decreasing sequence} and let µ be minµi, where
µi = sup Λi. Since 0 ∈ Λi and Λi is open in R+for all i, we must have µ > 0. Now, we
show that if µ′ ∈ Λi and µ′′ < µ′ then µ′′ ∈ Λi. This implies that Λi = [0, µi). The proof
for path 1 and path 4 are established in Deneckere and Liang (2008, Theorem 1).1 To prove
that this also holds for path 2 and path 3, we show that ∆Hk,i = x
H
k−1,i − xHk,i is decreasing
in µ for all i = 2, 3. By definition of xHk,i,
d∆Hk,i
dµ < 0 holds for k ≤ 2, i = 2, 3. The rest of
the proof comes from induction. As the first step of induction, we show that
dxH3,i
dµ > 0 and
d∆H3,i
dµ < −2(1 − µ)−1xH3,i. Since
dxH3,i
dµ = (1 − µ)−1(xH3,i + (1 − µ)−1a3,ixH2,i) and a3,i > 1, we
must have
dxH3,i
dµ > 2(1− µ)−1xH3,i > 0. Note that
d∆H3,i
dµ = −
dxH3,i
dµ . Thus,
d∆H3,i
dµ < −2(1− µ)−1xH3,i
holds for path i = 2, 3. As the second step of induction, we assume
dxHk−1,i
dµ > 0 and
d∆Hk−1,i
dµ <
−(k−2)(1−µ)−1xHk−1,i hold. We now show that
dxHk,i
dµ > 0 and
d∆Hk,i
dµ < −(k−1)(1−µ)−1xHk,i hold
as well. Since ∆Hk,i = (1−(1−µ)−1)xHk−1,i+(1−µ)−1ak,i∆Hk−1,i and
dxHk−1,i
dµ > 0, we have
d∆Hk,i
dµ <
−(1−µ)−2xHk−1,i + (1−µ)−2ak,i∆Hk−1,i + (1−µ)−1 dak,idµ ∆Hk−1,i+(1−µ)−1ak,i
d∆Hk−1,i
dµ . Moreover,
dak,2
dµ = ak,2(1−µ)−1((k−2)− θqH(θ−θ)qL+ρ(θqL+(θ−θ)(qH−qL))) and
dak,3
dµ = ak,3(1−µ)−1(k−2) imply
that we must have
d∆Hk,i
dµ < −(1−µ)−2xHk−1,i+(1−µ)−2ak,i(k−1)∆Hk−1,i+(1−µ)−1ak,i
d∆Hk−1,i
dµ .
Additionally, due to the induction, since
d∆Hk−1,i
dµ < −(k− 2)(1−µ)−1xHk−1,i and ak,i > 1,
d∆Hk,i
dµ
< −(k − 1)(1− µ)−2xHk−1,i + (1− µ)−2ak,i(k − 1)∆Hk−1,i = −(k − 1)(1− µ)−1xHk,i holds.
Now, we prove that a stationary equilibrium exists for µ ≤ µ. Let us define {PH (.), PL (.),
tH (.), tL (.), R (.)} as follows. First, we define path 1:
1These two are identical because the set of states of the high quality good on path 1 and on path 4 is the
same as the set of states of a durable good available in only one version.
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PH(xH , 0) =
 p
H
m1,1
for xH∈ [0,yHm1,1]
pHk,1 for x
H ∈ (yHk+1,1, yHk,1]
where k = 0, . . . ,m1 − 1,
PL(xH , 0) ≥θqL for all xH ,
tH
(
xH , 0
)
=

yHm1−1,1 for x
H ∈ [0, xHm1,1]
yHk−1,1 for x
H ∈ (xHk+1,1, xHk,1]
1 for xH ∈ (xH2,1, 1− µ]
where k = 2, . . . ,m1 − 1,
tL(xH , 0) = 0 for all xH ,
R(xH , 0) =

(yHm1−1,1 − xH)PH(yHm1−1,1, 0) + δRm1−1 for xH ∈ [0, xHm1,1]
(yHk−1,1 − xH)PH(yHk−1,1, 0) + δRk−1 for xH ∈ (xHk+1,1, xHk,1]
(1− xH)PH(1, 0) + δµθqH1−δ for xH ∈ (xH2,1, 1− µ]
where k = 2, . . . ,m1 − 1, Rs ≡ R(xHs,1, 0) and pHk,1 = (1− ρk)θqH + ρkθqH .
The sequence {xHk,1}m1k=2 is defined such that when the state is (xHk,1, 0) the monopolist is
indifferent between selecting (yHk−1,1, 0) and (y
H
k−2,1, 0) where y
H
k,1 =
xHk,1
1−µ .
Second, we define path 2:
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PH
(
xH , xL
)
=
 p
H
m2,2
for xH ∈ [0, yHm2,2(xL)]
pHk,2 for x
H ∈ (yHk+1,2(xL), yHk,2(xL)]
where k = 0, . . . ,m2 − 1,
PL
(
xH , xL
)
=

pLm2,2 for x
H ∈ [0, yHm2,2(xL)]
pLk,2 for x
H ∈ (yHk+1,2(xL), yHk,2(xL)]
0 for xH ∈ (yH1,2, yH0,2]
where k = 1, . . . ,m2 − 1,
tH(xH , xL) =

yHm2−1,2 for x
H ∈ [0, xHm2,2(xL)]
yHk−1,2 for x
H ∈ (xHk+1,2(xL), xHk,2(xL)]
1 for xH ∈ (xH2,2(xL), 1− µ]
where k = 2, . . . ,m2 − 1,
tL(xH , xL) = xL for all xH ,
R(xH , xL) =

(yHm2−1,2 − xH)PH(yHm2−1,2, xL) + δRm2−1,2 for xH ∈ D1
(yHk−1,1 − xH)PH(yHk−1,1, xL) + δRk−1,1 for xH ∈ D2
(1− xH)PH(1, xL) + δµθ(qH−qL)1−δ for xH ∈ D3
where k = 2, . . . ,m2 − 1, Rs,i ≡ R(xHs,i, 0), pL0,2 = 0,
pLk,2 = (1− ρk−1)θqL + ρk−1(1− ρ)θqL for k = 1, 2, . . .,
pHk,2 = p
L
k,2 + (θ − ρk(θ − θ))(qH − qL) for k = 0, 1, . . .,
D1 ≡ [0, xHm2,1(xL)], D2 ≡ (xHk+1,2(xL), xHk,2(xL)], and D3 ≡ (xH2,2(xL), 1− µ]
The sequence {xHk,2(xL)}m2k=2 is defined such that when the state is (xHk,2(xL), xL) the monop-
olist is indifferent between selecting (yHk−1,2(x
L), xL) and (yHk−2,2(x
L), xL) where yHk,2 =
xHk,2
1−µ . We
now define xL2,2(x
L) and prove the existence of this path. When the state is
(
xH , xL
)
, the state
of the low quality good in the second period will be xL2,2(x
L) = (1−µ)sxL, s ∈ {n, n+1, . . . , n}.
We define n as n =
⌊
ln(xL2,2)−ln(xL)
ln(1−µ)
⌋
where xL2,2 solves x
H
2,2(x
L)+xL2,2 = (1−µ)̂b, and define n as
m((1−µ)nxL) ≥ n and m((1−µ)nxL) < n+ 1 where m(x) is set such that xHm+1,2 < 0 ≤ xHm,2
with xL2,2 = x. Let us define the set Γ2 as Γ2 = {s : xH ∈ (xHs+2,2, xHs+1,2] s.t s = n, . . . , n} and
define k as k = min Γ2. Since x
H
s,2(x
L) < xHs,2(x´
L) for xL2 > x´
L
2 for all s = n+ 2, . . . , n+ 2, Γ2
is non-empty.
Third, we define path 3:
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PH(xH , xL) =
 p
H
m2,3
for xH ∈ [0, yHm3,3(xL)]
pHk,3 for x
H ∈ (yHk+1,3(xL), yHk,3(xL)]
where k = 0, . . . ,m3 − 1,
PL(xH , xL) =

pLm3,3 for x
H ∈ [0, yHm3,3(xL)]
pLk,3 for x
H ∈ (yHk+1,3(xL), yHk,3(xL)]
0 for xH ∈ (yH1,3, yH0,3]
where k = 1, . . . ,m3 − 1,
tH(xH , xL) =

yHm3−1,3 for x
H ∈ [0, xHm3,3(xL)]
yHk−1,3 for x
H ∈ (xHk+1,3(xL), xHk,3(xL)]
1 for xH ∈ (xH2,3 (xL) , 1− µ]
where k = 1, . . . ,m3 − 2,
tL(xH , xL) = xL for all xH ,
R(xH , xL) =

(yHm2−1,2 − xH)PH(yHm2−1,2, xL) + δRm2−1,2 for xH ∈ D1
(yHk−1,1 − xH)PH(yHk−1,1, xL) + δRk−1,1 for xH ∈ D2
(1− xH)PH(1, xL) + δµθ(qH−qL)1−δ for xH ∈ D3
where k = 2, . . . ,m3 − 1, Rs,i ≡ R(xHs,i, 0), pLk,3 = (1− ρk)θqL,
pHk,3 = p
L
k,3 + (θ − ρk(θ − θ))(qH − qL), D1 ≡ [0, xHm2,1(xL)],
D2 ≡ (xHk+1,2(xL), xHk,2(xL)], and D3 ≡ (xH2,2(xL), 1− µ].
The sequence {xHk,3(xL)}m3k=2 is defined such that when the state is (xHk,3(xL)), xL)) the
monopolist is indifferent between selecting (yHk−1,3(x
L), xL) and (yHk−2,3(x
L), xL) where yHk,3 =
xHk,3
1−µ . We now define x
L
2,3(x
L) and prove the existence of this path. When the state is (xH , xL),
the state of the low quality good in the second period is xL2,3 = (1 − µ)sxL, s ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}
where n′ is defined as n′ =
⌈
ln(xL2,3)−ln(xL)
ln(1−µ)
⌉
. Let us define the set Γ3 as Γ3 = {s : xH ∈
(xHs+3,3, x
H
s+2,3] s.t s = 0, . . . , n
′} and define k as k = max Γ3. To prove that path 3 exists
we show that Γ3 is a non-empty set. For s = 2, . . . , n
′ + 2, we have xHs,3(xL) < xHs,3(x´L)
for xL2 > x´
L
2 . To finish the proof we need to show that x
H
n′+2,3(x
L) < xHn+2,2(x
L). Note
that n − 1 ≤ n′ ≤ n. Hence, we show that xHs,3(xL) < xHs,2(xL) holds by induction. Since
xj2,2 = x
j
2,3 = x
j
2 for j = H,L, by definition we have x
H
3,3 < x
H
3,2. Now, we show that
xH4,3 < x
H
4,2 and ∆
H
4,2 < ∆
H
4,3 hold. Since we have a4,3 > a4,2 and a4,2x
H
3,2 > a4,3x
H
3,3 for
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µ < µ, the difference equations, xH4,2 − xH4,3 = (1 − µ)−1((xH3,2 − xH3,3) + (a4,2xH3,2 − a4,3xH3,3))
and ∆H4,3 −∆H4,2 = xH2 (a4,3 − a4,2) + (a4,2xH3,2 − a4,3xH3,3), are both positive. Then we assume
that xHk−1,3 < x
H
k−1,2 and ∆
H
k−1,2 < ∆
H
k−1,3 hold and show that x
H
k,3 < x
H
k,2 and ∆
H
k,2 < ∆
H
k,3.
Since ak,3 > ak,2 and ∆
H
k−1,2 < ∆
H
k−1,3, we have x
H
k,2 − xHk,3 = (1 − µ)−1((xHk−1,2 − xHk−1,3) +
(ak,3∆
H
k−1,3 − ak,2∆Hk−1,2)) > 0. Moreover, since ∆Hk,i = (1− (1− µ)−1)xHk−1,i + ak,i∆Hk−1,i, we
have ∆Hk,3 −∆Hk,2 = (1− (1− µ)−1)(xHk−1,3 − xHk−1,2) + ak,3∆Hk−1,3 − ak,2∆Hk−1,2 > 0.
Last, we define path 4:
PH(xH , xL) =
 p
H
m4,4
for xH ∈ [0, yHm4,4]
pHk,4 for x
H ∈ (yHk+1,4, yHk,4]
where k = 0, . . . ,m4 − 1,
PL(xH , xL) = 0 for all xH ,
tH(xH , xL) =

yHm4−1,4 for x
H ∈ [0, xHm4,4]
yHk−1,4 for x
H ∈ (xHk+1,4, xHk,4]
1 for xH ∈ (xH2,4, 1− µ]
where k = 2, . . . ,m4 − 1,
tL(xH , xL) = xL for all xH ,
R(xH , xL) =

(yHm4−1,4 − xH)PH(yHm4−1,4, xL) + δRm1−1 for xH ∈ D1
(yHk−1,4 − xH)PH(yHk−1,4, xL) + δRk−1 for xH ∈ D2
(1− xH)PH(1, xL) + δµθ(qH−qL)1−δ for xH ∈ D3
where k = 2, . . . ,m4 − 1, Rs ≡ R(xHs,4, 0),
pHk,4 = (1− ρk)θ(qH − qL) + ρkθ(qH − qL),
D1 ≡ [0, xHm4,4], D2 ≡ (xHk+1,4, xHk,4], and D3 ≡ (xH2,4, 1− µ].
The sequence {xHk,4}m4k=2 is defined such that when the state is (xHk,4, xL) the monopolist is
indifferent between selecting (yHk−1,4, x
L) and (yHk−2,4, x
L) where yHk,4 =
xHk,4
1−µ .
Now, we verify that the path defined above is a solution to the system. Let’s define
Π(y, x) = PH(y)(yH−xH)+PL(y)(yL−xL)+δR((1−µ)y). First, we show that the monopolist
never increases the state of the low quality good. When the state is (xHk , x
L
k ) the monopolist
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is indifferent between (
xHk−1
1−µ ,
xLk−1
1−µ ) and (
xHk−2
1−µ ,
xLk−2
1−µ ) when
(1− µ)(xHk (pHk−1 − pHk−2) + xLk (pLk−1 − pLk−2))
= xHk−1(p
H
k−1 − ρpHk−3) + xLk−1(pLk−1 − ρpLk−3)− xHk−2(pHk−2 − ρpHk−3)− xLk−2(pLk−2 − ρpLk−3)
holds for k = 3, . . .. Moreover, when the state is
(
xH2 , x
L
2
)
the monopolist is indifferent between
(̂b, 1− b̂) and (1, xL2 ) if
xH2 (p
H
1 − pH0 ) + xL2 pL1 = b̂pH1 − pH0 + (1− b̂)pL1 + ρ(1− b̂)pH0
Thus, we have
dxHk
dxLk
= −p
L
k−1−pLk−2
pHk−1−pHk−2
for all k. Then, it follows that on both path 2 and path
3 we have dΠ
dxLK
< 0 for k = 3, . . .. However, for k = 2 even though dΠ
dxL2
< 0 holds for path
3, dΠ
dxL2
< 0 holds for path 2 if θ > (θ − θ) which holds on ⋂
∀i
Γi. This implies that when the
state is (xHk , x
L
k ) the monopolist is indifferent between moving the state to (x
H
k−1, x
L
k−1) and to
(xHk−2, x
L
k−2) where x
L
k−1 = x
L
k−2 = (1 − µ)xLk . We therefore have Π(yk−1, xk) = Π(yk−2, xk).
Let hk(x) = Π(yk−1, x) − Π(yk−2, x). Then we have hk(xk) = 0 and
dhk(x)
dx
= −PH(yk−1) +
PH(yk−2) < 0. It implies that when xLk (x
L) =
xL2
(1−µ)k−2 , for x < x
H
k (x
L) we have yk−1  yk−2,
and for x > xHk (x
L) we have yk−1 ≺ yk−2. For a given xL, Π(y, x) is strictly increasing in
yH on any of the intervals [0, yHmi,i(x
L
2 )],(y
H
mi,i
(xL2 ), y
H
mi−1,i(x
L
2 )], . . . , (y
H
1 , 1]. It follows that
t(x) is a solution to the problem. Since buyers’ arbitrage equation is also satisfied, the set
{PH (.),PL (.),tH (.),tL (.),R (.)} is a stationary set for µ ≤ µ.
To prove the uniqueness of the solution, we consider any stationary equilibrium with unique
steady state (1, 0), and let {PH0 (.), PL0 (.), tH0 (.), tL0 (.), R0 (.)} be the associated stationary
set. We now prove that {PH0 (.), PL0 (.), tH0 (.), tL0 (.), R0 (.)} is equal to {PH (.), PL (.), tH (.),
tL (.), R (.)}.
First, we will show that PH0 (y) = P
H(y) for all yH ∈ (̂b, 1]. Since neither (̂b, 0) nor
(̂b, 1 − b̂) is a steady state, we must have V H (̂b) < θqH . Suppose now that there exists  > 0
such that V H(b) > θqH for all b ∈ (̂b, b̂ + ). This yields a contradiction, since we have
V H (̂b) < θqH . Therefore, V
H (b) = θqH for all b ∈ (̂b, 1]. It follows that for all yH ∈ (̂b, 1],
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we have PH(yH , 0) = θqH , and for b̂ < y
H + yL ≤ 1, we have PH(yH , yL) = θqH and for
yH + yL > 1, we have PH(yH , yL) = θ(qH − qL).
Second, we show that PL0 (y) = P
L(y) for all yH ∈ (̂b, 1]. The same argument can be
applied here. Since V L(̂b) < θqL and there exists no  > 0 such that V
L(b) > θqL for all
b ∈ (̂b, b̂+ ), we have V L(b) = θqL for all b ∈ (̂b, 1]. It follows that, for all (yH , yL) such that
b̂ < yH + yL ≤ 1, we have PL(yH , yL) = θqL and for yH + yL > 1, we have PL(yH , yL) = 0.
Then, we prove that tH0 (x
H
1 , x
L) = 1, and tL0 (x
H
1 , x
L) = xL. Let’s apply the arbitrage equa-
tion for the high quality good to b̂. We then have θqH − V H (̂b) = ρ(θqH − V H(tH0 (xH1 , xL))).
Since V H (̂b) < θqH , it follows that V
H (̂b) > V H(tH0 (x
H
1 , x
L)). Since V H (.) is non-increasing,
tH0
(
xH1 , x
L
)
> b̂ must hold. If we apply the arbitrage equation for the low quality good
to b̂ + yL where yL = x
L
1−µ , we will have t
H
0 (x
H
1 , 0) + t
L
0 (x
H
1 , 0) > b̂, and for x
L > 0,
tH0 (x
H
1 , x
L) + tL0 (x
H
1 , x
L) ≥ b̂ + yL. Given the price structure described above, the monop-
olist chooses tH0 (x
H
1 , x
L) = 1, and tL0 (x
H
1 , x
L) = xL. We now show that there exists xH2
such that tH0 (x
H
2 , x
L) = 1, and tL0 (x
H
2 , x
L) = xL and that xH2 = x
H
2 . Due to left conti-
nuity of tH0 there exists  > 0 such that t
H
0 (x
H , xL) = 1 for all xH ∈ (xH1 − , 1] and xL.
This implies that, due to the arbitrage equations and incentive compatibility constraints,
P j0
(
yH , yL
)
=

pj1,1 for y
H ∈ (yH1 − 11−µ , yH1 ], yL = 0
pj1,2 for y
H ∈ (yH1 − 21−µ , yH1 ], yH + yL ≤ yH1
pj1,4 for y
H ∈ (yH1 − 31−µ , yH1 ], yH1 < yH + yL ≤ 1
pj1,4 for y
H ∈ (yH1 − 41−µ , yH1 ], yH + yL > 1
for j = H,L. Let’s
define xH2,i as x
H
2,i = inf{xH : tH0 (xH , xLi ) = 1, ∀xLi where xL1 = 0, xL2 ∈ [0, xH1 − xH ],
xL3 ∈ (xH1 − xH , 1 − µ − xH1 ], xL4 > 1 − µ − xH1 }. To observe that xH2,i = xH2,i, recall
that. Π(y1, x) < Π(y0, x) for x
H > xH2 and Π(y1, x) > Π(y0, x) for x
H < xH2 . Since
Π0(y1, x) = Π(y1, x) and Π0(y0, x) = Π(y0, x) we must have x
H
2,i = x
H
2,i.
We now assume that the sequence holds for k = t, we will show that it holds for k = t+ 1
as well. That is we will show that PH0 (y
H , yL) = pHk+1, P
L
0 (y
H , yL) = pLk+1 for y
H ∈
(yHk+2(x
L), yHk+1(x
L)], and tH0 (x
H , xL) = yHk (x
L), tL0 (x
H , xL) = xL for xH ∈ (xHk+2(xL), xHk+1(xL)]
for all xL = (1 − µ)yL. To see this, first observe that for b < b̂, we have V H(b) < θqH ,
and for b < b̂ we have V L(b) < θqL, for b ∈ (̂b, 1] we have V L(b) < θqL, and for b <
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1 we have V L(b) = 0. If we apply the arbitrage equation for the high quality good at
yHk (x
L) and the arbitrage equation for the low quality good at yHk (x
L) + yL, we will have
tH0 (x
H
k (x
L), xL) > yHk (x
L) and tH0 (x
H
k (x
L), xL) + tL0 (x
H
k (x
L), xL) > yHk (x
L) + yL. We know
that xHk+1(x
L) = inf{xH : tH0 (xH , xL) = yHk−1(xL)}. Moreover, as discussed above, since
dyHk (y
L)
dyL
< 0 and dΠ
dyH
> dΠ
dyL
, the seller keeps the low quality good as low as possible. Hence,
we must have tH0 (x
H
k+1(x
L), xL) = yHk (x
L), tL0 (x
H
k+1(x
L), xL) = xL. Similar to the previous
discussion, we use left continuity of tH0 (·) to define xHk+2(xL) = inf{xH : tH0 (xH , xL) = yHk (xL)}
and conclude that xHk+2(x
L) = xHk+2(x
L).
Proof of Corollary 1. For the existence of the Coase Conjecture equilibrium in a vertically
differentiated market we must have qH − qL > qL and θ > θ − θ, and µ ∈
⋂
∀s
Γs, s = 1, . . . , 4.
Since Γi ⊂ Γj for all i = 2, 3 and j = 1, 4 and Γj is equivalent to the set Λ defined in Deneckere
and Liang which guarantees existence of the Coase Conjecture equilibrium, the threshold
depreciation rate for the Coase Conjecture equilibrium to exist in vertically differentiated
market is strictly less than the threshold depreciation rate in a market in which only one
version of the good is sold.
Proof of Corollary 2. By definition of xHk,i, x
H
k,i = (1−µ)−1(xHk−1,i−ak,i(xHk−2,i−xHk−1,i)) for
k ≥ 4, we have limz→0 xHk,i = limz→0+(xHk−1,i− ak,i(xHk−2,i− xHk−1,i)). Hence, limz→0+ (xHk−1,i−
xHk,i) > limz→0(x
H
k−2,i−xHk−1,i). By using induction, limz→0+(xHk−1,i−xHk,i) > limz→0+(xHk−2,i−
xHk−1,i) > limz→0+(x
H
2,i − xH3,i) > b̂ − xH2,i. For i = 1, 4 we have b̂ − xH2,i = (
1−b̂)θ
θ−θ , and for
i = 2, 3 we have b̂ − xH2,i = (
1−b̂)θ
θ−θ =
b̂(θqL+(θ−θ)(qH−qL))
(1−b̂)θ(qH−qL)−(1−b̂)θqL+xL2 θqL
. Therefore, for i = 1, 4
it will take at most mi ≤ b̂(θ−θ)(1−b̂)θ + 1 steps and for i = 2, 3 it will take at most mi ≤
b̂((1−b̂)θ(qH−qL)−(1−b̂)θqL+xL2 θqL)
b̂(θqL+(θ−θ)(qH−qL))
+ 1 steps to sell to all buyers.
Proof of Corollary 3. Let m represents the number of the interactions between the monop-
olist and the buyers in market sold one version of the good. As z diminishes both m and mi
for i = 1, 4 converges to
b̂(θ−θ)
(1−b̂)θ + 1, whereas mi for i = 2, 3 converges to
b̂
((
1− b̂
)
θ (qH − qL)−
(
1− b̂
)
θqL + x
L
2 θqL
)
b̂
(
θqL +
(
θ − θ) (qH − qL)) + 1.
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Since
b̂((1−b̂)θ(qH−qL)−(1−b̂)θqL+xL2 θqL)
b̂(θqL+(θ−θ)(qH−qL))
>
b̂(θ−θ)
(1−b̂)θ for all x
L
2 , the first part of the proof is finished.
To prove the second part of the corollary, we should observe that for a give qH ,
dmi
dqL
> 0 for
i = 2, 3 and limqL→0+mi =
b̂(θ−θ)
(1−b̂)θ + 1 for i = 2, 3.
Proof of Theorem 2. Let x˜jk,i be the state of the durable good j in period k on path i. There
exists three paths depending on the state of the low quality good. First, we define the set of
states for the high quality good. For all i, let x˜H0,i = (1−µ)̂b, and let x˜Hk,i = θ+ρ
k−1∆θ
θ+(1−µ)ρk−1∆θ x˜
H
k−1,i.
Second, we define the set of states for the low quality good. For all k ≥ 0, let x˜Lk,1 = 0, let
x˜Lk,2 = 1 − µ − x˜Hk,2 and let x˜Lk,3 be such that x˜Hk,3 + x˜Lk,3 > 1 − µ. Since, the state of the high
quality good is independent of the path, from now on we refer to the state of the high quality
good in period k on path i as x˜Hk . Observe that x˜
H
0 < x˜
H
1 < y˜
H
0 < x˜
H
2 < y˜
H
1 < x˜
H
3 < · · · where
y˜jk =
x˜jk
1−µ for µ ≥ µsg.
We now define {p˜jk,i}∞k=0. On path 1, the price of the high quality good is p˜Hk,1 = θqH +
ρk∆θqH and the price of the low quality good is set such that none of the buyers would
purchase it. On path 2, the price of the high quality good is p˜Hk,2 = θqH + ρ
k∆θ∆q and the
price of the low quality good is p˜Lk,2 = θqL. On path 3, the price of the high quality good is
p˜Hk,3 = θ∆q + ρ
k∆θ∆q and the price of the low quality good is p˜Lk,2 = 0.
Now, we prove that a stationary equilibrium exists for µ ≥ µsg. Let us define {PH (.),
PL (.), tH (.), tL (.), R (.)}. If x˜H∞ = lim
k→∞
x˜Hk ≥ 1 − µ, then set m = sup{k : x˜Hk < 1 − µ} and
define x˜Hm+1 = 1− µ. For a given state (xH , xL), we define the stationary path as follows.
PH
(
xH , xL
)
=

θqH for x
H ∈ D1 and xL = 0
θqH − θqL + θqL for xH ∈ D1 and xL ∈ DxH
θqH − θqL for xH ∈ D1 and xL ∈ D′xH
p˜Hk,1 for x
H ∈ D2 and xL = 0
p˜Hk,2 for x
H ∈ D2 and xL ∈ DxH
p˜Hk,3 for x
H ∈ D2 and xL ∈ D′xH
where k = 1, . . . ,m− 1,
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PL
(
xH , xL
)
=

θqL for x
H ∈ D1 and xL = 0
p˜Lk,1 for x
H ∈ D2 and xL = 0
θqL for all x
H and xL ∈ DxH
0 for all xH and xL ∈ D′
xH
where k = 1, . . . ,m+ 1,
tH(xH , xL) =
 b̂ for x
H ∈ D3
y˜Hk−1 for x
H ∈ D4
where k = 2, . . . ,m+ 1,
tL(xH , xL) =

0 for all xH and xL = 0
1− tH(xH , xL) for all xH and xL ∈ DxH
xL for all xH and xL ∈ D′
xH
R(xH , xL) =

( δµb̂1−δ + (̂b− xH))θqH for xH ∈ D3 and xL = 0
( δµb̂1−δ + (̂b− xH))(θ∆q + θqL) + C1 for xH ∈ D3 and xL ∈ DxH
( δµb̂1−δ + (̂b− xH))θ∆q for xH ∈ D3 and xL ∈ D′xH
(
µy˜Hk−1
1−δ + (x˜
H
k−1 − xH))p˜Hk−1,1 for xH ∈ D4 and xL = 0
(
µy˜Hk−1
1−δ + (x˜
H
k−1 − xH))p˜Hk−1,2 + C2 for xH ∈ D4 and xL ∈ CxH
(
µy˜Hk−1
1−δ + (x˜
H
k−1 − xH))p˜Hk−1,3 for xH ∈ D4 and xL ∈ CxH
where k = 2, . . . ,m− 1, C1 = ( δµ(1−b̂)1−δ + (1− b̂− xL))θqL,
C2 = (
µ(1−y˜Hk−1)
1−δ + (1− µ− x˜Hk−1 − xL))p˜Lk−1,2, CxH ≡ [0, 1− xH ],
D1 ≡ [0, b̂], D3 ≡ [0, x˜H1 ], D4 ≡ (x˜Hk−1, x˜Hk ], D2 ≡ (y˜Hk−1, y˜Hk ],
and DxH ≡ [0, 1− µ− xH ].
If x˜H∞ = lim
k→∞
x˜Hk,i < 1− µ. For all k ≥ 1 define R˜(·) as
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R˜k−1(xH | xL) =

(
µy˜Hk−1
1−δ + S1 for x
H ∈ D4, xL = 0
(
µy˜Hk−1
1−δ + S2 + C3 for x
H ∈ D4, xL ∈ CxH
(
µy˜Hk−1
1−δ + S3 for x
H ∈ D4, xL ∈ CxH
where C3 = (
µ(1−y˜Hk−1)
1−δ + (1− µ− (1− µ)y˜Hk−1 − xL))p˜Lk−1,2,
S1 ≡ ((1− µ)y˜Hk−1 − xH))p˜Hk−1,1, S2 ≡ ((1− µ)y˜Hk−1 − xH))p˜Hk−1,2,
S3((1− µ)y˜Hk−1 − xH))p˜Hk−1,3, CxH ≡ [0, 1− xH ],
and D4 ≡ (x˜Hk−1, x˜Hk ].
Define x´Hi = max{xH ∈ [(1 − µ)̂b, x˜H∞] : R˜k−1(xH) ≥ Rc(xH)}, where Rc(xH | xL) =
( δµ1−δ + (1 − xH))pc and pc =
 θqH for x
L = 0
θ∆q for xL > 0
. Since R˜k−1(. | xL) decreases as xL
increases, we have x´H1 > x´
H
2 > x´
H
3 . Let mi be such that x´
H
i ∈ (x˜Hmi , x˜Hmi+1]. Since R˜k−1(x˜H∞ |
0)−Rc(x˜H∞ | 0) < 0 and by definition of µ, m1 exists, so do m2 and m3. Now, let x˜Hmi+1,i ≡ x´Hi
and define the stationary path as follows.
PH
(
xH , xL
)
=

θqH for x
H ∈ D1 and xL = 0
θqH − θqL + θqL for xH ∈ D1 and xL ∈ DxH
θqH − θqL for xH ∈ D1 and xL ∈ D′xH
p˜Hk,1 for x
H ∈ D2,1 and xL = 0
p˜Hk,2 for x
H ∈ D2,2 and xL ∈ DxH
p˜Hk,3 for x
H ∈ D2,3 and xL ∈ D′xH
θqH for x
H ∈ D5 and xL = 0
θ∆q for xH ∈ D5 and all xL, i = 2, 3
where ki = 0, . . . ,mi + 1,
PL
(
xH , xL
)
=

θqH for x
H ∈ D1 and xL = 0
p˜Lk,1 for x
H ∈ D2 and xL = 0
θqL for all x
H and xL ∈ DxH
0 for all xH and xL ∈ D′
xH
where k = 1, . . . ,m1 + 1,
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tH(xH , xL) =

b̂ for xH ∈ D3
y˜Hk−1 for x
H ∈ D4
1 for xH ∈ D6
where k = 2, . . . ,m+ 1,
tL(xH , xL) =

0 for all xH and xL = 0
1− xH for all xH and xL ∈ DxH
xL for all xH and xL ∈ D′
xH
R(xH , xL) =

( δµb̂1−δ + (̂b− xH))θqH for xH ∈ D3 and xL = 0
( δµb̂1−δ + (̂b− xH))(θ∆q + θqL) + C1 for xH ∈ D3 and xL ∈ DxH
( δµb̂1−δ + (̂b− xH))θ∆q for xH ∈ D3 and xL ∈ D′xH
(
µy˜Hk−1
1−δ + (x˜
H
k−1 − xH))p˜Hk−1,1 for xH ∈ D4,1 and xL = 0
(
µy˜Hk−1
1−δ + (x˜
H
k−1 − xH))p˜Hk−1,2 + C2 for xH ∈ D4,2 and xL ∈ CxH
(
µy˜Hk−1
1−δ + (x˜
H
k−1 − xH))p˜Hk−1,3 for xH ∈ D4,3 and xL ∈ CxH
( δµ1−δ + (1− xH))θqH for xH ∈ D6 and xL = 0
( δµ1−δ + (1− xH))θ∆q for xH ∈ D6 and all xL.
where ki = 0, . . . ,mi + 1, D5 ≡ (y˜Hmi+1,1, 1], D6 ≡ (x˜Hm1+1, 1],
and all other variables are defined as above.
.
We now show that the stationary path defined above is a solution. We consider the case
where x˜H∞ < 1 − µ. First, we show that when the state of the low quality good is zero,
the monopolist prefers setting the price of the low quality good high enough so that none of
the buyers purchase the low quality good. Suppose that xH ∈ (x˜Hk−1, x˜Hk ]. For all µ > µst,
we have R˜1((1 − µ)̂b | 0) > R˜1((1 − µ)̂b | (1 − µ)(1 − b̂)). If there exists xHk such that
R˜k−1(xHk | 0) = R˜k−1(xHk | 1−µ−xHk ) then R˜k−1(xHk | 0) ≤ Rc(xHk | 0). Hence, tL
(
xH , 0
)
= 0.
Second, we show that for xL ∈ (0, 1− µ− xH ], tL(xH , xL) = 1− tH(xH , xL). In period k,
when the state is (xHk , x
L
k ) and x
H
k +x
L
k ≤ 1−µ, the monopolist is indifferent between staying at
(xHk , x
L
k ) forever and bringing the state to (x
H
k−1, x
L
k−1) if x
H
k (θqH+(1−µ)ρk−1∆θ∆q)+yLk θqL =
xHk−1(θqH+ρ
k−1∆θ∆q)+xLk−1θqL holds. Let Π2(x
H
k , x
L
k ) =
µx˜Hk
(1−δ)(1−µ) p˜
H
k,2+
µx˜Lk
(1−δ)(1−µ) p˜
L
k,2. Since
dxHk
dxLk
= − θqL
θqH+(1−µ)ρk−1∆θ∆q , we have
dΠ2(xHk ,x
L
k )
dxLk
> 0. Hence, xLk = 1−µ−xHk must hold. For a
given (xH , xL), since R˜ is increasing in yH on any of the intervals [0, y˜H0 ], (y˜
H
0 , y˜
H
1 ],. . .,(y˜
H
mi+1
, 1],
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we have tH ∈ {y˜H0 , y˜H1 , . . . , y˜Hmi+1, 1}.
Third, we construct the sequence of states such that when the state is (x˜Hk , 0), we have
R˜k−1(x˜Hk | 0) = R˜k(x˜Hk | 0), hence (y˜Hk−1, 0) ∼ (y˜Hk , 0). When the state is (x˜Hk , 1− µ− x˜Hk ), we
have R˜k−1(x˜Hk | 1 − µ − x˜Hk ) = R˜k(x˜Hk | 1 − µ − x˜Hk ), hence (y˜Hk−1, 1 − y˜Hk−1) ∼ (y˜Hk , 1 − y˜Hk ).
When the state is (x˜Hk , x
L) where x˜Hk + x
L > 1 − µ, we have R˜k−1(x˜Hk | xL) = R˜k(x˜Hk | xL),
hence (y˜Hk−1, x
L) ∼ (y˜Hk , xL). Now, let hmi+1(xH | xL) = Rc(xH | xL)− R˜m1(xH | xL), and for
k ≤ mi let hk(xH | xL) = R˜k(xH | xL) − R˜k−1(xH | xL). By definition of x˜Hk , hk(x˜Hk | 0) = 0
for all k. Moreover, we have
dhm1+1
dxH
= −(θqH − p˜Hm1,1) > 0 and dhkdxH = −(p˜Hk,1 − p˜Hk−1,1) > 0.
Hence, tH(xH , 0) is a solution. To see that tH(xH , 1− µ− xH) is a solution as well, we should
observe that for all k, hk(x˜
H
k | xL) = 0 where xL ≥ 1−µ−x˜Hk and
dhmi+1
dxH
= −(θ∆q− p˜Hmi,2) > 0
and dhk
dxH
= −(p˜Hk,i − p˜Hk−1,i) > 0 for i = 2, 3. Therefore, we conclude that the path we derived
is a solution to the optimization problem.
To prove the uniqueness of the solution, we consider any stationary equilibrium with a
steady state (̂b, 0) with the associated stationary set {PH0 (.),PL0 (.),tH0 (.),tL0 (.),R0 (.)}, and
show that {PH0 (.),PL0 (.),tH0 (.),tL0 (.),R0 (.)} is equal to {PH (.),PL (.),tH (.),tL (.),R (.)}.
Let’s define vˇH1 = sup
b>b̂
V H0 (b). First, suppose that vˇ
H
1 = θqH . We start with proving
vˇL1 ≤ θqL where vˇL1 = sup
b>b̂
V L0 (b). Suppose that there exists b > b̂ such that V
L
0 (b) > θqL.
If we apply the arbitrage equation to b, for the low quality good we have θqL − V L0 (b) =
ρ(θqL−V L0 (tH(·) + tL(·))). Since θqL−V L0 (b) < 0, we must have tH(·) + tL(·) < b. If we apply
the arbitrage equation to b, for the high quality good, θqH − V H0 (b) = ρ(θqH − V H0 (tH(·))).
Since V H0 (b) = θqH , we must have t
H(·) > b, which leads to a contradiction. Hence, we must
have tH(xH , xL) = 1 and tL(xH , xL) = xL for xH > (1− µ)̂b and
PH0
(
xH , xL
)
=

θqH if x
H ≤ b̂ and xH + xL ≤ b̂
θqH − θqL + θqL if xH ≤ b̂ and b̂ < xH + xL ≤ 1
θqH − θqL if xH ≤ b̂ and xH + xL > 1
θqH if x
H > b̂ and b̂ < xH + xL ≤ 1
θ∆q if xH > b̂ and xH + xL > 1
,
75
PL0
(
xH , xL
)
=

θqL if x
H ≤ b̂ and xH + xL ≤ b̂
θqL if x
H ≤ b̂ and b̂ < xH + xL ≤ 1
0 if xH ≤ b̂ and xH + xL > 1
θqL if x
H > b̂ and b̂ < xH + xL ≤ 1
0 if xH > b̂ and xH + xL > 1
,
tH0
(
xH , xL
)
=
 b̂ if x
H ≤ (1− µ)̂b
1 if xH > (1− µ)̂b
,
tL0
(
xH , xL
)
= xL for all xH , xL.
Hence, {PH0 , PL0 , tH0 , tL0 , R0} is uniquely determined.
Second, suppose that vˇH1 > θqH . We show that pˇ
H
1 =

p˜H1,1 if x
L = 0
p˜H1,2 if x
H + xL ≤ 1
p˜H1,3 if x
H + xL > 1
. First, we
must prove that there exists  > 0 such that tH0 ((1−µ)yH , xL) = b̂ for all yH ∈ (̂b, b̂+]. To see
this, observe that tH0 ((1−µ)yH , (1−µ)yL) < yH for all yH such that V H0 (yH) > θqH . If we had
tH0 ((1− µ)yH , (1− µ)yL) ≥ yH , we would have V H0 (tH0 ((1− µ)yH , (1− µ)yL)) ≤ V H0 (yH) that
would yield V H0 (y
H) = (1−ρ)θqH +ρV H0 (tH0 ((1−µ)yH , (1−µ)yL) ≤ (1−ρ)θqH +ρV H0 (yH) <
θqH which contradicts with the initial assumption.
Let xˇH1 (x
L) = max{xH ≤ 1 − µ | tH0 (xH , xL) = b̂}. First, if xˇH1 (xL) = 1 − µ then
{PH0 , PL0 , tH0 , tL0 , R0} is uniquely determined as follows
PH0
(
xH , xL
)
=

θqH if x
H ≤ b̂ and xL = 0
θqH − θqL + θqL if xH ≤ b̂ and xH + xL ≤ 1 and xL > 0
θqH − θqL if xH ≤ b̂ and xH + xL > 1
pˇH1,1 if x
H > b̂ and xL = 0
pˇH1,2 if x
H > b̂ and xH + xL < 1and xL > 0
pˇH1,3 if x
H > b̂ and xH + xL > 1
,
PL0
(
xH , xL
)
=

pˇL1,1 if x
L = 0
θqL if x
L > 0 and xH + xL ≤ 1
0 if xH > b̂ and xH + xL > 1
,
tH0
(
xH , xL
)
= b̂ for all xH , xL,
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tL0
(
xH , xL
)
=
 1− b̂ if x
H ≤ b̂ and xH + xL ≤ b̂
xL otherwise
.
Second, let us consider the case where xˇH1 (x
L) < 1 − µ. Define pˇH2 = sup{PH0 (b) | b >
xˇH1 (x
L)
1−µ }. If pˇH2 = θqH then as discussed above we have
PH0
(
xH , xL
)
=
 θqH if x
H ∈ ( xˇH1 (xL)1−µ , 1] and xH + xL ≤ 1
θ(qH − qL) if xH ∈ ( xˇ
H
1 (x
L)
1−µ , 1] and x
H + xL > 1
,
PL0
(
xH , xL
)
=
 θqL if x
H + xL ≤ 1
0 if xH + xL > 1
,
tH0
(
xH , xL
)
= 1 if xH ∈ ( xˇH1 (xL)1−µ , 1],
tL0
(
xH , xL
)
= xL if xH ∈ ( xˇH1 (xL)1−µ , 1].
It follows that R0(x
H , xL) =
 RC(x
H , xL) if xH ∈ (xˇH1 (xL), 1− µ]
R˜(xH , xL) if xH + xL > 1− µ
. By the continu-
ity of R0 at x
H = xˇH1 since R˜(xˇ
H
1 (x
L), xL) = R0((xˇ
H
1 (x
L), xL), we must have x´H1 = x´
H
2 = x´
H
3 .
Suppose now that pˇH2 > θqH . Then by the same reasoning, there must exits ε > 0 such
that tH0 (x
H , xL) =
xˇH1 (x
L)
1−µ , for all x
H ∈ (xˇH1 (xL), xˇH1 (xL) + ε]. Hence, pˇH2 = p˜H2 . Now we show
that xˇH1 (x
L) = x˜H1 (x
L).
Let us define
V0(x
H , xL) =

pi(̂b, 0 | xH , 0)− µp˜
H
1,1x
H
(1−µ)(1−δ) if x
L = 0
pi(̂b, 1− b̂ | xH , xL)− µp˜
H
1,2x
H+µp˜L1,2x
L
(1−µ)(1−δ) if 0 < x
L ≤ 1− xH .
pi(̂b, xL | xH , xL)− µp˜
H
1,3x
H
(1−µ)(1−δ) if x
L > 1− xH
Since tH0 (x
H , xL) = b̂ for all xH ≤ xˇH1 (xL) and tH0 (xH , xL) = xˇH1 (xL) for all xH ∈ (xˇH1 (xL),
xˇH1 (x
L)+ε], we must have V0(xˇ
H
1 (x
L), xL) = 0. Since V0(x˜
H
1 (x
L), xL) = 0 and ∂
∂xH
V0(x
H , xL) <
0, we must have xˇH1 (x
L) = x˜H1 (x
L).
We must apply the same argument inductively. Given xˇHk (x
L) = max{xH : tH0 (xH , xL) =
xˇHk−1((1−µ)xL)}, it must be that xˇHk (xL) = x˜Hk (xL). If xˇHk (xL) = 1−µ, then x˜Hk (xL) = 1−µ
and m = k−1. If xˇHk (xL) < 1−µ and pˇHk+1 = θqH then xˇHk (xL) = x´ = x˜Hk (xL) and m = k−1.
If xˇHk (x
L) < 1 − µ and pˇHk+1 > θqH then m > k − 1 and xˇHk+1(xL) = max{xH : tH0 (xH , xL) =
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xˇHk ((1− µ)xL)}.
Proof of Corollary 4. Since x˜Hk,1 = x˜k and p˜
H
k,1 = p˜k where (x˜k, p˜k) denotes the path when
the monopolist produces one version of the good, we must have µst(δ) = µs (δ).
Proof of Corollary 5. On path 1,
PH(y˜Hk,1,0)−PH(y˜Hk−1,1,0)
y˜Hk,1−y˜Hk−1,1
=
−(1−ρ)(p˜Hk−1,1−µ(p˜Hk−1,1−θqH))
µy˜Hk−1,1
. As
z approaches 0, since y˜Hk,1 − y˜Hk−1,1 converges to zero, we have PH1 (y, 0) y = −λ+rλ PH (y, 0).
The solution of the differential equation is PH (y, 0) = c1y
−λ+rλ . Since PH
(
b̂, 0
)
= θqH , we
have c1 = θqH b̂
λ+r
λ . Hence, PH (y, 0) = θqH
(
b̂
y
)λ+r
λ
. As z approaches zero,
y˜Hk,1−y˜Hk−1,1
z =
y˜Hk−1,1
p˜Hk−1,1−θqH
−z(p˜Hk−1,1−θqH)+ zµ p˜Hk−1,1
converges to y˙1 = λy1
(
1− θ
θ
(
b̂
y
)−λ+rλ )
.
On path 2,
PH(y˜Hk,2,1−y˜Hk,2)−PH(y˜Hk−1,2,1−y˜Hk−1,2)
y˜Hk,2−y˜Hk−1,2
=
−(1−ρ)((p˜Hk−1,2−θqL)−µ(p˜Hk−1,2−θqH))
µy˜Hk−1,2
. As z ap-
proaches 0, since y˜Hk,2 − y˜Hk−1,2 converges to zero, we have dP
H(y,1−y)
dy y = −λ+rλ (PH (y, 1− y)
− θqL). The solution of the differential equation is PH (y, 1− y) = c2y−
λ+r
λ + θqL. Since
PH
(
b̂, 1− b̂
)
= θqH − θqL+ θqL, we have c2 = θ∆qb̂
λ+r
λ . Hence, PH (y, 1− y) = θqH
(
b̂
y
)λ+r
λ
+ θqL. As z approaches zero,
y˜Hk,2−y˜Hk−1,2
z = y˜
H
k−1,2
p˜Hk−1,2−θqH
−z(p˜Hk−1,2−θqH)+ zµ(p˜Hk−1,2−θqL)
converges to
y˙2 = λy2
(
1− θ
θ
(
b̂
y
)−λ+rλ )
.
On path 3,
PH(y˜Hk,3,y
L)−PH(y˜Hk−1,3,yL)
y˜Hk,3−y˜Hk−1,3
=
−(1−ρ)(p˜Hk−1,3−µ(p˜Hk−1,3−θ∆q))
µy˜Hk−1,3
. As z approaches 0,
since y˜Hk,3 − y˜Hk−1,3 converges to zero, we have PH1 (y, .) y = −λ+rλ PH (y, .). The solution
of the differential equation is PH (y, .) = c3y
−λ+rλ . Since PH
(
b̂, yL
)
= θqH − θqL, we
have c3 = θ∆qb̂
λ+r
λ . Hence, PH (y, .) = θ∆q
(
b̂
y
)λ+r
λ
. As z approaches zero,
y˜Hk,3−y˜Hk−1,3
z =
y˜Hk−1,3
p˜Hk−1,3−θ∆q
−z(p˜Hk−1,3−θ∆q)+ zµ p˜Hk−1,3
converges to y˙3 = λy3
(
1− θ
θ
(
b̂
y
)−λ+rλ )
.
Proof of Theorem 3. As stated in the proof of Proposition 3, if (yˇH , 1 − yˇH) is a steady
state, we must have
V H(b) =

= θqH for b ≤ yˇH
< θqH for b ∈ (yˇH , b̂]
= θqH for b ∈ (̂b, 1]
(A.1)
and
V L(b) =
 < θqL for b ≤ b̂= θqL for b ∈ (̂b, 1] , (A.2)
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and if (yˆH , 0) is a steady state, we must have
V H(b) =

= θqH for b ≤ yˆH
< θqH for b ∈ (yˆH , b̂]
= θqH for b ∈ (̂b, 1]
(A.3)
and
V L(b) =

= θqL for b ≤ yˆH
< θqL for b ∈ (yˆH , b̂]
= θqL for b ∈ (̂b, 1]
. (A.4)
Let us establish that the existence of a reputational equilibrium implies µ ∈ (µ, µ]. First, we
show that µ > µ. Suppose that the steady state is (yˇH , 1− yˇH). Due to (A.1) and (A.2), for all
yH ≤ yˇH and for all yL, we have tH((1−µ)yH , (1−µ)yL) = yˇH and tL((1−µ)yH , (1−µ)yL) =
1− yˇH and hence we have PH(yH , yL) = θqH − θqL + θqL and PL(yH , yL) = θqL. This implies
that R((1−µ)yˇH , (1−µ)(1− yˇH)) = µyˇH(θqH−θqL+θqL)1−δ + µ(1−yˇ
H)θqL
1−δ . By the continuity of R(·),
yˇH solves ψ(y) = 0 where ψ(y) = µy(θqH−θqL+θqL)1−δ +
µ(1−y)θqL
1−δ − RC((1− µ)y, (1− µ)(1− y)).
Since ψ(̂b) = 0 when µ = µ, we must have ψ(̂b) < 0 for all µ < µ. Since, ψ(·) is strictly
increasing, the existence of yˇH < b̂ requires that µ > µ. Suppose now that the steady state
is (yˆH , 0). Due to (A.3) and (A.4), for all yH ≤ yˆH , we have tH((1 − µ)yH , 0) = yˆH and
tL((1 − µ)yH , 0) = 1 − yˆH and hence we have PH(yH , 0) = θqH and PL(yH , 0) = θqL. This
implies that R((1 − µ)yˆH , 0) = µyˆHθqH1−δ . By the continuity of R(·), yˆH solves ς(y) = 0 where
ς(y) = µy
HθqH
1−δ − RC((1− µ)y, 0). Since ς (̂b) = 0 when µ = µst, we must have ς (̂b) < 0 for all
µ < µst. Since, ς(·) is strictly increasing, the existence of yˆH < b̂ requires that µ > µst. By
definition of µst and µ, µst > µ.
Second, we show that µ < µ. The proof follows from a contradiction. Suppose that for
some µ > µ, a reputational equilibrium exists. Let us define
K1 = min{k : xHj,1 < xHj−1,1 for all j ≤ k}.
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Since the Coase Conjecture equilibrium does not exist for µ > µ, we have xH
K1,1
> 0. Further-
more, since xH
K1+1,1
≥ xH
K1,1
, when the initial state is (xH
K1,1
, 0) the monopolist prefers selling
to (yH
K1+1,1
, 0) to selling to (yH
K1,1
, 0). This implies that
µpH
K1,1
yH
K1,1
+ δRC(xH
K1,1
, xL) > RC(xH
K1,1
, xL).
Hence, ς(yH
K1,1
) > 0 and yˆH < yH
K1,1
. However, constructing the sequence for yH below yH
K1,1
is not possible. Similarly, let’s define
K3 = min{k : xHj,3 < xHj−1,3 for all j ≤ k and xL = 1− yHK1,3}.
Since the Coase Conjecture equilibrium does not exist for µ > µ, we have xH
K3,3
> 0. Further-
more, since xH
K3+1,3
≥ xH
K3,3
, when the initial state is (xH
K3,3
, 1 − µ − xH
K3,3
) the monopolist
prefers selling to (yH
K3+1,3
, 1− yH
K1,3
) to selling to (yH
K3,3
, 1− yH
K1,3
). This implies that
µpH
K3,3
yH
K3,3
+ µpL
K3,3
(1− yH
K3,3
) + δRC(xH
K3,3
, 1− µ− xH
K3,3
) > RC(xH
K3,3
, 1− µ− xH
K3,3
).
Hence, ψ(yH
K3,3
) > 0 and yˇH < yH
K3,3
. However, constructing the sequence for yH below yH
K3,3
is not possible. Hence, we must have µ < µ.
We now establish that a reputational equilibrium exists for any µ ∈ (µ, µ]. Let ∆ := ς−ψ.
Then, ∆(y) := µ(θy−θ)qL1−δ − (RC((1−µ)y, 0)−RC((1−µ)y, (1−µ)(1− y))). We have ∆(0) < 0
and ∆(1) > 0. Moreover, ψ(yˆH) > 0. For µ > µ, we have ψ(̂b) > 0. Since ψ(̂b) > 0. Since
ψ(0) = µθqL1−δ −RC(0, 1−µ) < 0, and ψ(·) is strictly increasing there exists a unique yˇH ∈ (0, b̂)
such that ψ(yˇH) = 0. Similarly, for µ > µst, we have ς (̂b) > 0. Since ς(0) = −RC(0, 0) < 0,
and ς(·) is strictly increasing, there exists a unique yˆH ∈ (0, b̂) such that ς(yˆH) = 0. Therefore,
for µ ∈ (µ, µst], the steady state of a reputational equilibrium is (yˇH , 1− yˇH). PH(yH , yL) =
θqH − θqL + θqL for all yH < yˇH and all yL, and PL(yH , yL) = θqL for all yH and yL. Hence,
R(xH , xL) = (yˇH−xH)(θqH−θqL+θqL)+(1− yˇH−xL)θqL+δ(µyˇ
H(θqH−θqL+θqL)
1−δ +
µ(1−yˇH)θqL
1−δ )
for xH ∈ [0, (1− µ)yˇH ] and for xL ∈ [0, (1− µ)(1− yˇH)], and the path is defined by the Coase
Conjecture path elsewhere. For µ ∈ (µst, µ], if θyˆH > θ, the reputational steady state is
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(yˆH , 0), otherwise it is (yˇH , 1− yˇH).
Now, we establish that µ < µ. Since µ < µst, to establish it we show that µst < µ by
proving {xk,1} is strictly decreasing and m is finite for µ ≤ µ. First, we show that x2,1 < x1,1
for any µ ≤ µ. Since h2(·) is decreasing and h2(xH2 ) = 0, to establish the proof, we show that
h2(x
H
1,1) < 0. We have
h2(x1,1) = Π(y1,1, x1,1)−Π(y0,1, x1,1) = PH (̂b, 0)µb̂+ δΠ(y0,1, x1,1)−Π(y0,1, x1,1)
= PH(yH1 , 0)µb̂− (1− δ)Π(y0,1, x1,1).
Since Π(y0,1, x1,1) ≥ µb̂θqH1−δ , we have
h2(x1,1) ≤ PH (̂b, 0)µb̂− µb̂θqH = µb̂(PH (̂b, 0)− θqH) < 0
Second, we show that there exist ∆ > 0 such that xH3,1 < x
H
2,1 −∆. Since h3(·) is decreas-
ing and h3(x
H
3,1) = 0, to establish the proof, we show that h3(x
H
2,1) < 0. We have h3(x
H
2,1)
= Π(y2,1;x2,1) − Π(y1,1;x2,1) = PH(y2,1)µyH2,1 − (1 − δ)Π(y1,1;x2,1). Since Π(y1,1;x2,1) =
Π(y0,1;x2,1), we have Π(y1,1;x2,1) = (x
H
1,1 − xH2,1)θqH + Π(y0,1;x1,1). Therefore, h3(xH2,1) <
PH(y2,1)
µxH2,1
1−δ −(1−δ)(xH1 −xH2 )θqH−µb̂θqH1−δ = (PH(y2,1)−θqH)
µxH2,1
1−δ −(1−δ)(xH1,1−xH2,1)θqH < 0.
Therefore, xH2,1 − xH3,1 =
h3(xH2,1)
h′3(x)
=
(1−δ)((xH1 −xH2 )θqH)
−PH(y2,1)+PH(y1,1) = ∆ > 0
Third, we suppose that there exist ∆ such that xHk < x
H
k−1 −∆ for k ≥ 3 and show that
it also holds for k + 1. Since the sequence is decreasing until k − 1, we have Π(yk−1,1, xk,1) ≥
Π(y0, xk) = (1−xk,1)θqH+δR (1− µ) = Π(y0,1, x1,1)+(xH1,1−xHk,1)θqH ≥
µb̂θqH
1− δ +(x
H
1 −xHk )θqH .
By the same argument stated above hk+1,1(x
H
k,1) = Π(yk,1, xk,1) − Π(yk−1,1, xk,1) < −(1 −
δ)(xH1,1 − xHk,1)θqH < 0. Therefore, since hk+1,1
(
xHk+1,1
)
= 0 and h′k+1,1 (.) = −PH(yk,1) +
PH(yk−1,1), we have xHk,1 − xHk+1,1 =
hk+1,1(xHk,1)
h′k+1,1(.)
>
(1−δ)(xH1,1−xHk,1)θqH
PH(yk,1)−PH(yk−1,1) .
Proof of Corollary 6. Consider
(
yˆH , 0
)
. We set yˆH such that ζ
(
yˆH , 0
)
= 0. Then
limz→0+ ζ
(
yH , 0
)
= limz→0+(
µθqHy
H
1−δ − ((1− (1−µ)yH)θqH + δµθqH1−δ )). Therefore, at
(
yˆH , 0
)
we
have yˆHqH = limz→0+
(1−δ)θqH+δµθqH
µθ+(1−δ)(1−µ)θ =
(λ+r)θqH
λθ+rθ
. Since θyˆH = (λ+r)θθ
λθ+rθ
> θ, the seller moves
to
(
yˆH , 0
)
from the initial state (0, 0) when µst < µ < µ.
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Now, consider
(
yˇH , 1− yˇH). We set yˇH such that ψ(yˇH , 1 − yˇH) = 0. Then limz→0+ ψ
(yH , 1− yH) = limz→0+(µ(θqH−θqL+θqL)y
H
1−δ +
µθqLy
L
1−δ − ((1− (1− µ)yH)θqH + δµθqH1−δ )).
Proof of Proposition 4. Trivial.
Proof of Corollary 7. Trivial.
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 5
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof is established by the following two claims. First, we
claim that if buyer b buys good i rather than waiting one period then b′ < b would prefer
buying good i to waiting one period as well. The Buyer b s payoff when she accepts pit is
f i (b) − pit + δVb (Ht, a) . When she rejects pit, her payoff is δVb (Ht, r). Since the good may
stop functioning with probability µ, Vb (Ht, a) = µVb (Ht, r) . Therefore, buyer b accepts p
i
t if
f i (b) − pit ≥ ρVb (Ht, r) . Suppose that b′ < b. Show that f i (b′) − pit ≥ ρVb′ (Ht, r) .Suppose
b adopts b′ s strategy. Then b s payoff would be less that b′ s payoff. That is, f i (b) − p˜i −
ρVb (Ht, r) ≤ f i (b′)− p˜i − ρVb′ (Ht, r) . This implies that
ρ (Vb′ (Ht, r)− Vb (Ht, r)) ≤ f i
(
b′
)− f i (b) .
If we rewrite the expression we get
pit ≤ f i (b)− ρVb (Ht, r) ≤ f i
(
b′
)− ρVb′ (Ht, r)
Second, we claim that If buyer b prefers high quality good to low quality good then b′ < b
would prefer high quality good as well. Buyer b s payoff when she accepts high quality good
is fH (b) − pHt + δµVb (Ht, r) . Her payoff when she accepts low quality good is fL (b) − pLt +
δµVb (Ht, r) . Therefore, buyer b prefers high quality good to quality one if f
H (b) − fL (b) ≥
pHt − pLt . Since for all b′ < b, fH (b′) − fL (b′) ≥ fH (b) − fL (b) , b′ prefers high quality good
as well.
For all pHt − pLt , one of the followings is true. All consumers may buy low quality good:
fH (0)−fL (0) ≤ pHt −pLt , all consumers may buy high quality good: fH (1)−fL (1) ≥ pHt −pLt ,
or there may exists b˜ such that for all b ≤ b˜ fH (b) − fL (b) ≤ pHt − pLt and for all b > b˜
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fH (b)− fL (b) > pHt − pLt .
Proof of Proposition 6. Any stationary equilibrium has at least one steady state. That is,
there exists (yH , yH) such that
tH
(
(1− µ) yH , (1− µ) yL) = yH
and
tL
(
(1− µ) yH , (1− µ) yL) = yL
where yH ∈ (0, 1], yH + yL ≤ 1. Moreover, the steady state prices satisfy
℘H
(
yH , yL
)
= fH
(
yH
)− fL (yH)+ fL (yH + yL)
and
℘L
(
yH , yL
)
= fL
(
yH + yL
)
.
If
(
yH , yL
)
are the stocks after trade in a steady state. Then PH
(
yH
)
= fH
(
yH
)
and
PL
(
yH + yL
)
= fL
(
yH + yL
)
. This implies that
℘H
(
yH , yL
)
= fH (yH)− fL (yH) + fL (yH + yL)
and
℘L
(
yH , yL
)
= fL (yH + yL) .
Let’s define the sets SH and SL
(
yH
)
as
SH =
{
yH : PH
(
yH
)
= fH
(
yH
)}
and
SL
(
yH
)
=
{
yL : PL
(
yH + yL
)
= fL
(
yH + yL
)}
.
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Suppose that SH and SL
(
maxSH
)
are nonempty. Let
(
yH , yL
)
be defined as
yH = maxSH
and
yL = maxSL
(
yH
)
.
First we will show that
(
yH , yL
)
is a steady state. To do that, we will prove that yH
and yL are the maximum states to have acceptance prices PH
(
yH
)
and PL
(
yH + yL
)
,
respectively. If there existed y˜H > yH with PH
(
y˜H
)
= PH
(
yH
)
from the definition of
yH we must have fH
(
y˜H
)
< fH
(
yH
)
. Since tH
(
xH , xL
)
is non-decreasing with respect
to xH for a given xL and since PH(·) is non-increasing we have PH(tH((1 − µ)y˜H , (1 −
µ)yL)) ≤ PH(tH((1− µ) yH , (1− µ) yL)) which implies a contradiction, since PH (y˜H) =
(1− ρ) fH (y˜H) + ρPH(tH((1−µ)y˜H , (1−µ)yL)) < (1−ρ)fH(yH) + ρPH(tH((1−µ)yH , (1−
µ)yL)) = PH
(
yH
)
.
If there existed y˜L > yL with PL
(
yH + y˜L
)
= PL
(
yH + yL
)
from the definition of yH
and yL we must have PL
(
yH + y˜L
)
< PL
(
yH + yL
)
. Since tL
(
xH , xL
)
is non-decreasing with
respect to xL for a given xH and since PL(·) is non-increasing we have PL(tH((1− µ)yH , (1−
µ)y˜L) + tL((1−µ)yH , (1−µ)y˜L)) ≤ PL(tH((1−µ)yH , (1−µ)yL) + tL((1−µ)yH , (1−µ)yL))
which implies a contradiction. PL
(
yH + y˜L
)
= (1− ρ)fL(yH + y˜L) + ρPL(tH((1− µ)yH , (1−
µ)yL)+tL((1−µ)yH , (1−µ)y˜L)) < (1−ρ) fL(yH+yL) + ρ PL(tH((1−µ)yH , (1−µ)yL)+tL((1−
µ)yH , (1−µ)yL)) = PL(yH + yL). So, following the offers PH (yH)− fL (yH)+PL (yH + yL)
for high quality good and PL
(
yH + yL
)
for low quality good, all b ≤ yH accept high quality
good and all yH < b ≤ yH + yL accept low quality good and all b > yH + yL reject the offers
of the monopolist. So, we derive from the arbitrage equations for the high and quality goods
PH
(
yH
)
= fH
(
yH
)
, and PL
(
yH + yL
)
= fL
(
yH + yL
)
respectively.
Suppose that there is a stationary equilibrium which does not have any steady states.
This implies that either SH or SLis empty. First, suppose SH is empty and that PL (b) is a
nonincreasing function. We will show that PH (b) < θqH for b ∈
[
0, b̂
]
and PH (b) > θqH
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for b ∈
(
b̂, 1
]
. If SH is empty then PH (b) 6= θqH for b ∈
[
0, b̂
]
and PH (b) 6= θqH for
b ∈
(
b̂, 1
]
. We know from Lemma 2 that the seller never charges a price less than θqH
for high quality good. This implies that PH (b) > θqH for b ∈
(
b̂, 1
]
. Moreover, it is not
possible that PH (b) > θqH for some b ∈
[
0, b̂
]
. If it was, it would imply that PH (0) >
θqH , since P
H(·) is nonincreasing. Given a state (0, y´L) , the arbitrage equation PH (0) =
(1− ρ) θqH + ρPH
(
tH
(
0, (1− µ) y´L)) implies that PH (tH (0, (1− µ) y´L)) > PH (0) which is
a contradiction because tH
(
0, (1− µ) y´L) ≥ 0 and PH(·) is a nonincreasing function. Now,
suppose SL is empty and that PH (b) is a nonincreasing function. We will show that PL (b) <
θqL for b ∈
[
0, b̂
]
and PL (b) > θqL for b ∈
(
b̂, 1
]
. If SL is empty then PL (b) 6= θqL
for b ∈
[
0, b̂
]
and PL (b) 6= θqL for b ∈
(
b̂, 1
]
. We know from Lemma 2 that the seller never
charges a price less than θqL for low quality good. This implies that P
L (b) > θqLfor b ∈
(
b̂, 1
]
.
Moreover, it is not possible that PL (b) > θqL for some b ∈
[
0, b̂
]
. If it was, it would imply
that PL (0) > θqL, since P
L(·) is nonincreasing. Given a state (0, y´L) , the arbitrage equation
PL (0) = (1− ρ) θqL+ρPL
(
tH (0, 0) + tL (0, 0)
)
implies that PL
(
tH (0, 0) + tL (0, 0)
)
> PL (0)
which is a contradiction because tj (0, 0) ≥ 0 for all j = H,L and PL(·) is a nonincreasing
function.
Suppose PH (b) < θqH for b ∈ [0, b̂] and PH (b) > θqH for b ∈ (̂b, 1] and that PL (b) is
a nonincreasing function. Given a state
(
yH , y´L
)
where yH ∈ [0, b̂], since θqH − PH
(
yH
)
>
0, the arbitrage equation θqH − PH
(
yH
)
= ρθqH − PH(tH((1 − µ)yH , (1 − µ)y´L))) implies
that PH(tH((1 − µ)yH , (1 − µ)y´L)) < PH(yH). That is, tH((1 − µ)yH , (1 − µ)y´L) > yH .
Similarly, given a state (̂b + , y´L) where  ∈ (0, 1 − b̂], since θqH − PH (̂b + ) < 0, the
arbitrage equation θqH − PH (̂b + ) = ρ(θqH − PH(tH((1 − µ)(̂b + ), (1 − µ)y´L))) implies
that PH(tH((1− µ)(̂b + ), (1− µ)y´L)) > PH (̂b + ). That is, tH((1− µ)(̂b + ), (1− µ)y´L) <
b̂ + . So, lim
→0
tH((1 − µ)(̂b + ), (1 − µ)y´L) ≤ b̂ < tH((1 − µ)̂b, (1 − µ)y´L). Since, T (·) is
upper hemi-continuous, (lim
→0
tH((1 − µ)(̂b + ), (1 − µ)y´L), lim
→0
tL((1 − µ)(̂b + ), (1 − µ)y´L)) ∈
T ((1−µ)̂b, (1−µ)y´L). Moreover, since T (·) is a lattice, meet of (lim
→0
tH((1−µ)(̂b+), (1−µ)y´L),
lim
→0
tL((1− µ)(̂b+ ), (1− µ)y´L)) and (tH((1− µ)̂b, (1− µ)y´L), tL((1− µ)̂b, ((1− µ)) y´L)) is in
T (·) as well which contradicts with the definition of (tH(·), tL(·)).
Suppose PL (b) < θqL for b ∈ [0, b̂] and PL (b) > θqL for b ∈ (̂b, 1] and that PH (b) is a
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nonincreasing function. Given a state
(
y´H , yL
)
where y´H+yL ∈ [0, b̂], since θqL−PL(y´H+yL) >
0, the arbitrage equation θqL−PL(y´H + yL) = ρ(θqL−PL(tH((1−µ)y´H , (1−µ)yL) + tL((1−
µ)y´H , (1 − µ)yL))) implies that PL(tH((1 − µ)y´H , (1 − µ)yL) + tL((1 − µ)y´H , (1 − µ)yL)) <
PL(y´H + yL). That is, tH((((1− µ)y´H , ((1− µ)yL) + tL((((1− µ)y´H , ((1− µ)yL) > y´H + yL.
Similarly, given a state (y´H , b̂+−y´H) where  ∈ (0, 1−b̂], since θqL−PL(̂b+) < 0, the arbitrage
equation θqL−PL(̂b+) = ρ(θqL−PL(tH((1−µ)y´H , (1−µ)(̂b+−y´H))+tL((1−µ)y´H , (1−µ)(̂b+
−y´H)))) implies that PL(tH((1−µ)y´H , (1−µ)(̂b+−y´H))+tL((1−µ)y´H , (1−µ)(̂b+−y´H))) >
PL(̂b+). That is, tH((1−µ)y´H , (1−µ)(̂b+− y´H))+tL((1−µ)y´H , (1−µ)(̂b+− y´H)) < b̂+.
So, lim
→0
tH((1 − µ)y´H , (1 − µ)(̂b +  − y´H)) + lim
→0
tL((1 − µ)y´H , (1 − µ)(̂b +  − y´H)) ≤ b̂ <
tH((1−µ)y´H , (1−µ)(̂b−y´H))+tL((1−µ)y´H , (1−µ)(̂b−y´H)). Since tH is increasing with respect
to each variable, we have lim
→0
tH((1−µ)y´H , (1−µ)(̂b+− y´H)) > tH((1−µ)y´H , (1−µ)(̂b− y´H)).
This implies that lim
→0
tL((1−µ)y´H , (1−µ)(̂b+−y´H)) < tL((1−µ)y´H , ((1− µ)) (̂b−y´H)). Since,
T (·) is upper hemi-continuous, (lim
→0
tH((1 − µ)y´H , (1 − µ)(̂b +  − y´H)), lim
→0
tL((1 − µ)y´H , (1 −
µ)(̂b +  − y´H))) ∈ T ((1 − µ)y´H , (1 − µ)̂b − y´H). Moreover, since T (·) is a lattice, meet of
(lim
→0
tH((1 − µ)y´H , (1 − µ)(̂b +  − y´H)), lim
→0
tL((1 − µ)y´H , (1 − µ)(̂b +  − y´H))) and (tH((1 −
µ)y´H , (1 − µ)̂b − y´H), tL((1 − µ)y´H , (1 − µ)̂b − y´H)) is in T (·) as well which contradicts with
the definition of
(
tH(·), tL(·)).
Proof of Proposition 7. Monopolist’s equilibrium valuation must be non-negative. More-
over, equilibrium surplus cannot exceed θqH . Therefore monopolist’s equilibrium valuation
cannot exceed θqH . Moreover, from Lemma 1 we know that buyer’s equilibrium valuation is
nonincreasing and has modulus of continuity no greater than 1. That is,
PH
(
b′
)− PH (b) ≤ fH (b′)− fH (b) .
This implies that
PH
(
b′
) ≤ PH (b) + fH (b′)− fH (b) .
Since buyers’ valuation is nonincreasing and does not exceed θqH , it must be that P
H (1) ≤
θqH . So above inequality and the upper bound on valuations imply that P
H (0) ≤ PH (1) +
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fH (0)− fH (1) ≤ 2θqH − θqH . By using the above inequality one more time we get PH (0) ≤
PH (1)+fH (0)−fH (1) . After rearranging the inequality, we get PH (1) ≥ PH (0) − (fH (0)−
fH (1)). That is, PH (1) ≥ fH (1) − fH (0) . Therefore, PH (1) ≥ θqH − θqH . Therefore all
buyers accept any price below θqH−θqH . So the monopolist never charges such prices. Knowing
that the lowest possible price is θqH − θqH all buyers accept prices such that θqH − p ≥
ρ
(
θqH −
(
θqH − θqH
))
. So any price below θqH − ρθqH is accepted by all buyers. Therefore,
for all positive n, all prices below θqH−ρnθqH are accepted by all buyers. As n goes to infinity
the limit price converges to θqH . Therefore the seller never charges less than θqH .The idea for
the low quality good is the same is the same.
Lemma 2.
The arg max correspondence T
(
xH , xL
)
of the objective function is a sublattice of [0, 1]×
[0, 1] .
Proof of Lemma 2. To prove the lemma, we show that the objective function is supermod-
ular. We claim that the objective function has increasing differences. Since the objective func-
tion has increasing difference on X×Y where X = [0, 1− µ)× [0, 1− µ) and Y = [0, 1]× [0, 1],
The objective function is supermodular on X×Y .1 Therefore, the objective function is super-
modular on Y for a given
(
xH , xL
)
. This implies that argmax correspondence of the objective
function is a sublattice of Y .2
Lemma 3.
If there exists
(
y´H , y´L
)
such that
i. PH
(
yH
)
= PH
(
y´H
)
and fH
(
yH
)
= fH
(
y´H
)
,
ii. PL
(
yH + yL
)
= PL
(
y´H + y´L
)
and fL
(
yH + yL
)
= fL
(
y´H + y´L
)
,
iii. PH
(
yH
) (
y´H − yH)+ PL (yH + yL) (y´L − yL) > 0
hold for some y´H ≥ 0 and y´L ≥ 0 then (yH , yL) cannot be a steady state.
Proof of Lemma 3. If the conditions hold then the monopolist strictly prefers
(
y´H , y´L
)
to(
yH , yL
)
. Therefore
(
yH , yL
)
cannot be a steady state since the monopolist deviates from that
1See Topkis Corollary 2.6.1, pg 45.
2See Topkis Theorem 2.7.1 pg 66.
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state with probability 1.
Proof of Proposition 8. First we present implications of the previous lemma.
1– We show that
(
y`H , 0
)
where y`H ∈
(
b̂, 1
)
cannot be a steady state. Suppose not. Then
PH
(
y`H
)
= θqH and P
L
(
y`H
)
= θqL. Since P (·) is a non-increasing function, PH (b) ≤ θqH and
PL (b) ≤ θqL for all b ∈
(
y`H , 1
]
. So, PH
(
yH
)
= θqH and PL
(
yH
)
= θqL for all y ∈
[
y`H , 1
]
.
Since the seller would prefer yH > y`H ,
(
y`H , 0
)
cannot be a steady state.
2– We show that
(
y`H , y`L
)
where y`H ∈
(
0, b̂
]
,and y`H+y`L ∈
(
b̂, 1
)
cannot be a steady state.
Suppose not. Then PH
(
y`H
)
= θqH and P
L
(
y`H + y`L
)
= θqL. Therefore, for all b > y`
H + y`L,
PL (b) ≤ θqL has to hold for
(
y`H , y`L
)
to be a steady state. But Lemma 3 states that for all
b ∈ [0, 1] , PL (b) ≥ θqL.So, for all b > y`H + y`L, fL (b) = θqL.Lemma 4 concludes that
(
y`H , y`L
)
cannot be a steady state.
3– We show that
(
y`H , y`L
)
where y`H ∈
(
b̂, 1
)
, and y`H + y`L ∈
(
b̂, 1
]
cannot be a steady
state. Suppose not. Then PH
(
y`H
)
= θqH and P
L
(
y`H + y`L
)
= θqL. Therefore, for all
bH > y`H and bL > y`H + y`L, PH
(
bH
) ≤ θqL and PL (bL) ≤ θqL have to hold for (y`H , y`L) to
be a steady state. But Lemma 3 states that for all bH ∈ [0, 1] and bL ∈ [0, 1] , PH (bH) ≥ θqL
and PL
(
bL
) ≥ θqL. So, for all bH > yH and bL > y`H + y`L, we have PH (bH) ≥ θqL and
PL
(
bL
)
= θqL.Lemma 4 concludes that
(
y`H , y`L
)
cannot be a steady state.
Proof of (2): Suppose that
(
b̂, 0
)
is a steady state. Then, according to Proposition 2,
PH
(
b̂
)
= θqH and P
L
(
b̂
)
= θqL. Since P
i(·) is decreasing and P i (b) ≤ θqi for all b ∈
[
0, b̂
]
.
So Lemma 4 shows that (b, 0) such that b < b̂ cannot be a steady state. We conclude that the
only possible steady states other than
(
b̂, 0
)
are
(
b̂, 1− b̂
)
and (1, 0) .
Proof of (3): Suppose that
(
y`H , 0
)
where y`H ∈
(
0, b̂
)
is a steady state. Then PH (b) =
θqH and P
L (b) = θqL for all b ∈
[
0, y`H
]
and PH (b) < θqH and P
L (b) < θqL for all b ∈(
y`H , b̂
]
. This implies that
(
b̂, .
)
cannot be a steady state. We conclude that the only possible
steady states other than
(
y`H , 0
)
when y`H ∈
(
0, b̂
)
are
(
y`H , 1− y`H) and (1, 0) . Suppose that(
y`H , b̂− y`H
)
where y`H ∈
(
0, b̂
)
is a steady state. Then PH
(
bH
)
= θqH and P
L
(
bL
)
= θqL
for all bH ∈ [0, y`H] and bH ∈ [0, b̂] and PH (bH) < θqH for all bH ∈ (y`H , b̂]. This implies that(
b̂, .
)
cannot be a steady state. We conclude that the only possible steady states other than(
y`H , b̂− y`H
)
when y`H ∈
(
0, b̂
)
are
(
y`H , 1− y`H) and (1, 0) . Suppose that (y`H , y`L) where
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y`H ∈
(
0, b̂
)
and y`H + y`L ∈
(
0, b̂
)
is a steady state. Then PH
(
bH
)
= θqH and P
L
(
bL
)
=
θqL for all b
H ∈ [0, y`H] and bH ∈ [0, y`H + y`L] and PH (bH) < θqH and PL (bL) < θqH for all
bH ∈
(
y`H , b̂
]
and bL ∈
(
y`H + y`L, b̂
]
. We conclude that the only possible steady states other
than
(
y`H , y`L
)
when y`H ∈
(
0, b̂
)
and y`H + y`L ∈
(
0, b̂
)
are
(
y`H , 1− y`H) and (1, 0) .
Proof of (1): If there is no steady state in
[
0, b̂
]
then (1, 0) is a steady state.
Proof of Theorem 4. The proof has two parts. First, we show that there exists an equi-
librium in which (1, 0) is the unique steady state. Then, in the second part, we prove the
uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Existence:
First, let’s define {xk}m
′
k=0 and {x̂k}mk=0 where xk = (xHk , (1− µ) b̂ − xHk ) and x̂k = (x̂Hk ,
1− µ− x̂Hk ). The initial values are xH0 = x̂H0 = 1− µ, xH1 = x̂H1 = (1− µ) b̂,
xH2 = x̂
H
2
qH
(qH − qL) − (1− µ) b̂
qL
(qH − qL)
where x̂H2 =
b̂θ − θ
θ − θ . The rest is defined as
xHk = (1− µ)−1
(
xHk−1 −
(
xHk−2 − xHk−1
) θ
ρk−2
(
θ − θ)
)
+ µb̂
qL
(qH − qL)
and
x̂Hk = (1− µ)−1
(
x̂Hk−1 −
(
x̂Hk−2 − x̂Hk−1
) θ
ρk−2
(
θ − θ)
)
.
Second, we derive the support of µ such that the state of high quality good is decreasing
(i.e. xHk−1 > x
H
k and x̂
H
k−1 > x̂
H
k ) and that there exist x
H
m′ and x̂
H
m such that xm′+1 < 0 ≤ xm′
and x̂m+1 < 0 ≤ x̂m hold.
We now claim that if x̂Hk−1 > x̂
H
k then x
H
k−1 > x
H
k holds and thatm
′ < m. To prove the claim
we show that xHk −xHk+1 =
(
x̂Hk − x̂Hk+1
) qH
(qH − qL) and x
H
k = x̂
H
k
qH
(qH − qL)−(1− µ) b̂
qL
(qH − qL)
for k = 2, . . . ,m′. By definition we have xHi − xHi+1 = (x̂Hi − x̂Hi+1)
qH
(qH − qL) and x
H
i =
x̂Hi
qH
(qH − qL) − (1− µ) b̂
qL
(qH − qL) for i = 1, 2. The proof comes from induction. Assume
that xHi − xHi+1 = (x̂Hi − x̂Hi+1)
qH
(qH − qL) and x
H
i = x̂
H
i
qH
(qH − qL) − (1− µ) b̂
qL
(qH − qL) hold
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for i = k − 1. We now show that it also holds for i = k. Due to the assumption on(
xHk−2 − xHk−1
)
and xHk−1 , we have x
H
k = (1− µ)−1 ((x̂Hk−1
qH
(qH − qL) − (1− µ) b̂
qL
(qH − qL)) −(
x̂Hk−2 − x̂Hk−1
) qH
(qH − qL)
θ
ρk−2
(
θ − θ))+µb̂ qL(qH − qL) . After simplifications xHk is pinned down
to xHk = (1−µ)−1(x̂Hk−1−(x̂Hk−2− x̂Hk−1)
θ
ρk−2
(
θ − θ)) qH(qH − qL)−(1− µ) b̂ qL(qH − qL) . By def-
inition of x̂Hk , we have x
H
k = x̂
H
k
qH
(qH − qL)−(1− µ) b̂
qL
(qH − qL) . This implies that x
H
k −xHk+1 =(
x̂Hk − x̂Hk+1
) qH
(qH − qL) which finishes the proof. Let’s define set Λ
′ and set Λ as
Λ′ =
{
µ ≥ 0 | ∃ m′ <∞ s.t. xHm′+1 < 0 ≤ xHm′ and
{
xHk
}m′
k=0
is decreasing
}
and
Λ =
{
µ ≥ 0 | ∃ m <∞ s.t. x̂Hm+1 < 0 ≤ x̂Hm and
{
x̂Hk
}m
k=0
is decreasing
}
.
Since xHk − xHk+1 > x̂Hk − x̂Hk+1, we have Λ ⊂ Λ′ and m′ < m. 3 Therefore, Λ represents the
domain of the depreciation rate. Let µ = sup Λ. Since 0 ∈ Λ and Λ is open in R+, we have
µ > 0. Note that x̂H2 ≤ x̂H1 , for all µ ≤
(
1− b̂
)
θ
b̂
(
θ − θ) whereas, x̂H3 ≤ x̂H2 for all µ <
(
1− b̂
)
θ
b̂
(
θ − θ) .
We now show that if µ` ∈ Λ and µ < µ`, then µ ∈ Λ. To show that we need to prove that(
x̂Hk−1 − x̂Hk
)
is decreasing in µ. We have x̂H0 < x̂
H
1 < x̂
H
2 < x̂
H
3 for all µ ≤ µ. To finish the
proof, we need to show that
(
x̂Hk−1 − x̂Hk
)
is decreasing with respect to µ as well. Let’s define
x̂Hk as
x̂Hk = (1− µ)−1
(
x̂Hk−1 −
(
x̂Hk−2 − x̂Hk−1
)
âk−2
)
where âk =
θ
ρk
(
θ − θ) . The proof comes from induction.
Step 1:
dx̂H3
dµ
> 0 and
d
(
x̂H2 − x̂H3
)
dµ
< −2 (1− µ)−1 x̂H3 .
Step 2: Assume that
dx̂Hk−1
dµ
> 0 and
d
(
x̂Hk−2 − x̂Hk−1
)
dµ
< − (k − 2) (1− µ)−1 x̂Hk−1.
Step 3: Show that
dx̂Hk
dµ
> 0 and
d
(
x̂Hk−1 − x̂Hk
)
dµ
< − (k − 1) (1− µ)−1 x̂Hk . Note that
x̂Hk−1 − x̂Hk = (1 − (1 − µ)−1)x̂Hk−1 + (1 − µ)−1ak−2(x̂Hk−2 − x̂Hk−1). So,
d(x̂Hk−1−x̂Hk )
dµ < −(1 −
3Since m′ is the same as m of DL (2008), the number of periods required to fulfill the market with product
differentiation is striclty less than single good setting of this model.
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µ)−2x̂k−1 +(k−1)(1−µ)−2âk−2(x̂Hk−2−x̂Hk−1)+(1−µ)−1âk−2
d(x̂Hk−2−x̂Hk−1)
dµ ≤ −(1−µ)−2(x̂Hk−1−
(k−1)−2ak−2(x̂Hk−2− x̂Hk−1)+(k−2)âk−2x̂Hk−1) < −(1−µ)−2(k−1)(x̂Hk−1− âk−2(x̂Hk−2− x̂Hk−1))
< −(1− µ)−1(k − 1)x̂Hk where the third inequality follows from âk−2 > 1.
Third, we prove that for µ ∈ Λ there exists a stationary equilibrium with unique steady
state (1, 0) . The pentad
{
PH(·), PL(·), tH(·), tL(·), R(·)} is defined as follows.
P (·) =

(
pHm, p
L
m
)
for xH ∈ D1, xL ∈ C1(
p̂Hm, θqL
)
for xH ∈ D2, xL ∈ C ′1(
pHk , p
L
k
)
for xH ∈ D3, xL ∈ C1, k ∈ S(
p̂Hk , θqL
)
for xH ∈ D4, xL ∈ C ′1, k ∈ S′
where D1 ≡ [0, yHm], D2 ≡ [0, ŷHm′ ], D3 ≡ (yHk+1, yHk ], D4 ≡ (ŷHk+1, ŷHk ], C1 ≡ [0, b̂ − xH ],
S ≡ {m− 1, ..., 0}, S′ ≡ {m′ − 1, ..., 0}.
t(·) =

(
yHm−1, b̂− yHm−1
)
for xH ∈ D1, xL ∈ C1(
ŷHm′−1, 1− ŷHm′−1
)
for xH ∈ D1, xL ∈ C ′1(
yHm−1, b̂− yHm−1
)
for xH ∈ D2, xL ∈ C2(
ŷHk−1, 1− ŷHk−1
)
for xH ∈ D2, xL ∈ C ′2(
yHk−1, b̂− yHk−1
)
for xH ∈ D1, xL ∈ C3(
ŷHm′−1, 1− ŷHm′−1
)
for xH ∈ D1, xL ∈ C ′3(
yHk−1, b̂− yHk−1
)
for xH ∈ D3, xL ∈ C3(
ŷHk′−1, 1− ŷHk′−1
)
for xH ∈ D3, xL ∈ C ′3(
yHk−1, b̂− yHk−1
)
for xH ∈ D4, xL ∈ C3(
ŷHm′−1, 1− ŷHm′−1
)
for xH ∈ D4, xL ∈ C ′3(
yHk−1, b̂− yHk−1
)
for xH ∈ D4, xL ∈ C4(
ŷHk′−1, 1− ŷHk′−1
)
for xH ∈ D4, xL ∈ C ′4(
yHk−1, b̂− yHk−1
)
for xH ∈ D5, xL ∈ C4
(1, 0) for xH ∈ D5, xL ∈ C ′4(
yHk−1, b̂− yHk−1
)
for xH ∈ D6, xL ∈ C5(
ŷHk′−1, 1− ŷHk′−1
)
for xH ∈ D6, xL ∈ C ′5(
yHk−1, b̂− yHk−1
)
for xH ∈ D7, xL ∈ C5
(1, 0) for xH ∈ D7, xL ∈ C ′6
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where k, t = m − 1, . . . 2, k′ = m′ − 1, . . . 2, and D1 ≡ [0, xHm] ∩ [0, x˜Hm′ ], D2 ≡ [0, xHm] ∩
(x˜Hk+1, x˜
H
k ], D3 ≡ [0, xHm] ∩ (x˜Hk′+1, x˜Hk′ ], D4 ≡ (xHt+1, xHt ] ∩ (x˜Hk′+1, x˜Hk′ ], D5 ≡ (xHt+1, xHt ] ∩
(x˜H2 , 1−µ], D6 ≡ (xH2 , 1−µ]∩ (x˜Hk′+1, x˜Hk′ ], D7 ≡ (xH2 , 1−µ]∩ (x˜H2 , 1−µ], C1 ≡ [0, t
(
xHm, x
H
)
]
∩T (x′ (yHm−1, y˜Hm′−1) , xH), C2 ≡ [0, t (xHm, xH)] ∩ T (x′ (yHm−1, y˜Hk−1) , xH), C3 ≡ [t (xHk+1, xH) ,
t
(
xHk , x
H
)
] ∩ T (x′ (yHk−1, y˜Hm′−1) , xH), C4 ≡ [t (xHk+1, xH) , t (xHk , xH)] ∩ T (x′ (yHk−1, 1) , xH),
C5 ≡ [t
(
xHk+1, x
H
)
, t
(
xHk , x
H
)
] ∩ T (x′ (yHk−1, 1) , xH). Moreover, we have
R
(
xH , xL
)
=
(
tH
(
xH , xL
)− xH)PH (tH (xH , xL) , tL (xH , xL))
+
(
tL
(
xH , xL
)− xL)PL (tH (xH , xL) , tL (xH , xL))
+ δR
(
(1− µ) tH (xH , xL) , (1− µ) tL (xH , xL))
where pHk = θqH − ρk(θqH − θqH), pLk = θqL − ρk(θqL− θqL), and p̂Hk = θqH − (θ− θ)(ρkqH +
(1−ρk)qL) for all k = 0, ...,m. We define ySk as ySk =
xSk
1− µ , S = H,L. Moreover, the threshold
values on xL are defined as
t
(
xHk , x
H
)
= xHk
qH − qL
qL
+ (1− µ) b̂− xH qH
qL
and
T
(
x′
(
yHk , y˜
H
k′
)
, xH
)
= A (k) + yHk B (k, k)− ŷHk′B
(
k′, k
)− xHC (k′, k)+D (k) ∆R (yHk , ŷHk′ )
where the functions of k and k′ are:
A (k) =
b̂θ − θ − ρk b̂∆θ
(1− ρk) ∆θ , B (t, k) =
(
θ − ρt∆θ)∆q
(1− ρk) ∆θqL , C (t, k) =
(
ρt − ρk) qH + (1− ρt) qL
(1− ρk) qL ,
D (k) =
δ
(1− ρk) ∆θqL , and ∆R
(
yHk , ŷ
H
k′
)
= R((1−µ)yHk , (1−µ)(̂b−yHk ))−R((1−µ)ŷHk′ , (1−
µ)(1− ŷHk′ )).
Let’s define Π((yH , b̂−yH); (xH , xL)) = (yH−xH)PH(yH , b̂−yH)+(̂b−yH−xL)PL(yH , b̂−
yH) + δR((1 − µ)y, (1 − µ)(̂b − yH)) and Π̂((ŷH , 1 − ŷH); (xH , xL)) = (ŷH − xH)PH(ŷH , 1 −
ŷH) + (1− ŷH − xL)PL(ŷH , 1− ŷH) + δR((1− µ)ŷ, (1− µ)(1− ŷH)). The state variable xHk is
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set such that
Π
((
yHk−1, b̂− yHk−1
)
;
(
xHk , (1− µ) b̂− xHk
))
= Π
((
yHk−2, b̂− yHk−2
)
;
(
xHk , (1− µ) b̂− xHk
))
.
Let’s define
hk
(
xH , xL
)
= Π
((
yHk−1, b̂− yHk−1
)
;
(
xH , xL
))−Π((yHk−2, b̂− yHk−2) ; (xH , xL))
then by definition of xHk we have hk
((
xHk , (1− µ) b̂− xHk
))
= 0. Since
∂hk
(
xH , xL
)
∂xH
= −PH
(
yHk−1, b̂− yHk−1
)
+ PH
(
yHk−2, b̂− yHk−2
)
< 0,
for xH < xHk we have
hk
(
xH , (1− µ) b̂− xHk
)
> 0
and for xH > xHk we have,
hk
(
xH , (1− µ) b̂− xHk
)
< 0.
Now, suppose that xH ∈ (xHk+1, xHk ]. Since ∂hk (xH , xL)∂xL =−PL(yHk−1, b̂−yHk−1) + PL(yHk−2, b̂−
yHk−2) < 0, ∃ x`L > 0 such that hk
(
xH , x`L
)
= 0 for xH ∈ (xHk+1, xHk ] . At x`L we have
∂hk
(
xH , x`L
)
∂xH
(
xHk − xH
)
=
∂hk
(
xH , x`L
)
∂xL
(
x`L −
(
(1− µ) b̂− xHk
))
.
Thus, for all xL > xHk
∆q
qL
+ (1− µ) b̂− xH qH
qL
we have
hk
(
xH , xL
)
< 0
and for all xL < xHk
∆q
qL
+ (1− µ) b̂− xH qH
qL
we have
hk
(
xH , xL
)
> 0.
Therefore, since Π
((
yH , yL
)
,
(
xH , xL
))
is strictly increasing with respect to yH and yL on any
94
of the intervals defined above, given xH ∈ (xHk+1, xHk ] , for all xL ∈ (t(xHk+1, xH), t(xHk , xH)]
where t(xHk , x
H) = xHk
qH − qL
qL
+ (1− µ) b̂ − xH qH
qL
, the optimum choice of the seller among
{(yH0 , b̂− yH0 ), (yH1 , b̂− yH1 ), . . . , (yHm, b̂− yHm)} is (yHk−1, b̂− yHk−1).
The state variable x̂Hk is set such that
Π̂
((
ŷHk−1, 1− ŷHk−1
)
;
(
x̂Hk , 1− µ− x̂Hk
))
= Π̂
((
ŷHk−2, 1− ŷHk−2
)
;
(
x̂Hk , 1− µ− x̂Hk
))
.
Let’s define
ĥk
(
xH , xL
)
= Π̂
((
ŷHk−1, 1− ŷHk−1
)
;
(
xH , xL
))− Π̂ ((ŷHk−2, 1− ŷHk−2) ; (xH , xL))
then ĥk
((
ŷHk , 1− µ− ŷHk
))
= 0.
Since
∂ĥk
(
xH , xL
)
∂xH
= −PH (ŷHk−1, 1− ŷHk−1)+ PH (ŷHk−2, 1− ŷHk−2) < 0, for xH < x̂Hk ,
ĥk
(
xH , xL
)
> 0
and for xH > x̂Hk ,
ĥk
(
xH , xL
)
< 0.
Since,
∂ĥk
(
xH , xL
)
∂xL
= 0, the seller would like to choose highest possible xL.Therefore, given
xH ∈ (x̂Hk+1, x̂Hk ] , for all xL the optimum choice of the seller among {(ŷH0 , 1− ŷH0 ), (ŷH1 , 1− ŷH1 ),
. . . , (ŷHm , 1− ŷHm)} is (ŷHk−1, 1− ŷHk−1).
Let’s define
dk
(
xH , xL
)
= Π
((
yHk , b̂− yHk
)
;
(
xH , xL
))− Π̂ ((ŷHk′ , 1− ŷHk′ ) ; (xH , xL)) .
Suppose xH ∈ (xHk+1, xHk ]∩(x̂Hk′+1, x̂Hk′], then there exists xL where dk (xH , xL) = 0. Moreover,
∂dk
(
xH , xL
)
∂xL
= − (1− ρk) (θ − θ) qL < 0. It follows that for a given xH ∈ (xHk+1, xHk ] ∩(
x̂Hk′+1, x̂
H
k′
]
if xL < T
(
x′
(
yHk , ŷ
H
k′
)
, xH
)
then
dk
(
xH , xL
)
> 0
95
and if xL > T
(
x′
(
yHk−1, y˜
H
k′−1
)
, xH
)
then
dk
(
xH , xL
)
< 0.
Since Π((yH , b̂ − yH); (xH , xL)) is strictly increasing in yH on any of the intervals [0, ym],
(ym, ym−1], . . . , (y1, 1] and Π̂((ŷH , 1 − ŷH); (xH , xL)) is strictly increasing in ŷH on any of
the intervals [0, ŷm′ ], (ŷm, ŷm−1], . . . , (ŷ1, 1]. This implies that (tH(xH , xL), tL(xH , xL)) is the
smallest solution of the monopolist’s optimization problem. Buyer’s arbitrage equations are
also satisfied. It follows that {PH(·), PL(·), tH(·), tL(·), R(·)} is a stationary triplet for µ ∈ Λ.
Uniqueness:
We now consider any stationary equilibrium whose unique steady state is (1, 0). Let {PH0 (·),
PL0 (·), tH0 (·), tL0 (·), R0(·)} be the stationary triplet of that equilibrium. We show that {PH(·),
PL(·), tH(·), tL(·), R(·)} = {PH0 (·), PL0 (·), tH0 (·), tL0 (·), R0(·)}.
First, we show that tH0 (x
H
1 , (1 − µ)̂b − xH1 ) = 1 and tL0 (xH1 , (1 − µ)̂b − xH1 ) = 0. Since
(̂b, 0) and (̂b, 1 − b̂) are not steady states, we must have PH
(
b̂
)
< θqH , P
L
(
b̂
)
< θqL.
Moreover, since (1, 0) is a steady state, we must have PH (1) = θqH , P
L (1) = θqL. Now,
consider the arbitrage equations at
(
b̂, 0
)
. Due to the arbitrage equation for high quality
good θqH − PH0
(
b̂
)
= ρ(θqH − PH0 (tH0 ((1 − µ)̂b, 0))), we have PH0 (tH0 ((1 − µ)̂b, 0)) < PH0 (̂b).
Since PH0 (·) is non-increasing, the stock of high quality good increases at b̂: tH0 ((1−µ)̂b, 0) > b̂.
Similarly, due to the arbitrage equation for low quality good θqL−PL0 (̂b) = ρ(θqL−PL0 (tH0 ((1−
µ)̂b, 0)+ tL0 ((1−µ)̂b, 0))), we have PH0 (tH0 ((1−µ)̂b, 0)+ tL0 ((1−µ)̂b, 0)) < PL0 (̂b). Since PL0 (·) is
non-increasing, total stock of durable good increases at b̂ is tH0 ((1−µ)̂b, 0)+ tL0 ((1−µ)̂b, 0) > b̂.
Moreover, at any b ∈ [0, 1] , marginal benefit of high quality good is greater than marginal cost
of low quality good. Thus, we have tH0
(
(1− µ) b̂, 0
)
= 1 and tL0
(
(1− µ) b̂, 0
)
= 0.
Second, we show that tH0
(
x̂H1 , 1− µ− x̂H1
)
= 1 and tL0
(
x̂H1 , 1− µ− x̂H1
)
= 0. We know
that we must have PH
(
b̂
)
< θqH , P
L
(
b̂
)
< θqL and P
H (1) = θqH , P
L (1) = θqL. Due to
the arbitrage equation for the high quality good θqH −PH0 (̂b) = ρ(θqH −PH0 (tH0 ((1−µ)̂b, (1−
µ)(1− b̂)))), we have PH0 (tH0 ((1−µ)̂b, (1−µ)(1− b̂))) < PH0 (̂b). Since PH0 (·) is non-increasing,
the stock of high quality good increases at b̂: tH0
(
(1− µ) b̂, (1− µ)
(
1− b̂
))
> b̂. Similarly,
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due to the arbitrage equation for low quality good θqL−PL0 (1) = ρ(θqL−PH0 (tH0 ((1−µ)̂b, (1−
µ)(1− b̂)+tL0 ((1−µ)̂b, (1−µ)(1− b̂))), we have PH0 ((tH0 (1−µ)̂b, (1−µ)(1− b̂))+tL0 (1−µ)̂b, (1−
µ)(1 − b̂)) < PL0 (1). Since PL0 (·) is non-increasing, total stock of durable good increases at
b̂, we have tH0
(
(1− µ) b̂, (1− µ)
(
1− b̂
))
+ tL0
(
(1− µ) b̂, (1− µ)
(
1− b̂
))
≥ 1. Therefore, we
must have tH0
(
(1− µ) b̂, (1− µ)
(
1− b̂
))
+ tL0
(
(1− µ) b̂, (1− µ)
(
1− b̂
))
= 1 Moreover, at
any b, marginal benefit of high quality good is greater than marginal cost of low quality good.
Thus, we have tH0
(
(1− µ) b̂, (1− µ)
(
1− b̂
))
= 1 and tL0
(
(1− µ) b̂, (1− µ)
(
1− b̂
))
= 0.
Third, we show that for all xH ∈ (xH1 − , xH1 ] we have tH0 (xH , (1 − µ)̂b − xH) = 1 and
tL0 (x
H , (1−µ)̂b−xH) = 0. By the left continuity of tH0 (xH , xL), ∃  > 0 such that tH0 (xH , (1−
µ)̂b−xH) = 1 and tL0 (xH , (1−µ)̂b−xH = 0 for all xH ∈ (xH1 − , xH1 ]. The arbitrage equations
for yH ∈ (yH1 −

1− µ, y
H
1 ] and y
L ≤ b̂− yH are
for high quality good: fH
(
yH
)− PH0 (yH) = ρ (fH (yH)− PH0 (1)),
for low quality good: fL
(
yH + yL
)− PL0 (yH + yL) = ρ (fL (yH)− PH0 (1)).
Since yH ≤ b̂ and yH+yL ≤ b̂, the arbitrage equations imply that PH0
(
yH
)
= θqH−ρ
(
θ − θ) qH
and PL0
(
yH + yL
)
= θqL − ρ
(
θ − θ) qL where yH + yL ≤ b̂.
Fourth, we show that for all xH ∈ (x̂H1 −, x̂H1 ], and xL ∈ ((1−µ)̂b−xH−γ, (1− µ) b̂−xH ],
tH0
(
xH , xL
)
= 1 and tL0
(
xH , xL
)
= 0. By the left continuity of tL0
(
xH , .
)
, ∃ γ > 0 such
that tH0
(
xH , xL
)
= 1 and tL0
(
xH , xL
)
= 0 for all xH ∈ (x̂H1 − , x̂H1 ] and all xL ∈ ((1 −
µ)̂b − xH − γ, ((1− µ)) b̂ − xH ]. The arbitrage equations for yH ∈ (ŷH1 −

1− µ, ŷ
H
1 ] and
yL ∈ ((1− µ)̂b− yH − γ
1− µ, (1− µ) b̂− y
H ] are
for high quality good: fH
(
yH
)− PH0 (yH) = ρ (fH (yH)− PH0 (1))
for low quality good: fL
(
yH + yL
)−PL0 (yH + yL) = ρ (fL (yH)− PH0 (1)) . Since yH ≤ b̂
and yH + yL ≤ b̂, the arbitrage equations imply that PH0
(
yH
)
= θqH − ρ
(
θ − θ) qH and
PL0
(
yH + yL
)
= θqL − ρ
(
θ − θ) qL where yH + yL ≤ b̂.
Fifth, we show that inf
(
xH1 − 
)
= xH2 .Let’s define x`
H
2 = inf{xH : tH0
(
xH , xL
)
= 1,
xL ∈ ((1− µ) b̂−xH−γ, (1− µ) b̂−xH ]}. We know that when xL = (1− µ) b̂−xH2 , if xH < xH2
then Π
(
y1;
(
xH , xL
))
> Π
(
y0;
(
xH , xL
))
. Otherwise, if xH > xH2 then Π
(
y1;
(
xH , xL
))
<
Π
(
y0;
(
xH , xL
))
. Since Π0(y1; (x
H , xL)) = Π(y1; (x
H , xL)) and Π0(y0; (x
H , xL)) = Π (y0;
(xH , xL)), we must have x`H2 = x
H
2 .
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Sixth, we show that inf((1 − µ)̂b − xH − γ) = t(xH2 , xH). Let’s define x`L2 = inf{xL :
tL0 (x
H , xL) = 0, xH ∈ (xH2 , 1 − µ]}. We know that for a given xH , if xL < t(xH2 , xH)
then Π(y1; (x
H , xL)) > Π(y0; (x
H , xL)); whereas if xL > t(xH2 , x
H) then Π(y1; (x
H , xL)) <
Π(y0; (x
H , xL)). Since Π0(y1; (x
H , xL)) = Π(y1; (x
H , xL)) and Π0(y0; (x)) = Π (y0; (x)), we
must have x`L2 = t(x
H
2 , x
H).
Seventh, suppose tH
(
xH , xL
)
= yHk−1 and t
L
(
xH , xL
)
= b̂ − yHk−1 for xH ∈
(
xH2 , 1− µ
]
and xL ∈ (t(xHk+1, xH), t(xHk , xH)] for k = 1, 2, . . . , i. Show that it holds for i + 1. We have
tH
(
xH , xL
)
= yHi−1 and t
L
(
xH , xL
)
= b̂ − yHi−1 for xH ∈
(
xH2 , 1− µ
]
and xL ∈ (t(xHi+1, xH),
t(xHi , x
H)]. Now, we prove that {PH(·), PL(·), tH(·), tL(·), R(·))} = {PH0 (·), PL0 (·), tH0 (·),
tL0 (·), R0(·)} holds for i + 1 for xH ∈ (xH2 , 1 − µ]. We must have PH0
(
yHi+1, y
L
i+1
)
< θqH
and PL0
(
yHi+1, y
L
i+1
)
< θqL. This implies that we have P
H
0
(
yHi+1
)
> PH0
(
tH0
(
xHi+1, x
L
i+1
))
and
PL0
(
yHi+1 + y
L
i+1
)
> PL0
(
tH0
(
xHi+1, x
L
i+1
)
+ tL0
(
xHi+1, x
L
i+1
))
. Since PH0 (·) and PL0 (·) are non-
increasing, stock of high quality good and total stock increase when xHi+1 = (1− µ) yHi+1 and
xLi+1 = (1− µ) yLi+1. That is, tH0
(
xHi+1, x
L
i+1
) ≥ yHi+1 and tH0 (xHi+1, xLi+1) + tL0 (xHi+1, xLi+1) ≥
yHi+1 + y
L
i+1. Since x
H
i+1 and x
L
i+1 are defined as
xHi+1 = inf
{
xH : t0
(
xH , xL
)
= yHi−1 where x
L = (1− µ) b̂− xH
}
and
xLi+1 = inf
{
xL : t0
(
xH , xL
)
= b̂− yHi−1 where xH ∈
(
xH2 , 1− µ
]}
,
this imply that lim→0 tH0
(
xHi+1 − , xLi+1
)
= yHi and lim→0 t
L
0
(
xHi+1, x
L
i+1 − 
)
= b̂− yHi . Now,
we can use left continuity of ti(·) functions to define
x`Hi+2 = inf
{
xH : t0
(
xH , xL
)
= yHi where x
L = (1− µ) b̂− xH
}
and
x`Li+2 = inf
{
xL : t0
(
xH , xL
)
= yLi where x
H ∈ (xH2 , 1− µ]} .
Now, to finish the proof we need to show that x`Hi+2 = x
H
i+2 and x`
L
i+2 = x
L
i+2.We know that
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when xL = (1− µ) b̂ − xHi+2 if xH < xHi+2 then Π
(
yi+1;
(
xH , xL
))
> Π
(
yi;
(
xH , xL
))
; other-
wise, if xH > xHi+2 then Π
(
yi+1;
(
xH , xL
))
< Π
(
yi;
(
xH , xL
))
. Since Π0
(
yi+1;
(
xH , xL
))
=
Π
(
yi+1;
(
xH , xL
))
and Π0
(
yi;
(
xH , xL
))
= Π
(
yi;
(
xH , xL
))
then we must have x`Hi+2 = x
H
i+2.
Similarly, for a given xH , if xL < t
(
xHi+2, x
H
)
then Π
(
yi+1;
(
xH , xL
))
> Π
(
yi;
(
xH , xL
))
;
whereas if xL > t
(
xHi+2, x
H
)
then Π
(
yi+1;
(
xH , xL
))
< Π
(
yi;
(
xH , xL
))
. Since Π0 (yi+1;
(xH , xL)) = Π(yi+1; (x
H , xL)) and Π0(yi; (x
H , xL)) = Π(yi; (x
H , xL)), we must have x`Li+2 =
t
(
xHi+2, x
H
)
.
Eighth,we show that for all xH ∈ (x̂H1 − , x̂H1 ], we have tH0 (xH , 1− µ− xH) = 1 and
tL0
(
xH , 1− µ− xH) = 0. By the left continuity of tH0 (xH , xL), ∃  > 0 such that tH0 (xH , 1−µ−
xH) = 1 and tL0
(
xH , 1− µ− xH) = 0 for all xH ∈ (x̂H1 − , x̂H1 ]. Since yH ≤ b̂ and yH+yL > b̂,
the arbitrage equations for high quality good fH
(
yH
) − PH0 (yH) = ρ (fH (yH)− PH0 (1))
and for low quality good fL(yH + yL) − PL0 (yH + yL) = ρ(fL(yH) − PH0 (1)) imply that
PH0
(
yH
)
= θqH − ρ
(
θ − θ) qH and PL0 (yH + yL) = θqL where yH + yL > b̂. Now, consider
buyer b ∈
(
ŷH1 −

1− µ, ŷ
H
1
]
. Buyer b strictly prefers low quality good for all pH ≥ θqH −(
θ − θ) (ρqH + (1− ρ) qL). The monopolist has to leave some rent to high type buyers when
yH + yL > b̂. Hence, when yH ∈
(
ŷH1 −

1− µ, ŷ
H
1
]
and yL > b̂− yH
PH
(
yH
)
= θqH −
(
θ − θ) (ρqH + (1− ρ) qL)
and
PL
(
yL
)
= θqL.
Ninth, we show that for all xH ∈ (x̂H1 − , x̂H1 ], and xL ∈ (1− µ− x̂H − γ, 1− µ− x̂H1 ],
we have tH0
(
xH , xL
)
= 1 and tL0
(
xH , xL
)
= 0. By the left continuity of tL0
(
xH , .
) ∃ γ > 0
such that tH0
(
xH , xL
)
= 1 and tL0
(
xH , xL
)
= 0 for all xH ∈ (x̂H1 − , x̂H1 ] and all xL ∈(
1− µ− xH − γ, 1− µ− xH]. Since yH ≤ b̂ and yL ∈ (1−yH− γ
1− µ, 1−y
H ] and yH+yL > b̂
, the arbitrage equations for high quality good fH
(
yH
) − PH0 (yH) = ρ (fH (yH)− PH0 (1))
and for low quality good: fL
(
yH + yL
) − PL0 (yH + yL) = ρ (fL (yH)− PH0 (1)) imply that
PH0
(
yH
)
= θqH −ρ
(
θ − θ) qH and PL0 (yH + yL) = θqL where yH +yL > b̂. Hence, due to the
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incentive compatibility constraint, when yH ∈ (y˜H1 −

1− µ, y˜
H
1 ] and y
L ∈ (1−yH− γ
1− µ, 1−y
H ]
we have
PH
(
yH
)
= θqH −
(
θ − θ) (ρqH + (1− ρ) qL)
and
PL
(
yL
)
= θqL.
Tenth, we show that inf
(
x˜H1 − 
)
= x˜H2 . Let’s define x´
H
2 = inf{xH : tH0
(
xH , xL
)
= 1,
xL ∈ (1 − µ − xH − γ, 1 − µ − xH ]}. We know that when xL = 1 − µ − x˜H2 , if xH <
x˜H2 then Π
(
y˜1;
(
xH , xL
))
> Π
(
y˜0;
(
xH , xL
))
; otherwise if xH > x˜H2 then Π
(
y˜1;
(
xH , xL
))
<
Π
(
y˜0;
(
xH , xL
))
. Since Π0
(
y˜1;
(
xH , xL
))
= Π(y˜1; (x
H , xL)) and Π0(y˜0; (x
H , xL)) = Π(y˜0;
(xH , xL)), we must have x´H2 = x˜
H
2 .
Eleventh, we show that inf
(
1− µ− x̂H − γ) = 0. Let’s define x´L2 = inf{xL : tL0 (xH , xL) =
0, xH ∈ (x̂H2 , 1 − µ]}. Since Π
(
ŷ1;
(
xH , xL
))
< Π
(
ŷ0;
(
xH , xL
))
, for all xL and for xH ∈(
x̂H2 , 1− µ
]
, we must have x´L2 = 0.
Twelfth, suppose that xH ∈ (xH2 , 1− µ]∩(x˜H2 , 1− µ] and that xL ∈ (t(xHk+1, xH), t(xHk , xH)].
We now prove the existence of T
(
x`
(
yHk−1, 1
)
, xH
)
.First, we should observe that there exists a
threshold on xL, let’s call is X ′, such that for all xL < X ′, Π0((yHk−1, b̂ − yHk−1); (xH , xL)) >
Π̂0((1, 0); (x
H , xL)) and for all xL > X ′, Π0((yHk−1, b̂− yHk−1); (xH , xL)) < Π̂0((1, 0); (xH , xL)).
Now, we show that X ′ = T
(
x`
(
xHk , x
H
))
. For a given xH ∈ (xH2 , 1− µ] ∩ (x˜H2 , 1− µ] ,if
xL < T
(
x`
(
xHk , x
H
))
then Π
((
yHk−1, b̂− yHk−1
)
;
(
xH , xL
))
> Π˜ (1, 0) ;
(
xH , xL
)
; otherwise
if xL > T
(
x`
(
xHk , x
H
))
then Π((yHk−1, b̂ − yHk−1); (xH , xL)) < Π˜((1, 0); (xH , xL)). Since we
have Π0((y
H
k−1, b̂ − yHk−1); (xH , xL)) = Π((yHk−1, b̂ − yHk−1); (xH , xL)), and Π̂0((1, 0); (xH , xL))
= Π̂((1, 0); (xH , xL)), we must have X ′ = T
(
x`
(
xHk , x
H
))
.
Finally, suppose the sequence holds for k = 1, 2, . . . , i. Show that it holds for i+ 1 as well.
Proof of Corollary 8.
See the proof of Corollary 2.
Proof of Corollary 9. By definition of xHk and x̂
H
k , for k ≥ 3; limz→0 xHk = limz→0+(xHk−1−(
xHk−2 − xHk−1
) θ(
θ − θ)) and similarly limz→0+ x̂Hk = limz→0(x̂Hk−1− (x̂Hk−2 − x̂Hk−1) θ(θ − θ)).
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Moreover, limz→0+ xH2 =
b̂θ − θ
θ − θ
qH
(qH − qL) −b̂
qL
(qH − qL) < x̂
H
2 .
By induction,
lim
z→0+
(
xHk−1 − xHk
)
> lim
z→0
(
xHk−2 − xHk−1
)
> b̂− lim
z→0
xH2 =
(
1− b̂
)
θ
θ − θ
qH
(qH − qL)
and
lim
z→0
(
x̂Hk−1 − x̂Hk
)
> lim
z→0
(
x̂Hk−2 − x̂Hk−1
)
> b̂− x̂H2 =
(
1− b̂
)
θ
θ − θ .
Therefore, when the seller serves only high type buyers on the path to the steady state, it takes
at most m′ ≤ b̂
(
θ − θ)(
1− b̂
)
θ
(qH − qL)
qH
+ 1 steps to sell the high quality good to all consumers.
However, when the seller serves both buyers, it takes at most m ≤ b̂
(
θ − θ)(
1− b̂
)
θ
+ 1 steps to sell
the high quality good to all consumers.
Proof of Theorem 5. The proof has two parts. First, we show that there exists an equilib-
rium in which
(
b̂, 0
)
is a steady state. Then we prove that the equilibrium derived in the first
part is unique.
Existence:
First, we derive a path of states that reaches a steady state. The path {x˜k}∞k=1 is for
the standard monopoly steady state
(
b̂, 0
)
, and the path {x̂k}∞k=1 is for segmented monopoly
steady state
(
b̂, 1− b̂
)
. Let’s iteratively define the sequence {x˜k}∞k=1 where x˜k =
(
x˜Hk , 0
)
as
x˜Hk =
p˜Hk−1x˜
H
k−1
µθqH + (1− µ) p˜Hk−1
with the initial value x˜H0 = (1− µ) b̂. We set x˜Hk such that when
the state is
(
x˜Hk , 0
)
the monopolist is indifferent between staying at
(
x˜Hk , 0
)
forever and moving
the state to
(
x˜Hk−1, 0
)
. The price of high quality good p˜Hk and low quality good p˜
L
k are derived
from buyers’ arbitrage equations. The prices are set such that marginal buyers are indifferent
between today and tomorrow. The prices are defined as p˜Hk =
(
1− ρk) θqH + ρkθqH and
p˜Lk =
(
1− ρk) θqL + ρkθqL. Similarly, we iteratively define the sequence {x̂k}∞k=1 where x̂k =(
x̂Hk , 1− µ− x̂Hk
)
as x̂Hk =
(
p̂Hk−1 − θqL
)
x̂Hk−1
µθqH − θqL + (1− µ) p̂Hk−1
with the initial value x̂H0 = (1− µ) b̂.
The prices that make buyers be indifferent between today and tomorrow are p̂Hk = θqH +
ρk∆θ∆q and p̂Lk = θqL. We should note that x˜
H
0 < x˜
H
1 < x˜
H
2 < . . . and x̂
H
0 < x̂
H
1 < x̂
H
2 < . . ..
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Which sequence that the monopolist follows depends on the amount of low quality good in the
market. If the low quality good is low enough, the monopolist prefers buying all low quality
good back and following {x˜k}∞k=1 thereafter. However, if the amount of low quality good in
the market is sufficiently high then he would follow {xk}∞k=1. The steady that the monopolist
will reach not only depend on the amount low quality good but the limit value of x˜Hk and x̂
H
k
as well. If the limit value is less than the market size then when the amount of high quality
good is sufficiently high, the monopolist fulfills the market immediately and reaches the Coase
Conjecture steady state (1, 0).
If xH∞ = limk→∞ xHk ≥ 1−µ, then set m = sup
{
k : xHk < 1− µ
}
and define xm+1 = 1−µ.
Let yHk =
xHk
1− µ. The pentad
{
PH(·), PL(·), tH(·), tL(·), R(·)} is defined as follows.
PH
(
xH , xL
)
=

θqH ∀xH ∈
[
0, b̂
]
and ∀xL ∈ [0, xL (xH)]
θqH − θqL + θqL ∀xH ∈
[
0, b̂
]
and ∀xL /∈ [0, xL (xH)]
p˜Hk ∀xH ∈
(
yHk−1, y
H
k
]
and ∀xL ∈ [0, xL (xH)]
p̂Hk ∀xH ∈
(
yHk−1, y
H
k
]
and ∀xL /∈ [0, xL (xH)]
PL
(
xH , xL
)
=

θqH ∀xH ∈
[
0, b̂
]
and ∀xL ∈ [0, xL (xH)]
θqL ∀xH ∈
[
0, b̂
]
and ∀xL /∈ [0, xL (xH)]
p˜Lk ∀xH ∈
(
yHk−1, y
H
k
]
, k ∈ S and ∀xL ∈ [0, xL (xH)]
θqL ∀xH ∈
(
yHk−1, y
H
k
]
, k ∈ S and ∀xL /∈ [0, xL (xH)]
tH
(
xH , xL
)
=
 b̂ ∀x
H ∈ [0, xH1 ] and ∀xL
yHk−1 ∀xH ∈
(
xHk−1, x
H
k
]
, k ∈ {2, . . . ,m+ 1}
tL
(
xH , xL
)
=

0 ∀xH ∈ [0, xH1 ] and ∀xL ∈ [0, xL (xH)]
1− b̂ ∀xH ∈ [0, xH1 ] and ∀xL /∈ [0, xL (xH)]
0 ∀xH ∈ (xHk−1, xHk ] , k ∈ S′and ∀xL ∈ [0, xL (xH)]
1− yHk−1 ∀xH ∈
(
xHk−1, x
H
k
]
, k ∈ S′and ∀xL /∈ [0, xL (xH)]
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R
(
xH , xL
)
=

(
δµb̂
1− δ + (̂b− x
H))θqH − θqLxL
(
δµb̂
1− δ + (̂b− x
H))
(
θqH − θqL + θqL
)
+ C1
(
µyHk−1
1− δ − (x
H − xHk−1))p˜Hk−1 − xLp˜Lk−1
(
µyHk−1
1− δ −
(
xH − xHk−1
)
)p̂Hk−1 + C2
where S ≡ {1, . . . ,m+ 1}, S′ ≡ {2, . . . ,m+ 1}, C1 ≡ (δµ(1− b̂)
1− δ + (1− b̂− x
L))θqL, C2 ≡
(
µ
(
1− yHk−1
)
1− δ −
(
xL − (1− µ− xHk−1)))θqL.
If xH∞ = limk→∞ xHk < 1− µ then let’s define
R˜
(
xH , xL
)
=
(
µx˜Hk−1
(1− δ) (1− µ) −
(
xH − x˜Hk−1
))
p˜Hk−1 − xLp˜Lk−1,
R̂
(
xH , xL
)
= (
µx̂Hk−1
(1− δ) (1− µ)−(x
H−x̂Hk−1))p̂Hk−1+(
µ(1− µ− x̂Hk−1)
(1− δ) (1− µ) −(x
L−1−µ−x̂Hk−1)))θqL
for xH ∈ (xHk−1, xHk ] and k ≥ 1. Set
x˜∗ = max
{
xH ∈
(
(1− µ) b̂, x˜∞
]
: R˜
(
xH , xL
) ≥ R1 (xH , xL)}
and
x̂∗ = max
{
xH ∈
(
(1− µ) b̂, x̂∞
]
: R̂
(
xH , xL
) ≥ R1 (xH , xL)}
where
R1
(
xH , xL
)
=
(
δµ
(1− δ) +
(
1− xH)) θqH − xLθqL.
Let m and m′ be such that x˜∗ ∈ (xHm, xHm+1] and x̂∗ ∈ (xHm′ , xHm′+1].
Now, we prove the existence of m and m′:
Since x˜H∞ < 1− µ, we have
R˜
(
x˜H∞, x
L
)−R1 (x˜H∞, xL) = ( µx˜H∞(1− δ) (1− µ) −
(
δµ
(1− δ) +
(
1− x˜H∞
)))
θqH < 0.
This implies that x˜∗ < x˜H∞. Furthermore, due to definition of µ, x˜∗ ≥ (1− µ) b̂. Similarly,
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x̂∗ < x̂H∞, since
R̂
(
x̂H∞, x
L
)−R1 (x̂H∞, xL)
=
(
µx̂H∞
(1− δ) (1− µ) −
(
δµ
(1− δ) +
(
1− x̂H∞
)))
θqH +
(
(1− δ (1− µ)) (1− µ− x̂H∞)
(1− δ) (1− µ)
)
θqL
=
(
(1− ρ) x̂H∞ − (1− ρ) (1− µ)
(1− δ) (1− µ)
)
θqH +
(
(1− ρ) (1− µ− x̂H∞)
(1− δ) (1− µ)
)
θqL
=
(1− ρ)
(1− δ) (1− µ)
(
x̂H∞ − (1− µ)
)
θ (qH − qL) < 0
when x̂H∞ < 1 − µ. Moreover, due to the definition of µ, x̂∗ ≥ (1− µ) b̂. Additionally, when
xL < xL, since R̂
(
x̂∗, xL
)
< R1
(
x̂∗, xL
)
, we have x̂∗ < x˜∗. On the other hand, when xL > xL,
since R̂
(
x̂∗, xL
)
> R1
(
x̂∗, xL
)
, we have x̂∗ > x˜∗.
The pentad {PH(·), PL(·), tH(·), tL(·), R(·)} is defined as follows.
PH
(
xH , xL
)
=

θqH ∀xH ∈
[
0, b̂
]
and ∀xL ∈ [0, xL (xH)]
θqH − θqL + θqL ∀xH ∈
[
0, b̂
]
and ∀xL /∈ [0, xL (xH)]
p˜Hk ∀xH ∈
(
yHk−1, y
H
k
]
, k ∈ S and ∀xL ∈ [0, xL (xH)]
p̂Hk ∀xH ∈
(
yHk−1, y
H
k
]
, k ∈ S′ and ∀xL /∈ [0, xL (xH)]
θqH ∀xH ∈
(
yHm+1, 1
]
and ∀xL ∈ [0, xL (xH)]
θqH ∀xH ∈
(
yHm′+1, 1
]
and ∀xL /∈ [0, xL (xH)]
PL
(
xH , xL
)
=

θqH ∀xH ∈
[
0, b̂
]
and ∀xL ∈ [0, xL (xH)]
θqL ∀xH ∈
[
0, b̂
]
and ∀xL /∈ [0, xL (xH)]
p˜Lk ∀xH ∈
(
yHk−1, y
H
k
]
, k ∈ {1, . . . ,m+ 1} and ∀xL ∈ [0, xL (xH)]
θqL ∀xH ∈
(
yHk−1, y
H
k
]
, k ∈ {1, . . . ,m′ + 1} and ∀xL /∈ [0, xL (xH)]
θqL ∀xH ∈
(
yHm+1, 1
]
and ∀xL ∈ [0, xL (xH)]
θqL ∀xH ∈
(
yHm′+1, 1
]
and ∀xL /∈ [0, xL (xH)]
tH
(
xH , xL
)
=

b̂ ∀xH ∈ [0, xH1 ] and ∀xL
yHk−1 ∀xH ∈
(
xHk−1, x
H
k
]
, k ∈ {2, . . . ,m+ 1}
1 ∀xH ∈ (yHm′+1, 1] and ∀xL /∈ [0, xL (xH)]
1 ∀xH ∈ (yHm′+1, 1] and ∀xL /∈ [0, xL (xH)]
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tL
(
xH , xL
)
=

0 ∀xH ∈ [0, xH1 ] and ∀xL ∈ [0, xL (xH)]
1− b̂ ∀xH ∈ [0, xH1 ] and ∀xL /∈ [0, xL (xH)]
0 ∀xH ∈ (xHk−1, xHk ] , k ∈ S and ∀xL ∈ [0, xL (xH)]
1− yHk−1 ∀xH ∈
(
xHk−1, x
H
k
]
, k ∈ S′and ∀xL /∈ [0, xL (xH)]
0 ∀xH ∈ (yHm+1, 1] and ∀xL ∈ [0, xL (xH)]
0 ∀xH ∈ (yHm′+1, 1] and ∀xL /∈ [0, xL (xH)]
R
(
xH , xL
)
=

(
δµb̂
1− δ + (̂b− x
H))θqH − θqLxL
(
δµb̂
1− δ + (̂b− x
H))
(
θqH − θqL + θqL
)
+ C1
(
µyHk−1
1− δ − (x
H − xHk−1))p˜Hk−1 − xLp˜Lk−1
(
µyHk−1
1− δ − (x
H − xHk−1))p̂Hk−1 + C2
(
δµ
(1− δ) + (1− x
H))θqH − xLθqL
(
δµ
1− δ + (1− x
H))θqH − xLθqL
where S ≡ {1, . . . ,m+ 1}, S′ ≡ {2, . . . ,m+ 1}, C1 ≡ (δµ(1− b̂)
1− δ + (1− b̂− x
L))θqL, C2 ≡
(
µ
(
1− yHk−1
)
1− δ −
(
xL − (1− µ− xHk−1)))θqL.
Now, we will show that the stationary pentads defined above satisfy the maximization prob-
lem of the monopolist. First, we consider the case in which (1, 0) coexists with the monopoly
steady states, i.e., xH∞ < 1−µ. Let Π (y;x) = PH
(
yH , yL
) (
yH − xH)+PL (yH , yL) (yL − xL)+
R ((1− µ) y) . We show that TL (x) ⊂ {0, 1 − yHm+1, 1 − yHm , . . . , 1 − yH0 ).Π (y;x) is strictly
increasing in yH on any of the intervals [0, y0] × [0, 1] , (y0, y1] × [0, 1] , . . . , (ys+1, 1] × [0, 1] ,
s ∈ {m,m′}. So, TH (x) ⊂ {yH0 , yH1 , . . . , yHm+1, 1}.
Due to the recursive structure of x˜k and x̂k we have Π (y˜k; x˜k) = Π (y˜k−1; x˜k) and Π (ŷk; x̂k) =
Π (ŷk−1; x̂k). Let’s define h˜, ĥ, g as follows.4
h˜m+1
(
xH , xL
)
= Π
(
1;
(
xH , xL
))−Π (y˜m; (xH , xL)) ,
4h˜m+1
(
xH , xL
)
=
[(
δµ
(1− δ) +
(
1− xH)) θqH − xLθqL]− [( µyHm
1− δ −
(
xH − xHk−1
))
p˜Hm − xLp˜Lm
]
h˜k
(
xH , xL
)
=
[(
µyHk
1− δ −
(
xH − xHk
))
p˜Hk − xLp˜Lk
]
−
[(
µyHk−1
1− δ −
(
xH − xHk−1
))
p˜Hk−1 − xLp˜Lk−1
]
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h˜k
(
xH , xL
)
= Π
(
y˜k;
(
xH , xL
))−Π (y˜k−1; (xH , xL))
for k ≤ m where y˜k =
(
y˜Hk , 0
)
, and5
ĥm′+1
(
xH , xL
)
= Π
(
1;
(
xH , xL
))−Π (ŷm′ ; (xH , xL)) ,
ĥk
(
xH , xL
)
= Π
(
ŷk;
(
xH , xL
))−Π (ŷk−1; (xH , xL))
for k ≤ m′ where ŷk =
(
ŷHk , 1− µ− ŷHk
)
. In this case h˜k
(
x˜Hk , 0
)
= 0 and ĥk(x̂
H
k , 1− µ− x̂Hk )
= 0 for all k. The state variable if high quality good affect h’s as follows
∂ĥk
∂xH
= p̂Hk−1 − p̂Hk > 0.
Now, the existence of the threshold value of low quality good will be proved. We define
g
(
xH , xL
)
= Π
(
y˜k;
(
xH , xL
))−Π (ŷk; (xH , xL)) .
There exists xL = xL
(
xH
)
such that g
(
xH , xL
)
= 0. Moreover,
∂g
∂xL
= −p̂Lk + θqL < 0.
Uniqueness:
Let
{
PH0 (·), PL0 (·), tH0 (·), tL0 (·), R0(·)
}
be the pentad with some stationary equilibrium hav-
ing
(
b̂, 0
)
as steady state. We will show that the pentad is unique.
Let’s define p¨H1 = supP
H
0
(
yH , yL
)
yH>b̂
, and p¨L1 = supP
L
0
(
yH , yL
)
yH+yL>b̂
. First, suppose that p¨H1 =
θqH . In this case, P
H
0
(
yH , yL
)
=
 θqH for y
H ∈
(
0, b̂
]
and all yL
θqH for y
H ∈
(
b̂, 1
]
and all yL
. For yH > b̂, buyer’s
arbitrage equation for high quality good implies that tH0
(
(1− µ) yH , (1− µ) yL) > b̂ for all
5ĥm′+1
(
xH , xL
)
=
[(
δµ
(1− δ) +
(
1− xH)) θqH − xLθqL]
−
[(
µyHm′
1− δ −
(
xH − xHm′
))
p̂Hm′ +
(
µ
(
1− yHm′
)
1− δ −
(
xL − (1− µ− xHm′))
)
θqL
]
ĥk
(
xH , xL
)
=
[(
µyHk
1− δ −
(
xH − xHk
))
p̂Hk +
(
µ
(
1− yHk
)
1− δ −
(
xL − (1− µ− xHk ))
)
θqL
]
−
[(
µyHk−1
1− δ −
(
xH − xHk−1
))
p̂Hk−1 +
(
µ
(
1− yHk−1
)
1− δ −
(
xL − (1− µ− xHk−1))
)
θqL
]
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(1− ρ) θqH + ρPH0
(
tH0
(
(1− µ) yH , (1− µ) yL)) = PH0 (yH) = θqH . Therefore, since θqH for
all yH ∈
(
b̂, 1
]
and all yL, we have tH0
(
xH , xL
)
= 1 for all xH > (1− µ) b̂. We now show that
p¨L1 = θqL. Suppose not. Since p¨
L
1 > θqL for some y
H + yL > b̂, buyer’s indifference equation
for low quality good implies that tH0
(
xH , xL
)
+ tL0
(
xH , xL
)
<
xH + xL
1− µ for x
H +xL > (1− µ) b̂
since θqL−PL0
(
yH + yL
)
= ρ(θqL−PL0 (tH0 ((1−µ)yH , (1−µ)yL) + tL0 ((1−µ)yH , (1−µ)yL))).
This leads to a contradiction because tH0
(
xH , xL
)
= 1 for all xH > (1− µ) b̂. Therefore,
PH0
(
yH , yL
)
=
 θqL for y
H ∈
(
0, b̂
]
and all yL
θqL for y
H ∈
(
b̂, 1
]
and all yL
. It follows that, since PH0
(
yH , yL
)
>
PH0
(
yH , yL
)
for yH > b̂, we have tL0
(
xH , xL
)
= 0 for all xH ∈
(
b̂, 1
]
. Now, define p˙L1 =
inf PL0
(
yH , yL
)
yH+yL≤b̂
. Suppose first that p˙L1 = θqL. Now, suppose that p˙
L
1 < θqL. Define. Let
b˙L1 = sup
{
xH + xL < (1− µ) b̂ : tL0
(
xH , xL
)
= 0
}
. Then, since
(
b̂, 0
)
is a steady state, we
have
PH0
(
yH , yL
)
=
 θqH for y
H ∈
(
0, b̂
]
and all yL
θqH for y
H ∈
(
b̂, 1
]
and all yL
,
PH0
(
yH , yL
)
=
 θqL for y
H ∈
(
0, b̂
]
and all yL
θqL for y
H ∈
(
b̂, 1
]
and all yL
,
tH0
(
xH , xL
)
=
 b̂ for y
H ∈
(
0, b̂
]
and all yL
1 for yH ∈
(
b̂, 1
]
and all yL
,
tL0
(
xH , xL
)
=
{
0 for all yH and all yL ,
R
(
xH , xL
)
=
 b̂ for y
H ∈
(
0, b̂
]
and all yL
1 for yH ∈
(
b̂, 1
]
and all yL
.
Therefore,
{
PH0 (·), PL0 (·), tH0 (·), tL0 (·), R0(·)
}
is uniquely defined.
Secondly, suppose that p¨H1 > θqH and p¨
L
1 = θqL. Now we show that p¨
H
1 = p̂
H
1 . First
one should observe that tH0
(
(1− µ) yH , (1− µ) yL) < yH for all yH ∈ (b̂, 1] and yL when
PH0
(
yH , yL
)
> θqH . Suppose not. Let t
H
0
(
(1− µ) yH , (1− µ) yL) ≥ yH .This implies that
PH0
(
tH0
(
(1− µ) yH , (1− µ) yL)) < PH0 (yH) .Due to the indifference equation we have PH0 (yH)
= (1− ρ) θqH + ρPH0
(
tH0
(
(1− µ) yH , (1− µ) yL)) ≤ (1− ρ) θqH + ρPH0 (yH) . Therefore,
PH0
(
yH
) ≤ θqH which contradicts with the initial assumption. We now claim that there exists
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ε > 0 such that tH0
(
(1− µ) yH , (1− µ) yL) = b̂ for all yH ∈ (b̂, b̂+ ]. Let’s choose yH0 , yL0 ∈(
b̂, 1
]
with PH0
(
yH0
)
> θqH and iteratively define y
H
K as y
H
K = t
H
0
(
(1− µ) yHk−1, (1− µ) yLk−1
)
.
The reasoning is, if there is no such  then
{
yHK
}
would be decreasing sequence bounded
below by b̂. In this case, the indifference equation implies that PH0
(
yH0
)
=
(
1− ρk) θqH +
ρkPH0
(
yHk
)
. As k goes to infinity, this would imply that lim
k→∞
PH0
(
yH0 , 1− yH0
)
= θqH which
yields to a contradiction. This implies that p¨H1 = p̂
H
1 . Let’s define xˇ
H
1 = max{x ≤ 1 − µ :
tH0 (xH , 1− µ− xH) = b̂} and p¨H2 = sup
yH>b̂
{
PH0
(
yH , yL
) | yH > xˇH1
1− µ
}
. Now, we show that
xˇH1 = x̂
H
1 . There are three cases.
Suppose xˇH1 = 1 − µ. Then we have PH0
(
yH , yL
)
= p̂H1 for all y
H ∈
(
b̂, 1
]
and all yL,
R0
(
xH , xL
)
= R̂
(
xH , xL
)
, tH0
(
xH , xL
)
= b̂ and tL0
(
xH , xL
)
= 1− b̂ for all xH ∈ [0, 1− µ] and
xL. Therefore, the pentad is uniquely defined and x̂H1 = 1− µ and m′ = 0.
Suppose xˇH1 < 1 − µ and p¨H2 = θqH Then as above, PH0
(
yH , yL
)
= θqH for all y
H ∈(
xˇH1
1− µ, 1
]
and yL, R0
(
xH , xL
)
= R1
(
xH , xL
)
, tH0
(
xH , xL
)
= 1 and tL0
(
xH , xL
)
= 0 for
all xH ∈ [xˇH1 , 1− µ] and xL. Moreover, R0 (xH , xL) = R̂ (xH , xL) for all xH < xˇH1 . The
continuity of R0 at x
H = xˇH1 implies that R̂
(
xˇH1 , x
L
)
= R1
(
xˇH1 , x
L
)
. Therefore, xˇH1 = x̂
∗ =
x̂H1 .
Suppose xˇH1 < 1−µ and p¨H2 > θqH . Then we claim that p¨H2 = p̂H2 . To establish the claim we
need to show that there exists  > 0 such that tH0 (xH , xL) =
xˇH1
1− µ for all x
H ∈ (xˇH1 , xˇH1 + ].
Then we show that xˇH1 = x̂
H
1 . Let’s define a function V̂
(
xH , xL
)
as
V̂
(
xH , xL
)
= Π̂
((
b̂, 1− b̂
)
;
(
xH , xL
))− ( µp̂H1 xH
(1− µ) (1− δ) +
µθqLx
L
(1− µ) (1− δ)
)
where Π̂((̂b, 1− b̂), x) = ( δµb̂
1− δ +(̂b−x
H))(θqH−θqL+θqL) + (δµ(1− b̂)
1− δ +(1− b̂−x
L))θqL. By
definition of x̂H1 , we have V̂
(
x̂H1 , 1− µ− x̂H1
)
= 0. Since tH0
(
xH , xL
)
= b̂ and tL0
(
xH , xL
)
=
1 − b̂ for xH ≤ xˇH1 and all xL, and tH0
(
xH , xL
)
=
xˇH1
1− µ and t
L
0
(
xH , xL
)
= 1 − xˇ
H
1
1− µ for
xH ∈ (xˇH1 , xˇH1 + ] and all xL. Continuity of R0 implies that V̂ (xˇH1 , 1− µ− xˇH1 ) = 0 as well.
Moreover, since
dV̂ (x, 1− µ− x)
dx
< 0 we must have xˇH1 = x̂
H
1 .
The same argument can be applied inductively. Given xˇHk = max
{
x : tH0
(
xH , xL
)
= xˇHk−1
}
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then it must be that xˇHk = x̂
H
k . If xˇ
H
k = 1− µ then x̂Hk = 1− µ and m = k − 1. If xˇHk < 1− µ
then p¨Hk+1 = θqH then xˇ
H
k = x̂
∗ = x̂Hk and m = k, p¨
H
k+1 > θqH then m > k − 1 and define
xˇHk+1 = max
{
x : tH0
(
xH , xL
)
= xˇHk
}
.
Thirdly, suppose that p¨H1 > θqH and p¨
L
1 > θqL. We claim that p¨
H
1 = p˜
H
1 and p¨
L
1 = p˜
L
1 . To
prove the claim we need to show that there exist  and δ such that tH0
(
(1− µ) yH , (1− µ) yL)
= b̂ and tL0
(
(1− µ) yH , (1− µ) yL) = 0 for all yH ∈ (b̂, b̂+ ] and yL ∈ [0, δ]. We know from
the previous discussion that there exists  > 0 such that tH0
(
(1− µ) yH , (1− µ) yL) = b̂ for
yH ∈
(
b̂, b̂+ 
]
and all yL. Now, we show that there exists δ such that tL0 ((1−µ)yH , (1−µ)yL)
= 0 for all yH ∈ (̂b, b̂+ ] and yL ∈ [0, δ] where p¨H > θqH and p¨L > θqL. Since p¨L > θqL. stock
of low quality good should be decreasing. That is, b̂+tL0
(
(1− µ) yH , (1− µ) yL) < yH+yL. As
yH approaches b̂, we would have lim
yH→b̂+ t
L
0
(
(1− µ) yH , (1− µ) yL) < yL. Now let’s choose
yH0 and y
H
0 with P
L
0
(
yL0
)
> θqL and y
H
0 + y
L
0 ∈
(
b̂, 1
]
. If there was no such δ then
{
yH0 + y
L
k
}
would be a decreasing sequence bounded below by yH0 . Then P
L
0
(
yL0
)
=
(
1− ρk) θqL + ρk
PL0
(
yLk
)
where yLk = t
H
0
(
(1− µ) yH0 , (1− µ) yLk−1
)
which would imply that lim
k→∞
PL0
(
yL0
)
= θqL.
This yields a contradiction.
Now define xˇH1 = sup{xH ≤ 1 − µ : tH0
(
xH , 0
)
= b̂} and xˇL1 = sup{xL ≤ 1 − µ − b̂ :
tH0
(
xˇH1 , x
L
)
= 0}. Suppose xˇH1 = 1−µ. Then PH0
(
yH , yL
)
= p˜H1 and P
H
0
(
yH , yL
)
= p˜L1 for all
yH ∈
(
b̂, 1
]
and all yL, and R0
(
xH , xL
)
= R˜
(
xH , xL
)
, tH0
(
xH , xL
)
= b̂, tL0
(
xH , xL
)
= 0 and
xH ∈ [0, 1− µ] and all xL. PH0
(
yH , yL
)
= p˜H1 , R0
(
xH , xL
)
= R˜
(
xH , xL
)
, tH0
(
xH , xL
)
= b̂,
tL0
(
xH , xL
)
= 0 for all yH ∈
(
b̂, 1
]
and xH ∈ [0, 1− µ] and all xL. Suppose xˇH1 < 1 − µ
and xˇL1 = 1 − µ − xˇH1 and p¨H2 = θqH . Then as above, PH0
(
yH , yL
)
= θqH , P
L
0
(
yH , yL
)
=
θqL, R0
(
xH , xL
)
= R1
(
xH , xL
)
, tH0
(
xH , xL
)
= 1, tL0
(
xH , xL
)
= 0 for yH ∈
(
xˇH1
1− µ, 1
]
and
xH ∈ [xˇH1 , 1− µ] and all xL ≥ 0 and PH0 (yH , yL) = θqH − θqL + θqL, PL0 (yH , yL) = θqL
and tH0
(
xH , xL
)
= b̂, tL0
(
xH , xL
)
= 1 − b̂, R0
(
xH , xL
)
= R̂
(
xH , xL
)
for all yH ∈
[
0,
xˇH1
1− µ
]
and xH ∈ [0, xˇH1 ] and all yL. R0 (xH , xL) = R̂ (xH , xL) for all xH ≤ xˇH1 . Continuity of
R0 at x
H = xˇH1 implies that R̂
(
xˇH1 , x
L
)
= R1
(
xˇH1 , x
L
)
. Therefore, xˇH1 = x̂
∗ = x̂H1 .Define
p¨L2 = sup
yH>b̂
{
PL0
(
yH , yL
) | yL > xˇL1
1− µ
}
. Then the same argument can be applied inductively.
Proof of Corollary 10. First, we derive the threshold for xL. Define g (x) = Π
(
y˜k,
(
xH , x
))−
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Π
(
ŷk,
(
xH , x
))
where
Π
(
y˜k,
(
xH , xL
))
=
(
µyHk
1− δ −
(
xH − xHk
))
p˜Hk − xLp˜Lk
and
Π
(
ŷk,
(
xH , xL
))
=
(
µyHk
1− δ −
(
xH − xHk
))
p̂Hk +
(
µ
(
1− yHk
)
1− δ −
(
xL − (1− µ− xHk ))
)
θqL.
The threshold xL, xL
(
xH
)
, solves g (x) = 0 Since
dg (x)
d (x)
< 0. Therefore, for all xL ≤ xL (xH)
the seller prefers y˜k to ŷk; otherwise, the seller prefers ŷk to y˜k. When the time horizon between
two successive offers is z,
xL
(
xH
)
= yHk
(
θ
ρk∆θ
+ 1
)
1− ρ
1− δ −
(1− ρ) θ
(1− δ) ρk∆θ − x
H .
In the limit, as the length of time period z approaches zero, we have
xL
(
xH
)
= yHk
θ
∆θ
λ+ r
r
− θ
∆θ
λ+ r
r
− xH .
Second, we derive the market prices of the goods.
i. Derivation of prices on the standard monopoly path, PH
(
y˜Hk
)
: Since PH
(
y˜Hk
)
= p˜k =
θqH + ρ
k∆θqH we have p˜k − p˜k−1 = −ρk−1 (1− ρ) ∆θqH . This implies that
PH
(
y˜Hk
)− PH (y˜Hk−1)
y˜Hk − y˜Hk
=
−ρk−1 (1− ρ) ∆θqH
(
µθqH + (1− µ) p˜Hk−1
)
y˜Hk−1
(
p˜Hk−1 −
(
µθqH + (1− µ) p˜Hk−1
))
Since p˜Hk − θqH = ρk∆θqH ,
PH
(
y˜Hk
)− PH (y˜Hk−1)
y˜Hk − y˜Hk−1
=
− (1− ρ) (p˜Hk−1 − µ (p˜Hk−1 − θqH))
µy˜Hk−1
.
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As z approaches 0, y˜Hk − y˜Hk−1 converges to zero. Hence, the above equation converges to6
PH1 (y, 0) y = −
λ+ r
λ
PH (y, 0) .
The solution of this differential equation gives us PH (y, 0) = k˜0y
−
λ+ r
λ . Since PH
(
b̂, 0
)
=
θqH , k˜0 is defined by k˜0 = θqH
(
b̂
)λ+ r
λ . Therefore,
PH (y, 0) = θqH
(
b̂
y
)λ+ r
λ
.
ii. Derivation of prices on the segmented monopoly path, PH
(
y˜Hk
)
: Since PH
(
ŷHk
)
= p̂k =
θqH + ρ
k∆θ∆q we have p̂k − p̂k−1 = −ρk−1 (1− ρ) ∆θ∆q. This implies that
PH
(
ŷHk
)− PH (ŷHk−1)
ŷHk − ŷHk
=
−ρk−1 (1− ρ) ∆θ∆q (µθqH − θqL + (1− µ) p̂Hk−1)
ŷHk−1
(−µθqH + µp̂Hk−1) .
Since p̂Hk − θqH = ρk∆θ∆q,
PH
(
ŷHk
)− PH (ŷHk−1)
ŷHk − ŷHk−1
=
− (1− ρ) (µθqH − θqL + (1− µ) p̂Hk−1)
µŷHk−1
.
As z approaches 0, ŷHk − ŷHk−1 converges to zero. Hence, the above equation converges to7
PH1 (y, 1− y) y = −
λ+ r
λ
(
PH (y, 1− y)− θqL
)
.
6Since limz→0+
PH
(
y˜Hk
)− PH (y˜Hk−1)
y˜Hk − y˜Hk−1
= PH1 (y, 0) and limz→0+
− (1− ρ) (p˜Hk−1 − µ (p˜Hk−1 − θqH))
µy˜Hk−1
=
−λ+ r
λ
PH (y, 0)
y
.
7Since
limz→0+
PH
(
ŷHk
)− PH (ŷHk−1)
ŷHk − ŷHk−1
= PH1 (y, 1− y)
limz→0+
− (1− ρ) (µθqH − θqL + (1− µ) p̂Hk−1)
µŷHk−1
= −λ+ r
λ
(
PH (y, 0)− θqL
)
y
.
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The solution of this differential equation gives us PH (y, 1− y) = k̂0y
−
λ+ r
λ + θqL. Since
PH
(
b̂, 0
)
= θqH − θqL + θqL, k̂0 is defined by k̂0 = θ∆q
(
b̂
)λ+ r
λ . Therefore,
PH (y, 1− y) = θ∆q
(
b̂
y
)λ+ r
λ
+ θqL.
Third, we derive y˙.
i. Derivation of y˙ on the standard monopoly path,
dy˜
dz
: Upon dividing both sides by z, the
equation for y˜Hk − y˜Hk−1 becomes
y˜Hk − y˜Hk−1
z
=
µy˜Hk−1
z
(
p˜Hk−1 − θqH
µθqH + (1− µ) p˜Hk−1
)
.
Since limz→0+
y˜Hk − y˜Hk−1
z
=
dy˜
dz
and limz→0+
µy˜Hk−1
z
(
p˜Hk−1 − θqH
µθqH + (1− µ) p˜Hk−1
) = λy˜
PH (y, 0)− θqH
PH (y, 0)
,
we have
˜˙y = λy˜PH (y, 0)− θqH
PH (y, 0)
= λy˜
1− θ
θ
(
y˜
b̂
)λ+ r
λ
 .
ii. Derivation of y˙ on the segmented monopoly path,
dŷ
dz
: Upon dividing both sides by z,
the equation for ŷHk − ŷHk−1 becomes
ŷHk − ŷHk−1
z
=
µŷHk−1
z
(
p̂Hk−1 − θqH
µθqH − θqL + (1− µ) p̂Hk−1
)
.
By the same reasoning we have,
dŷ
dz
= λŷ(1− θ (qH − qL)
PH (ŷ, 1− ŷ)− θqL ) = λŷ(1−
θ
θ
(
ŷ
b̂
)λ+ r
λ ).
Proof of Corollary 11. See the proof of Theorem 5.
Proof of Theorem 6. Consider a reputational equilibria in which
(
y`H , y`L
)
where y`H < b̂
and y`H + y`L ≤ b̂ is a steady state. By the proof of Proposition 3, we have PH (bH) = θqH
for b ≤ y`H , PH (bH) < θqH for b ∈ (y`H , b̂], and PH (bH) = θqH for b ∈ (b̂, 1]. Moreover,
the proof of Proposition 3 also implies that PL (b) = θqL for b ≤ y`H + y`L, PL (b) < θqL for
112
b ∈
(
y`H + y`L, b̂
]
, and PL (b) = θqL for b ∈
(
b̂, 1
]
. Therefore, for b ∈ (y`H , 1], the stock of high
quality good is strictly increasing and for b ∈ (y`H + y`L, 1], total stock of durable goods (high
quality and low quality) is strictly increasing. It follows that when the stock of high quality
good is greater than y`H , then the stationary pentad must coincide with the Coase Conjecture
equilibrium pentad.
The proof has three main parts. First, we show that the existence of a reputational
equilibrium implies µ ∈ (µ, µ] . Then, we show that µ < µ. Finally, we prove that for each
µ ∈ (µ, µ] there exists a reputational equilibrium.
First, we prove that µ > µ if a reputational equilibrium exists. Since PH (b) = θqH for all
b ≤ y`H and PL (b) = θqL for all b ≤ y`H + y`L, we must have tH
(
(1− µ) yH , (1− µ) yL) = y`H
and tL
(
(1− µ) yH , (1− µ) yL) = y`L for all yH ≤ y`H and yL ≤ y`H + y`L. This implies that
R
(
(1− µ) y`H , (1− µ) y`L) = µy`HθqH
1− δ +
µy`LθqL
1− δ . By the continuity of function R, y`
H and y`L
solve ζ
(
yH , yL
)
= 0 where ζ(·) is defined as
ζ
(
yH , yL
)
=
µyHθqH
1− δ +
µyLθqL
1− δ −R
C
(
(1− µ) yH , (1− µ) yL)
with yH ≤ y`H and yL ≤ y`H + y`L. Since ζ
(
b̂, 0
)
= 0 at µ, we have ζ
(
b̂, 0
)
< 0 for all µ < µ.
Moreover, since ζ is strictly increasing, the existence of 0 < y`H < b̂ and 0 ≤ y`H + y`L ≤ b̂
requires µ > µ.
Second, we prove that the existence of a reputational equilibrium implies µ ≤ µ. The
proof follows a contradiction. Suppose that for some µ > µ, a reputational equilibrium with(
y`H , y`L
)
exists. Let’s define
K = min
{
k : xHj < x
H
j−1 for all j ≤ k
}
and
K˜ = min
{
k : x˜Hj < x˜
H
j−1 for all j ≤ k
}
.
Since the Coase Conjecture equilibrium does not exist for µ > µ, we have xH
K
> 0 and
x˜H
K˜
> 0. Since, xH
K+1
> xH
K
, when the initial state is
(
xH
K
, xL
)
, for all xL ≤ (1− µ) b̂ − xH
K
,
113
the monopolist prefers selling to
(
yH
K
, yL
)
to selling to
(
yH
K−1, b̂− yHK−1
)
. That is,
µpHyH
K
+ µpLyL + δRC
(
xH
K
, xL
)
> RC
(
xH
K
, xL
)
which can be rewritten as
µpHyH
K
1− δ +
µpLyH
K
1− δ > R
C
(
xH
K
, xL
)
.
Therefore, ζ
(
yH
K
, yL
)
> 0. Since ζ(·) is increasing we have y`H < yH
K
. This is not possible
because the sequence of the Coase Conjecture equilibrium cannot be extended to initial states
below xH
K
.
Now, we will show that µ < µ. To do that we need to prove that if µ ≤ µ then the
sequence
{
xHk
}
and
{
x˜Hk
}
are strictly decreasing and m and m′ are finite. Because the
continuity of xHk and x˜
H
k in µ implies that the same property holds in a right neighbor-
hood of µ which implies that µ ≥ µ. The proof of Theorem 2 establishes that µ ≤ µ iff
µb̂θqH
1− δ ≤ Π
(
(1, 0) ,
(
(1− µ) b̂, 0
))
which is equivalent to
µb̂
(
θqH − θqL + θqL
)
1− δ +
µ
(
1− b̂
)
θqL
1− δ ≤ Π((1, 0), ((1− µ)̂b, (1− µ)(1− b̂))).
To prove that the sequence
{
xHk
}
and
{
x˜Hk
}
are strictly decreasing and m and m′ are
finite, we use induction. First, we show that xH2 < x
H
1 hold for any µ ≤ µ. To establish that
xH2 < x
H
1 , we need to show that h2
(
xH1
)
which implies that xH2 < x
H
1 , since h2(·) is decreasing
and h2
(
xH2
)
= 0. We define h2
(
xH1
)
as
h2
(
xH1
)
= Π
((
yH1 , 0
)
;
(
xH1 , 0
))−Π ((yH0 , 0) ; (xH1 , 0))
= PH
(
yH1 , 0
)
µb̂+ δΠ
((
yH0 , 0
)
;
(
xH1 , 0
))−Π ((yH0 , 0) ; (xH1 , 0))
= PH
(
yH1 , 0
)
µb̂− (1− δ) Π ((yH0 , 0) ; (xH1 , 0))
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Since Π
((
yH0 , 0
)
;
(
xH1 , 0
)) ≥ µb̂θqH , we have
h2
(
xH1
) ≤ PH (yH1 , 0)µb̂− µb̂θqH = µb̂ (PH (yH1 , 0)− θqH) < 0.
Similarly to establish that x˜H2 < x˜
H
1 , we need to show that h˜2
(
x˜H1
)
which implies that
x˜H2 < x˜
H
1 , since h˜2(·) is decreasing and h˜2
(
x˜H2
)
= 0. We define h˜2
(
x˜H1
)
as
h˜2
(
x˜H1
)
= Π
((
y˜H1 , 1− y˜H1
)
;
(
x˜H1 , 1− µ− x˜H1
))
−Π ((y˜H0 , 1− y˜H0 ) ; (x˜H1 , 1− µ− x˜H1 ))
= PH
(
y˜H1 , 1− y˜H1
)
µb̂+ PL
(
y˜H1 , 1− y˜H1
)
µ
(
1− b̂
)
− (1− δ) Π ((y˜H0 , 1− y˜H0 ) ; (x˜H1 , 1− µ− x˜H1 )) .
Since Π
((
y˜H0 , 1− y˜H0
)
;
(
x˜H1 , 1− µ− x˜H1
)) ≥ µ((θqH − θqL + θqL) b̂+ θqL (1− b̂)) , we have
h˜2
(
x˜H1
) ≤ (PH (y˜H1 , 1− y˜H1 )− (θqH − θqL + θqL))µb̂
+
(
PL
(
y˜H1 , 1− y˜H1
)− θqL)µ(1− b̂) < 0.
To establish the second step of induction, we need to show that there exist ∆ such that
xH3 < x
H
2 −∆. The idea is the same. We prove that h3
(
xH2
)
< 0 which directly implies that
xH3 < x
H
2 since h3(·) is decreasing and h3
(
xH3
)
= 0. We define h3
(
xH2
)
as
h3
(
xH2
)
= Π (y2;x2)−Π (y1;x2)
= PH (y2)µy
H
2 + P
L (y2)µ
(
b̂− yH2
)
− (1− δ) Π (y1;x2)
= PH (y2)µy
H
2 + P
L (y2)
µ
1− µ
(
(1− µ) b̂− xH2
)
− (1− δ) Π (y1;x2) .
We know that Π (y1;x2) = Π (y0;x2). This implies that Π (y1;x2) =
(
xH1 − xH2
)
θqH −
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(
(1− µ) b̂− xH2
)
θqL + Π (y0;x1). Therefore,
h3
(
xH2
)
< PH (y2)
µxH2
1− µ + P
L (y2)
(
µb̂− µx
H
2
1− µ
)
− (1− δ) (xH1 − xH2 ) θqH
+ (1− δ)
(
(1− µ) b̂− xH2
)
θqL − µb̂θqH
=
(
PH (y2)− PL (y2)
) µxH2
1− µ + P
L (y2)µb̂− (1− δ)
(
xH1 − xH2
)
θ∆q − µb̂θqH
=
(
PH (y2)− PL (y2)
) µxH2
1− µ −
(
θqH − PL (y2)
)
µb̂− (1− δ) (xH1 − xH2 ) θ∆q
<
((
PH (y2)− PL (y2)
)− (θqH − PL (y2))) µxH21− µ − (1− δ) (xH1 − xH2 ) θ∆q
=
(
PH (y2)− θqH
) µxH2
1− µ − (1− δ)
(
xH1 − xH2
)
θ∆q < 0.
Similarly we now prove that h˜3
(
x˜H2
)
< 0 which directly implies that x˜H3 < x˜
H
2 since h˜3(·) is
decreasing and h˜3
(
x˜H3
)
= 0. We define h˜3
(
x˜H2
)
as
h˜3
(
x˜H2
)
= Π (y˜2; x˜2)−Π (y˜1; x˜2)
= PH (y˜2)µy˜
H
2 + P
L (y˜2)µ
(
1− y˜H2
)− (1− δ) Π (y˜1; x˜2)
= PH (y˜2)µy˜
H
2 + P
L (y˜2)
µ
1− µ
(
(1− µ)− x˜H2
)− (1− δ) Π (y˜1; x˜2) .
We know that Π (y˜1; x˜2) = Π (y˜0; x˜2). This implies that Π (y˜1; x˜2) =
(
xH1 − xH2
)
θqH −(
(1− µ) b̂− xH2
)
θqL + Π (y0;x1). Therefore,
h˜3
(
x˜H2
)
< PH (y˜2)
µx˜H2
1− δ +P
L (y˜2) (µ− µx˜
H
2
1− δ )−(1− δ)
(
1− µ− x˜H2
)
θ∆q−(1− δ) Π (y˜0; x˜0)
=
(
PH (y˜2)− PL (y˜2)
) µx˜H2
1− µ + P
L (y˜2)µ− (1− δ)
(
1− µ− xH2
)
θ∆q
− µb̂ (θqH − θqL + θqL)− µ(1− b̂) θqL
=
(
PH (y˜2)− PL (y˜2)
) µx˜H2
1− δ − (1− δ)
(
1− µ− x˜H2
)
θ∆q − µb̂ (θqH − θqL)
<
(
PH (y˜2)− PL (y˜2)− θqH + θqL
) µx˜H2
1− δ
− (1− δ) (1− µ− x˜H2 ) θ∆q < 0.
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Now, suppose that there exist ∆ such that xHk < x
H
k−1 − ∆ for k ≥ 3. We will show that it
also holds for k + 1. Since the sequence is decreasing until k − 1, we have
Π
(
yk−1, xk
) ≥ Π (y0, xk)
= (1− xk) θqH −
(
(1− µ) b̂− xk
)
θqL + δR (x0)
= Π (y0, x1) +
(
xH1 − xHk
)
θqH −
(
(1− µ) b̂− xk
)
θqL
≥ µb̂θqH
1− δ +
(
xH1 − xHk
)
θqH −
(
(1− µ) b̂− xk
)
θqL.
Therefore, we have Π
(
yk−1, xk
) ≥ µb̂θqH
1− δ +
(
xH1 − xHk
)
θ∆q. The last inequality follows the
first inequality stated above.
Now, we will show that hk+1
(
xHk
)
= Π (yk, xk)−Π
(
yk−1, xk
)
< 0. Since,
Π (yk, xk) = µy
H
k P
H (yk) + µ
(
b̂− yHk
)
PL (yk) + δΠ
(
yk−1, xk
)
we have
hk+1
(
xHk
)
= µyHk
(
PH (yk)− PL (yk)
)
+ µb̂PL (yk)− (1− δ) Π
(
yk−1, xk
)
.
By using the above inequality
hk+1
(
xHk
) ≥ µyHk (PH (yk)− PL (yk))+ µb̂PL (yk)
− µb̂θqH − (1− δ)
(
xH1 − xHk
)
θ∆q
= µyHk
(
PH (yk)− PL (yk)
)− µb̂ (θqH − PL (yk))− (1− δ) (xH1 − xHk ) θ∆q
< −µyHk
(
θqH − PH (yk)
)− (1− δ) (xH1 − xHk ) θ∆q < 0.
Therefore, since hk+1
(
xHk+1
)
= 0 and hk+1(·) is decreasing, we must have xHk+1 < xHk .
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Similarly,
Π (y˜k−1, x˜k) ≥ Π (y˜0, x˜k) =
(
1− x˜Hk
)
θqH −
(
(1− µ)− x˜Hk
)
θqL + δR (x˜0)
= Π (y˜0, x1) +
(
x˜H1 − x˜Hk
)
θqH −
(
(1− µ)− x˜H1
)
θqL −
(
(1− µ)− x˜Hk
)
θqL
= Π (y˜0, x1) +
(
x˜H1 − x˜Hk
)
∆q
≥ µb̂
(
θqH − θqL + θqL
)
1− δ +
µ
(
1− b̂
)
θqL
1− δ +
(
(1− µ) b̂− xk
)
θ∆q.
The last inequality follows the first inequality stated above.
Now, we will show that h˜k+1
(
x˜Hk
)
= Π (y˜k, x˜k)−Π (y˜k−1, x˜k) < 0. Since,
Π (y˜k, x˜k) = µy
H
k P
H (y˜k) + µ
(
1− y˜Hk
)
PL (y˜k) + δΠ (y˜k−1, x˜k)
we have
h˜k+1
(
x˜Hk
)
= µy˜Hk
(
PH (y˜k)− PL (y˜k)
)
+ µPL (y˜k)− (1− δ) Π (y˜k−1, x˜k) .
By using the above inequality, we will have h˜k+1
(
x˜Hk
)
< µy˜Hk P
H (y˜k) + µ(1 − y˜Hk )PL (y˜k)
−µb̂(θqH − θqL + θqL) −µ(1− b̂)θqL− (1− δ) ((1−µ)̂b− x˜Hk )θ∆q = µy˜Hk (PH (y˜k)−PL (y˜k)) +
µPL (y˜k) −µ((̂bθqH−θqL)+(1− b̂)θqL) −(1−δ)((1−µ)̂b− x˜Hk )θ∆q = µy˜Hk (PH (y˜k)−PL (y˜k))
−µb̂(θqH − θqL − θqL) − (1 − δ)((1 − µ)̂b − x˜Hk )θ∆q < 0. Therefore, since h˜k+1
(
x˜Hk+1
)
= 0
and h˜k+1(·) is decreasing, we must have x˜Hk+1 < x˜Hk . This implies that m ≤ 2 +
b̂− xH2

and
m′ ≤ 2 + b̂− x˜
H
2

.
Finally, we show that a reputational equilibrium exists for any µ ∈ (µ, µ] . Let’s define ζ(·)
with yH < b̂ and yH + yL ≤ b̂ as
ζ
(
yH , yL
)
=
µyHθqH
1− δ +
µyLθqL
1− δ −R
C
(
(1− µ) yH , (1− µ) yL) .
First, we show that there exists y`H such that ζ
(
y`H , 0
)
= 0. Since ζ (0, 0) = −RC (0, 0) < 0
and ζ
(
b̂, 0
)
> 0 and ζ(·) is increasing, there must exist y`H ∈
(
0, b̂
)
such that ζ
(
y`H , 0
)
= 0.
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Second, we show that there exists yˇH ∈ (0, y`H) such that ζ (yˇH , b̂− yˇH) = 0. Since ζ
is increasing with respect to both arguments, ζ
(
y`H , b̂− y`H
)
> 0 and ζ1 > ζ2, there exists
yˇH < y`H such that ζ
(
yˇH , b̂− yˇH
)
= 0.
To establish that 0 < yˇH , we will show that ζ
(
0, b̂
)
< 0 which directly implies that there
exists y`H ∈ (0, y`H) such that ζ (y`H , y`H − b̂) = 0. By definition of µ, ζ (b̂, 0) > 0 and as yH
decreases ζ
(
yH , b̂− yH
)
decreases as well. Since
RC
(
0, (1− µ) b̂
)
> RC
(
(1− µ) b̂, (1− µ)
(
1− b̂
))
>
µb̂
(
θqH − ρ∆θ∆q
)
1− δ +
µ
(
1− b̂
)
θqL
1− δ ,
we have
ζ
(
0, b̂
)
=
µb̂θqL
1− δ −R
C
(
0, (1− µ) b̂
)
<
µb̂θqL
1− δ −
µb̂
(
θqH − ρ∆θ∆q
)
1− δ −
µ
(
1− b̂
)
θqL
1− δ < 0.
This finishes the proof that yˇH ∈ (0, y`H) .
Additionally, if θ
(
y`H + y`L
)
> θ then the monopolist moves to
(
y`H , y`L
)
otherwise the
monopolist would move to
(
y`H , 1− y`H) immediately. Therefore, there exists (y`H , y`L) such
that PH
(
yH , yL
)
= θqH , P
L
(
yH , yL
)
= θqLfor y
H ∈ [0, y`H] and for yL ∈ [0, y`L] and
PH
(
yH , yL
)
=
(
θqH − θqL + θqL
)
, PL
(
yH , yL
)
= θqLfor y
H ∈ [0, y`H] and for yL ∈ (y`L, 1].
Moreover, if θ
(
y`H + y`L
) ≥ θ then we have tH (yH , yL) = y`H and tL (yH , yL) = y`L for
yH ∈ [0, y`H] and for yL ∈ [0, y`L]. If θ (y`H + y`L) < θ then we have tH (yH , yL) = y`H and
tL
(
yH , yL
)
= 1 − y`H for yH ∈ [0, y`H] and for all yL. Thus, R (xH , xL) = (y`H − xH) θqH +(
y`L − xL) θqL + δµy`HθqH
1− δ +
δµy`LθqL
1− δ for θ
(
y`H + y`L
) ≥ θ and for yH ∈ [0, y`H], yL ∈ [0, y`L],
whereas R
(
xH , xL
)
=
(
y`H − xH) (θ∆q + θqL) + (1 − y`H − xL) θqL + δµy`H (θ∆q + θqL)
1− δ +
δµ
(
1− y`H) θqL
1− δ for θ
(
y`H + y`L
)
< θ and for yH ∈ [0, y`H], all yL. The pentad is defined by
the Coase Conjecture pentad otherwise.
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Proof of Corollary 12. Consider (y`H , y`L). We set y`Hand y`L such that ζ(y`H , y`L) = 0.
limz→0+ ζ(yH , yL) = limz→0+((
µθqHy
H
1− δ +
µθqLy
L
1− δ ) − ((1 − (1 − µ)y
H)θqH − (1 − µ)yLθqL +
δµθqH
1− δ )) = limz→0+
1
1− δ ((y
HqH + y
LqL)(µθ + (1 − δ)(1 − µ)θ) − ((1 − δ)θqH + δµθqH)).
Therefore, at
(
y`H , y`L
)
we have (y`HqH+y`
LqL) = limz→0+
(1− δ) θqH + δµθqH
µθ + (1− δ) (1− µ) θ =
(λ+ r) θqH
λθ + rθ
.
Since (y`H + y`L)θ > (y`H + y`L
qL
qH
)θ =
(λ+ r) θθ
λθ + rθ
> θ, the seller moves to (y`H , y`L) from the
initial state (0, 0).
Proof of Proposition 9. The functions µ (δ) and µ (δ) are decreasing, with µ (0) = µ (0) =(
1− b̂
)
θ
θ − θ , limδ→1− µ (δ) = 0, and limδ→0+ µ (δ) > 0. Consider µ. We know that µ is derived
from the existence of the Coase Conjecture equilibrium. By definition we have xH0 = 1 − µ,
xH1 = (1 − µ)̂b, xH2 =
b̂θ − θ
θ − θ
qH
(qH − qL) − (1− µ) b̂
qL
(qH − qL) , and x
H
k = (1 − µ)−1(xHk−1 −(
xHk−2 − xHk−1
) θ
ρk−2
(
θ − θ)) + µb̂ qL(qH − qL) . Define ∆k = xHk−1 − xHk . Then it follows that
∆1 = (1 − µ)(1 − b̂), ∆2 = (
(
1− b̂
)
θ − µb̂ (θ − θ)
θ − θ )
qH
qH − qL , ∆k = (1 − (1 − µ)
−1)xHk−1 +
(1 − µ)−1∆k−1 θ
ρk−2
(
θ − θ) − µb̂ qL(qH − qL) . First, we show that limδ→0+ µ (δ) =
(
1− b̂
)
θ
θ − θ .
We set µ so that for all µ ≤ µ, we have ∆k > 0 for k = 1, . . . ,m and there exists m such
that xHm+1 < 0 ≤ xHm holds. As δ → 0, ∆3 increases drastically and so does ∆k for all
k ≥ 3. In this case, we need to make sure that ∆2 is positive. For all µ ≤
(
1− b̂
)
θ
θ − θ , we have
xH2 ≤ xH3 . Therefore, we guarantee that for k = 1, . . . ,m we have ∆k > 0 and m is set such
that xHm+1 < 0 ≤ xHm.
We now claim that limδ→1− µ (δ) > 0. When δ = 1 and µ = 0, for k = 3, . . . ,m + 1, ∆k
is pinned down to ∆k = ∆k−1
θ(
θ − θ) . Hence ∆k = ∆2( θ(θ − θ))k−1 > 0. Let m be such that
xHm+1 < 0 ≤ xHm. Since xHk is a continuous function of µ, it follows that there exists µ′ > 0
such that for all µ ∈ [0, µ′) we have ∆k > 0 and xHm+1 < 0 ≤ xHm.
Finally, we show that µ is a decreasing function of δ. First, we choose µ < µ (δ) so
that ∆k > 0 for all k = 1, . . . ,m + 1. Then we show that ∆k is decreasing in δ which
gives us that ∆k (δ
′) > ∆k (δ) > 0 where δ′ > δ. This implies that µ (δ′) > µ (δ) for
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δ′ > δ. Observe that ∆2 and xH2 are independent of δ and xH3 is increasing in δ. More-
over,
d∆3
dδ
= −∆2
δρ
θ
(1− µ) (θ − θ) < 0. The proof comes from induction. If dx
H
k−1
dδ
> 0 and
d∆k−1
dδ
< −( θ
(1− µ) (θ − θ))k−1 then we prove that dxHkdδ > 0 and d∆kdδ < −( θ(1− µ) (θ − θ))k.
Since ∆k = (1− (1−µ)−1)xHk−1 + (1−µ)−1∆k−1
θ
ρk−2(θ − θ) −µb̂
qL
(qH − qL) ,
d∆k
dδ
< (1− (1−
µ)−1)
dxHk−1
dδ
+ (1− µ)−1d∆k−1
dδ
θ
ρk−2
(
θ − θ) − (k − 2)(1− µ)−1∆k−1 θρk−2 (θ − θ) δ . Moreover,
since (1−(1−µ)−1)dx
H
k−1
dδ
< 0 and (k−2)(1−µ)−1∆k−1 θ
ρk−2(θ − θ)δ > 0, we have
d∆k
dδ
< (1−
µ)−1
d∆k−1
dδ
θ
ρk−2
(
θ − θ) . Due to the assumption on d∆k−1dδ , d∆kdδ < −( θ(1− µ) (θ − θ))k 1ρk−2 <
−( θ
(1− µ) (θ − θ))k since 1ρk−2 > 1. Now, to finish the induction we need to show that
dxHk
dδ
> 0. By definition, we have
dxHk
dδ
= (1− µ)−1(dx
H
k−1
dδ
− d∆k−1
dδ
θ
ρk−2
(
θ − θ) + (k − 2) ∆k−1 θδρk−2 (θ − θ)).
Since
d∆k−1
dδ
< 0 it follows that
dxHk
dδ
> 0. Therefore, we conclude that if µ ≤ µ (δ) then
µ ≤ µ (δ′) for all δ′ < δ, µ is a decreasing function of δ. The same results hold for µ (δ).
Proof of Corollary 13. Trivial.
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